

N: D210/4

**Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia**

Name of interviewee: KHIEU Samphan

Date:.....

Duration: 47 minutes

Interviewed by:

00:00:00-00:16:00

**Questions and Answers**

**A:** ...impossible on Cambodian battlefields. First, in order to understand the military situation, please have a look at the developing situation between December 1979 and January 1981. You may also have observed this situation. For the entire period of more than 13 months, the enemy Yuon Le Duan (ឡៃ យ៉ាន់) came to a standstill and hang their heads down. Standstill in the sense that they cannot defeat the army and the militias of Democratic Kampuchea. You could draw a comparison between the situations in the dry seasons before the 70s and before 1979-1980 and 1980-1981, which are comparable. In the dry season of 1979-1980, from the beginning when it was still in the rainy season the Yuon launched their large-scale invasion. Now we are into mid January 1981. It has been more than two months since the start of dry season. The enemy Yuon, the Le Duan Yuon, have not come up with any military initiative yet. The situation clearly reflects the changing nature of force comparison in which enemy Yuon heads are hanging low. Their forces have become worn down and exhausted, while the Army of Democratic Kampuchea has become increasingly progressive in terms of politics, ideology, and combat quality. This is the military situation on which I wish to brief you. It clearly shows that the Yuon Le Duan is facing a deadlock. The possibility that the enemy Yuon Le Duan will be defeated is clear.

Now I wish to give some examples. As I have said, up until now the enemy Yuon has not come up with any substantial initiatives against us. The initiatives they have taken have been attacked and broken by us. For instance, the battlefield initiatives they have taken were as follows: First, the battlefield along the path from Nimitt (នីមិត្ត) to Au Srâlau (អូរស្រ្តឡៅ). Nimitt is along National Road Number 5. I wish to tell you that in November we attacked and smashed the Au Châm Bâk (អូរចំប៉ាក់) position situated along the road. In early December, forces were mobilized in an attempt to attack and seize the Au Châm Bâk position and to push us to leave the place. I wish to tell you that they arrived in December. However, not until early January did they move in along Road Number 5. We attacked them for only one week and they retreated from the battlefield. They left in early January. And they withdrew not only their reinforcements, but also their Au Srâlau positions.

**Q:** What is the size of their force?

**A:** The Au Srâlau position was a regimental position.

**Q:** How far is it from Au Châm Bâk to Au Srâlau?

**A:** Not far. The distance is about 2 kilometers. Au Châm Bâk was a company position. The Au Srâlau position was a regimental position. This is a battle which we managed to win quickly, which is different from the dry season of 1979-1980. Yesterday, we

fought at Rang Mountain (ភ្នំរាំង), east of Malai Mountain (ភ្នំម៉ាលីយ៉ា). We used DK-75 guns in the fighting. This is a reflection of a newly-developing situation. Previously we could not use such types of heavy guns because they would come to surround us. But now they do not dare to do so. This is a changing situation on the battlefields, which I wish to tell you. We, our principle is to fight ...

**Q:** How about yesterday? He asked whether yesterday they did not dare?

**A:** Yesterday, they were not able to counter us. They held on within their positions. Our principle is that attacking and wearing them down for a while like this will force them to flee. Constantly attack and wear them down, attack and cut their transportation routes... As in the case of Au Srâlau position, we spent considerable period of time to attack and wear them down. We froze them in position until they became exhausted and worn down, and after a while they had to withdraw. Another example is the Ta Kong (តាកុង) battlefield to the southwest. They assembled a force of three regiments.

0:16-0:32

**Q:** Since when?

**A:** About the same time as the Au Srâlau battlefield in early December. But it was not until early January that they begin the attack during which they managed to push 8 kilometers beyond Ta Kong. We counterattacked them from both the front and the rear for only one week, and they retreated. Now the fighting is still going on in the area surrounding Ta Kong. However, they have retreated from where they previously penetrated, 8 kilometers beyond Ta Kong. This is also an indication that they can be defeated quickly. As for Thma Puok (ថ្មពួក), they mobilized their forces in early December and sent the combined forces from three regiments to the area. Thma Puok is north of Sisophon (ស៊ីសុផុន). It is a battlefield. Since early December up until now these forces have not started any attack and some of their forces have been withdrawn from the area. We are monitoring them. We don't know to where this force has withdrawn. It is possible that the force will be sent to Ta Kong as reinforcements, because their forces there have been suffered heavy losses, or they might pull back to Siem Reap because we have also increased our operations in Siem Reap. We fought along Road Number 6, in the areas in the east of Siem Reap, in the Angkor compound, and along the road from Angkor to Banteay Srei (បន្ទាយស្រី). We fought along the road. Some of these examples show that during this dry season the enemy Yuon have not made any substantial initiatives and they are off-balance. They sent their forces to areas including Koh Kong (កោះកុង) to the west, the Cardamom Mountains (ភ្នំក្រវាញ) battlefield, Road Number 10, Pailin (ប៉ៃលិន), these two battlefields and the Thma Puok battlefield.

**Q:** According to what we know, how many divisions do we have to the west?

**A:** About eight.

**Q:** How many troops?

**A:** The total number is perhaps 80,000 troops altogether, but that does not mean that all 80,000 troops are all combat forces. The examples about the situation that I have just briefed you indicate that the enemy Yuon are hanging their heads down on the battlefield. They have been hanging their heads down for more than 13 months, since December 1979.

- Q:** Do you mean that since the start of the dry season the Yuon have not sent additional forces to the Thai border?
- A:** They have sent additional forces. However, these are not the strong forces. Why do I say like this? Because their veteran forces, their veteran soldiers who are their core forces, have been worn down for two years, both in number and morale. The new forces which have just been added consist of young people, most of whom are students who do not have combat experience and who are not very daring in combat. In Samlout (សំឡូត), after about ten days they started coming over to us; ten of them came over to us, however one was shot dead by their side. The second time, they shot when ... The second time, another six came to our side; all of them were young.
- Q:** When?
- A:** In November.
- Q:** And since then, how many more have come to our side?
- A:** There have been subsequent surrenders on various battlefields, but I cannot remember the number. And they fled from Samlout battlefield and escaped to Vietnam. I give you an example in which six young soldiers managed to run to Takeo (តាកែវ) province and were surrounded and arrested by Yuon soldiers there in Takeo. The six soldiers pulled out grenades and said that their whole division at Samlout was gone and that only six of them survived. They threatened to set off the grenades if they were arrested. The soldiers there did not dare to move in to arrest them. In fact, it is not true that the entire division perished. They just said so because they had had it up to their necks.
- Q:** Do you have the total figure of the Yuon who have surrendered to us and who are still in our control since the war started?
- A:** The number is in the thousands.
- Q:** Where do you keep them all?
- A:** Our policy is that we treat them according to their requests. Sometimes they want to go back to Vietnam. We set them free at the Thai border.
- Q:** Do we still have prisoners of war in our hands now?
- A:** No. It is difficult to keep them because and if we keep them inactive too long at one place they die of fever.

00:32:00-00:47:00

And I would like to tell you that enemy Yuon forces have suffered losses in combat on the one hand, but also they have died of fever while fixed in their positions and surrounded.

- Q:** Have you captured any, or helped with medical treatment?
- A:** When the enemy Yuon first arrived, we saw many European bodies. But now there are fewer than before ...
- Q:** Approximately how many?
- A:** Yes?
- Q:** Approximately how many?
- A:** I did not added them up. That was at the time when the Yuon first arrived. It was since the 1970s, but they are rarely seen now. At that time we fought in ... in the area around here. At that time Soviet advisors came to Phnom Penh and from Phnom Penh they went to... Two were killed and 40 were injured when their truck overturned.
- Q:** When?
- A:** In October. But besides that, they are rarely seen. Now I would like to get back to the topic of the military situation of the enemy Yuon. It is seen that their situation is one

in which their heads are hanging low. Their heads are hanging low, and they are being worn down in terms of both their life force and their positions. And as for the army and the militias of Democratic Kampuchea, first we have increased guerrilla attacks throughout the country — guerrilla warfare along main national roads and in provincial centers all the way to Phnom Penh and Cambodia's eastern border. That's first. Second, we are capable. Our Democratic Kampuchea army and militias have the capabilities to attack platoon and company positions. No, not platoons, that is ... I want to present examples of some battlefields where we have carried out attacks in this way. I have just mentioned the battlefields on which we have fought. A moment ago I told you about the battlefield along the Nimitt to Au Srâlau trail when we attacked and smashed the Au Châm Bâk positions and we kept on attacking until the Yuon forced themselves to withdraw from the Au Srâlau positions. Not Au Châm Bâk, but the Châm Bâk Camp.

**Q:** Is Au Srâlau under our control now?

**A:** There are no more enemy Yuon at Au Srâlau. I give you another example. In Samlout, previously there was a position in the district center to the south of Road Number 10. Previously, they had their positions were in west of Samlout.

**Q:** Which part of Samlout?

**A:** In the west. To the east of Ta Sanh (តាសាញ) and to the south, now we have completely swept all these positions clean. They have only one position left in the district center of Samlout, and now this position is surrounded by us and have are fighting to cut the transportation route from Samlout to Road Number 10. Therefore, the situation on the Samlout battlefield is causing the enemy Yuon difficulties. They sent in reinforcements of three regiments via Road Number 10 to Pailin because we were attacking both...

**Q:** When?

**A:** In early December because we have been attacking on both battlefields, in Pailin and in Samlout. But now they are gathering their forces to this area to protect this road. It means they are struggling to defend Samlout and are abandoning the defense of Pailin or vice versa.

**Q:** How many Yuon troops are there in Pailin?

**A:** One division. I would like to give example of another battlefield, the Chhèt (ឃ្នែត) battlefield in Preah Vihear (ព្រះវិហារ). We have swept clean their positions around Chhèt and we have fought along the road from the river bank west of Stung Treng (ស្ទឹងត្រែង) because this road is one of their important transportation links. Down this road along Road Number 19 from Vietnam from Yuon Military Region 5 down to Road Number 5...

**Q:** What number?

**A:** 5.

**Q:** Aside from this, we have attacked the roads which link Chhèt with Laos and Chhèt with Choam Khsant (ជាំក្សាន្ត) in Preah Vihear. Thus, the combat qualities of the army and militias of Democratic Kampuchea are high. In general, we use guerrilla warfare. We have attacked their platoon and company positions These are some of the battlefields about which I have told you. Besides these, there are also the Koh Kong battlefield, the battlefield along the road from Leach (លាច) to the west extending to

southwestern Cambodia, and there is also activity along Road Number 12 to Road Number 16.

**End of Tape 5 (A)**

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Name of interviewee: KHIEU Samphan

Date:.....

Duration: 47 minutes

Interviewed by:

### Questions and Answers

0:00-0:16

**Q:** Is SON Sen in that province because it is a logistics base of the Yuon, or what exactly?

**A:** They have an important headquarters installation there in charge of the Preah Vihear battlefield. Previously, they deployed troops along the Mekong River to prevent us from crossing back and forth from Ratanakiri (រតនគីរី) to this side and from this side to Mondulkiri (មណ្ឌលគីរី) and along the road from Mondulkiri to ... But when we strongly attacked at Chhèt, they had to withdraw those troops to reinforce. Therefore, we were alarmed (not heard clearly).

**Q:** Has your army occupied major cities? Or is it your strategy that you do not want not to occupy major cities?

**A:** Our strategy focuses mainly on damaging the life force of the enemy. We keep on smashing them for a period of time until they have to choose between concentrating forces to protect their forces or scattering forces to occupy territory because... That our army has the capabilities to attack their platoon and company positions has an important strategic meaning. It means the Yuon cannot deploy small forces. If they do deploy small forces, we will smash them one by one. If they concentrate large forces to protect their forces, they will have to abandon territory. This is the emerging direction. And let me, let me tell you that this is the emerging direction. Because our armed forces have attacked their major positions, the Yuon have had to concentrate their forces to defend the positions. Meanwhile, people have chase down and kill four to ten Yuon in the villages. Militiamen who are currently armed and who appear to serve the Yuon will become a force to chase down and shoot the Yuon. This is the situation, the developing direction that makes it hard for them.

**Q:** How do you know the militiamen will come to the people's side? Do we have undercover agents, or what exactly?

**A:** We know this because we can contact them and have daily cooperation with them. They hide our comrades. They hide our militiamen. Nowadays, the Yuon are beginning new suppression operations along Road Number 7. They carry out activities in the central zone, in the north part of Kampong Cham (កំពង់ចាម). They carry out suppression activities in Kampong Chhnang (កំពង់ឆ្នាំង) and in Kampong Speu (កំពង់ស្ពឺ). When they were militiamen, they had the duty to guide the Yuon. They told our comrades to stay in one place. They guided us to that place; and the they guided the Yuon to another place. And this allowed us to attack the Yuon from the rear. That's why we were able to stay in Memot. So then, I have just mentioned the military situation and I have also touched upon some of the political situation. This reflects the political situation.

**Q:** Do you mean that the Yuon will be conducting suppression operations from now on, to the finish, or what exactly? (inaudible)

**A:** We must monitor the situation constantly. There is high possibility of a large Yuon strike. The possibility is less likely than it was during the dry season of 1979-1980. I went into the political situation somewhat a moment ago because the military situation gives impetus to the political situation. That our army has attacked their platoon and company positions strongly raises the morale of the people, and this good situation boosts the military situation. As I have mentioned, on the battlefields ... for a while that the enemy Yuon has had to concentrate their forces to protect their forces in the their installations, and people have chased down the Yuon authorities.

**Q:** Approximately how long from now do people say the Yuon will take control of the villages?

**A:** We cannot tell you right now. However, we see things moving in that direction.

**Q:** It's easier to put in writing than in saying. Three years, four years or five years?

**A:** I can tell you that the important Yuon forces have been concentrated along the border in front of Kampuchea.

0:16-0:32

They concentrate their forces there. Sometime when the interior is hollow, when their forces along the western border break, the situation will change quickly. But as for when, we cannot say, but that's how we see the direction. Then, our forces will multiply in size two times, three times, four times, or five times. The struggle for national liberation is like this in all countries. Now the political situation regarding the people, as you may know, is as has been mentioned. The morale of the people and the morale of the militias have also been mentioned. There are no more worries about the people supporting the Yuon. No matter what they do, the Yuon cannot snatch Cambodian people from us. But now, what is the attitude of people towards Democratic Kampuchea? At the beginning, previously, in the year ... in mid 1980, there were still some people asking us whether we were implementing a United Front policy program? What would we do after we pushed the Yuon out of the country? They guided our army and militia to attack the Yuon, and during free time they raised these questions.

Now these questions are rarely asked because they are increasingly warm and confident in Democratic Kampuchea and the Great United Front because they can see our daily activities. First, Democratic Kampuchea fights against the Yuon and has the capability to attack the Yuon. They have suffered from the Yuon genocidal war of aggression. Consequently, they see Democratic Kampuchea as the only thing they can rely upon. Besides, Democratic Kampuchea and the Great United Front follow the Great United Front policy program. If they accept the supporters of Democratic Kampuchea during the three-year period, they also accept Great Solidarity Front policy program. For those who opposed the cooperatives during the three-year period, now they are also satisfied with the political program. This is the situation among the people. Apart from these situations, other groups, various other separate armed factions have also joined the Democratic Great United Front.

**Q:** Which faction chiefs want to join us?

**A:** There have not been any chiefs from major factions yet. However, there have been from small groups, intermediate groups.

**Q:** Are there any of these people from any special movement? Are there any from SON Sann...from SON Sann's faction or from any faction?

**A:** Yes, there are. There are people from Moulinaka (មូលីណាកាវ), the so-called Sēreika (ស៊ែរីកា). Not ...

**Q:** How many? Approximately how many?

- A:** They have joined one after another, 100 at a time, 50 at a time. By now there may be thousands of them.
- Q:** Beginning when?
- A:** This has occurred successively. In 1980, there were thousands.
- Q:** How many?
- A:** More than 1,000 in total. Let me tell you, like in Thma Puok, where our combat forces include 600 forces from various groups who are fighting along with us. They have joined our forces. They have been joining us successively since late 1979. And this also has occurred in other places, for example in the mountainous areas, the southern Sisophon battlefield, the battlefields in Pursat (ព្រៃពិសាត់) and in Leach. And besides this, Cambodian people who live abroad are increasingly contributing to Cambodian people's struggle movement under the leadership of ... For example...
- Q:** How? How do they help contribute?
- A:** They have contributed in the form of issuing statements, coordinating support, and organizing meetings in the countries they are living. For instance, almost all Cambodian people in Canada and in Montreal in particular have carried out various activities in support of the Great United Front. As you may know, this is also the case with Cambodian people living in America...in Japan. They also have such activities. And a situation which reflects the political progress regarding the stance of Cambodian people overseas is in France.

0:32-0:47

- A:** Currently, there are growing numbers of Cambodian people living in France who have political tendencies. Now these tendencies and these movements have jointly established a committee known as Committee for National Solidarity Promotion. The committee has sent me a letter written by Professor TĂN Bunsâ (តាន់ ប៊ុនសាវ). Mr. TĂN Bunsâ was a professor at the University of Science in Phnom Penh before the coup in 1970. I could read his letter to you.  
(*The interpreter read Professor TĂN Bunsâ's letter to Mr. KHIEU Samphan in English.*)
- A:** To conclude, the political situation underwent significant changes in the whole 1980 among the mass Cambodian population of all classes. The situation on the international arena is also moving in the right direction. The Yuon Le Duan is isolated, completely isolated. The Front which supports the cause of Cambodian people's struggle is expanding in size and in strength. In this regards, ASEAN member countries play the most active role and countries like Yugoslavia, Japan, West Germany play the roles according to the situations in their respective countries. Now there is an appeal for the convening of an international conference aiming at obliging the Yuon to withdraw as required by the UN General Assembly's resolution. ASEAN member countries has called for an immediate meeting and Japan's first minister Sizuki (ស៊ីស៊ុក្កី) supports KHIEU Samphan and many other countries also support KHIEU Samphan. This is the situation and the right stance. The world is working together to press Yuon to abide by the UN resolution by withdrawing its troops from Cambodia. Therefore, this is a good situation. Of course, currently in the world there are still some opinions which are not in favor of Democratic Kampuchea and which has yet clear stance. However, I hope that these opinions will examine the practical situation more carefully. I hope the countries with these opinions will see whether what is done in favor of Democratic Kampuchea, a major force fighting hard battles against the Yuon, is advantageous or disadvantageous to the maintaining of peace and



security. There are still some opinions which oppose Democratic Kampuchea. However, the world's common tendency has already understood that the Democratic Kampuchea's forces are fighting against the Yuon to defend the nation and to contribute to the maintaining of peace in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there are some opinions which intend to reject Democratic Kampuchea. We hope that the countries with these opinions will reconsider if there were no Democratic forces fighting against the Yuon on the battles, what would happen? I want to ask whether it's a benefit or a loss to us the people in Cambodia, the people in Southeast Asia, and the world at large. It's the opinion I wish to share.

In conclusion, the situation of our Cambodian people's struggle is making good progress both militarily and politically. The Cambodian people must continue their hard work. The different forces that love peace, independence and justice in the world must also unite with each other.

**End of Tape 5 (B)**

**Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia**

Name of interviewee: KHIEU Samphan

Date:.....

Duration: Slide A 0:00-0:46 and Slide B 0:00-0:23 minutes

Interviewed by: Stephen Heder (ស្ទីវ ហេដឌឺរ)

**Slide A:**

- Q:** First, I ask about Samdech Sihanouk (សម្តេចសីហនុ). Up until now, Samdech Sihanouk has refused to cooperate with Democratic Kampuchea. Whenever the Chinese government or the US government persuades him to cooperate, he declares that he has retired from politics. Meanwhile, he still demands that Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations be left unoccupied. Can you explain to me why he does so?
- A:** I would like to choose not to make comments about the reasons regarding the issue of Samdech Sihanouk. I only wish to confirm that our group always welcomes him because for us we do not have any problem. We do not have any problem besides the issue of the Cambodian nation. This is the first point. Second, if Democratic Kampuchea's seat is left vacant, who will benefit from this? Only the Yuon invader will benefit from it. It will not benefit the Cambodian people. It will not benefit the Cambodian nation.
- Q:** Do you mean that if he does so, it is a loss? It is a loss to Cambodian people and to the struggle of Cambodian people?
- A:** Yes, because if he does so, it will benefit the Yuon.
- Q:** And as for SON Sann (ស៊ីន សាន), he is also the same. The difference is that SON Sann, as far as I know, has not demanded that the seat be left vacant?
- A:** Yes.
- Q:** But he still refuses to come into cooperation with each other?
- A:** Yes. H.E. SON Sann has declared to fight the Yuon and he agrees to prevent both armed forces from clashing with each other. We try our best to avoid clashing with each other. This is the right stance, and we welcome that although he has not joined the Great United Front and has not cooperated with each other. For our work of the Great United Front, we have made rapid progress in villages, communes, and districts. The people who are direct victims of the enemy Yuon support whoever fights against the Yuon.
- Q:** In practical terms, how do they support you?
- A:** They support us in the forms of helping hide our troops, helping guide our troops, carrying out fighting activities to destroy the Yuon whenever it is possible, attacking the Yuon secretly, and trying to destroy the Yuon by all means.
- Q:** Have they supported you in the form of ammunition?
- A:** No. Basically, people have seized weapons from the Yuon when they attacked the Yuon. However, their weapon seizure is not huge. The important point is that the act of attacking the Yuon secretly and destroying the Yuon is carried out by people in general, the militia and local authorities.
- Q:** Recently, both Mr. SON Sann and King Sihanouk have gone to Beijing. There in Beijing, have they had any new communication with Democratic Kampuchea's embassy in Beijing?

- A:** Mr. SON Sann's trip to Beijing is unknown to us. However, Samdech Sihanouk's trip to Beijing is normal. In my opinion, his trips in and out of Beijing are normal.
- Q:** So according to the information you have, up until now they have not contacted ...their trips have not shown any political implication yet?
- A:** Not shown any implication yet related to what is called real unity.
- Q:** During his trip to America, King Sihanouk delivered a speech in March. Recently, there has been a release of a magazine in which there is an article written by him. Based on my judgment regarding the speech and the article, I think King Sihanouk's stance on the issue is that he will participate in the cooperation only when his three conditions are met. In my opinion, first he wants his government or movement to receive international recognition as much as yours. Second, he wants to have his own army with its own channel of aid from abroad. Third, he wants to have his own authorities or authority movements. And as far as I know, Mr. SON Sann also has similar preference. Nonetheless, I think first it depends on whether China, America and Thailand agree or not. It is also the case with the second point. Third, it depends on the country's domestic situation and on whether your group agrees to let them have their own separate authorities. Regarding this issue, I think there are possibilities that the three conditions are met.
- A:** Regarding the idea of establishing the armed force, we do not oppose it. If Samdech Sihanouk can establish the army to fight against the Yuon, I will be even happier.
- Q:** Even if the army is a separate force and under a separate command?
- A:** Yes. I always welcome. I always welcome the forces intending to fight the Yuon. However, regarding the forming of a new government, I do not see it as advantageous to this cause of struggle. When I say like this, it does not mean that I think about the benefits for Democratic Kampuchea or for myself. Instead, I think about the benefits to the cause of struggle against the Yuon. It benefits our nation and our people because Democratic Kampuchea is a sovereign state recognized by the world by the United Nations, and the Yuon invasion of Democratic Kampuchea is a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. It is on this point that the world opposes and disagrees with the Yuon because they see the Yuon activities as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Speaking from a legal point of view, the Yuon are wrong when they violate of the Charter of the United Nations. The Yuon are guilty and have committed a serious mistake. If there is the formation of another new government, it will put the country in a chaotic situation. It will split the world's force in which our allied countries adhere to the anti-invasion principle. The world adheres to the anti-invasion principle, and they recognize Democratic Kampuchea because they adhere to this principle, the anti-invasion principle. If there is the formation of another new government, it will cause difficulties to our allied countries in the world. It will not give any benefit. Instead, it will split the support and it will pave the way for the Yuon to ... and then everything will be in chaos. This is the first point. Second, if anything is done to obstruct Democratic Kampuchea, it obstructs the force that is fighting against the Yuon in a practical sense. To sum up, it will not benefit the nation and the people, but the Yuon. That is the reason why I think that the formation of another new government will not benefit the cause of our struggle. It will not benefit the nation and the people. We should cooperate with each other to push the Yuon out of the country. After that, various problems could be solved through an election. When the Yuon have withdrawn all their army out of the country, we will hold an election. We will let the people judge. When the people vote for any faction, we respect their decisions. I think only when we follow this path will it benefit all; the nation, the people, and each faction could maintain their respective viewpoints and

stances. Everything depends on the people's judgment. To ensure that the election is fair, we could invite the Secretary General of the United Nations or his representative and there must be adequate numbers of United Nations' staff to monitor the election. I see this as the only way which can deal with the united forces and all the democratic national patriotic forces that are fighting against the Yuon. We could still maintain our conflicting ideas and let them be solved through the people's judgment. One more thing is that when we join hands to fight against the Yuon, we will understand each other gradually. However, let everything be judged and decided by the people. I find this as the only right solution.

**Q:** In my opinion, King Sihanouk, as an individual or a representative of a social regime, still maintain his popularity among the mass population.

**A:** I choose not to give any comment regarding this opinion.

**Q:** How about Mr. SON Sann?

**A:** I also do not want to comment about Mr. SON Sann. The practical issue is that all of us should cooperate with each other to push the Yuon out of the country. After that, when the people support anyone, that person will take the responsibility to lead Cambodia into the future.

**Q:** Suppose that the country has been liberated, it will be possible that war will take place if King Sihanouk has his own separate army or Mr. SON Sann has his own separate army. There might be civil war between Democratic Kampuchea's army and King Sihanouk's army. If it is possible to prevent such a war, how should we prevent it? What measures should be taken to prevent possible conflicts?

**A:** To deal with this issue, the policy program of the United Front first states that an election shall be held following the Yuon withdrawal. Second, all factions can establish political parties. There shall be newspaper, and the parliamentary system shall be adopted. Why? So that all parties, whether they win or lose in the election, can pursue their views based on their individual perceptions and present their views to the people so that the people will judge. I think this is the only correct solution.

**Q:** Based on the current situation, are soldiers breaking away from the armies of Samdech Sihanouk or SON Sann to join Democratic Kampuchea? And if there are, are they coming in large numbers or small numbers or what?

**A:** We only would like to tell you that there are soldiers from separate groups, separate armed groups.

**Q:** By separate groups you mean they are not Democratic Kampuchea's army, correct?

**A:** Yes, they are not from the Democratic Kampuchea army.

**Q:** Regarding the second issue, I think nowadays the trend in humanitarian aid is that aid will decrease or be cut off in the future. I believe that in the future the amount of aid will be smaller than that received nowadays. Concerning this issue, has the Democratic Kampuchea come up with any solution to this problem?

0:16-0:32

**A:** I think that the collective aid donated by the entire world to Cambodian people is an enormous amount. Based on that huge amount, it can save the lives of many Cambodian people. Nevertheless, some of the aid sent to the Yuon in Phnom Penh has not reached Cambodian people's hands, which makes donors disappointed. The donors do not feel happy. As a result, if they feel disappointed, the aid in the future, as you have mentioned, may decrease. If it decreases, Cambodian people's lives will be affected, since the people cannot cultivate rice in areas under the Yuon occupation. The people cannot cultivate rice. The Yuon allow the cultivation of rice in some areas along the roads to give a false view to foreign guests who are brought to visit the areas. However, in reality people in the country cannot do cultivation. The Yuon have

carried out their destructive activities in the form of a war of genocide and depriving people of food so that they will starve to death because they know that the people are the source of manpower for the militia and guerrilla warfare of Democratic Kampuchea. They know about this because they have experiences in warfare. As for the areas under our control, we lead people to cultivate rice through small militia means. If the Yuon comes to destroy these areas, we still have other areas. However, they have a systematic destructive plan. They cannot enter our area, but they gather their forces to destroy other places where considerable cultivation activities are seen. After they have completely destroyed a place, they leave the area. Therefore, cultivation is a fight, a war, guerrilla warfare. However, cultivation on a small scale is difficult and insufficient to support people's health. You'll see that if you go to visit villages. As I have mentioned, the Yuon cannot cause any harm to us militarily, but they kill the people. For this reason, I would like the world to see this issue and offer support to our people by pressing the Yuon to abide by the resolution of the 34<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of the United Nations and to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. If countries in the world including the United States of America, Western Europe and Western countries jointly press and press the Yuon, they cannot prolong their stay. On the one hand they are getting bogged down on the battlefield, and on the other hand the world including the United States, Western Europe, ASEAN, and Japan jointly pressure them. The Yuon, for sure, cannot prolong their stay. If the world does so, it will greatly help our Cambodian people and it will contribute to the maintaining of security and peace in Southeast Asia. If the Yuon withdraw their troops from the border and back to their country, Cambodia, an independent, neutral and non-aligned state, will act as a buffer zone preventing the Yuon troops from establishing their bases at the Thai border, the Thai-Cambodian border, the Lao-Cambodian border from where they can secretly carry out their provocative acts in Southeast Asia. This is in the common interest of the West who supports us. As mentioned, an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia will become a buffer zone resisting the Yuon invasion and expansionist strategies. But, in order for an independent, neutral Cambodia to exist, there must be forces fighting the Yuon to force them to withdraw. The force is Democratic Kampuchea's. It is the major force currently fighting against the Yuon and it will safeguard Cambodia's independence and neutrality in the future. Therefore, though people may be happy or unhappy with Democratic Kampuchea about this point or that point, they must, for the sake of common interests, support Democratic Kampuchea and the Cambodian people who are resisting the Yuon. For us, we firmly stand by the western United Front in order to resist the Yuon invasion and expansionist strategies.

**Q:** Concerning the issue of humanitarian aid, if the aid is cut back or cut off, will the Democratic Kampuchean government have any plan to appeal to Western countries to offer direct assistance on a state-to-state basis?

**A:** We welcome all means of assistance. If there is the direct assistance to the Democratic Kampuchea, we feel even happier. This is the only mean that the aid will reach the people. As Cambodian nationals, we share the suffering with the Cambodian people and we are responsible for the lives of the Cambodian people. Unlike the Yuon, we cannot starve the people to death. In contrast, if the aid is offered through the Yuon, how could they distribute the aid to the Cambodian people while they are here to kill the Cambodian people? This is my request not to send the aid through the Yuon. If aid is not sent through the Yuon, then how should aid be distributed? The United Nations may assign its staff to come to distribute the aid without allowing the involvement of the parties concerned. The United Nations can dispatch its staff to distribute the aid

directly to the people, but please do not send the aid through the Yuon. The staff are dispatched to distribute the aid to people everywhere across throughout the country.

**Q:** Why is your position now completely different from before is it not?

**A:** Not different. From the beginning, we have always appealed to international organizations to come to distribute...

**Q:** Speaking of the period 1975-1978? Different?

**A:** From 1975 to 1978, there were no cases of people who died from starvation as in the period under Yuon occupation. Bertsman Elizabeth Beker (ប៊ែតស្មាន អេលីហ្សាបេត ប៊ែកកី) also witnessed this. There were no cases of people who died from starvation.

**Q:** So the situations are different?

**A:** The situations are very different, like the distance between the sky and the earth. Nonetheless, as I already mentioned this morning, what channel will allow Cambodia to subsist? We have already tried the Soviet channel, but we did not obtain any fruitful result. Cambodia could not subsist through that channel. In stead, it became worst. As mentioned this morning, the 1975-1978 channel was not successful because the Yuon Communist Party was active. Today...although today they may withdraw from Cambodia, they will come back again in the future when they have the opportunity. For this reason, there is only one channel, the United Front policy program, and we stand by the western United Front.

**Q:** Third, ASEAN has recently issued a statement appealing for an establishment of a demilitarized zone along the border in Cambodia. What is Democratic Kampuchea's position regarding the statement?

**A:** As far as I know, the statement issued by ASEAN member countries aims at rejecting the Vientiane proposal. We support this opposition. We support ASEAN's stance in opposing the proposal made during the so-called Vientiane Meeting. ASEAN's stance is right and bright because actually the meeting in Vientiane is simply a [false] image. As you have already known, the coalition of Vietnam-Soviet commanders in Moscow are the ones who give the order. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong (ឆាំ វ៉ាន់ដុង), Vo Nguyen Giap (វ៉ូ ឡឺនយ៉ាប) have gone to Moscow and have stayed there for quite a long time.

They have given their order from there. All decisions are made by the commanders in Moscow. Their maneuver is first to push the resisting forces of Democratic Kampuchea and the Cambodia People's United Front to the dead end. This is their main target. Second, they legitimize their rule of the Indo-Chinese Federation through the convening of a meeting in Vientiane between the Yuon and the two puppets—the Phnom Penh puppet and the Vientiane puppet. Third, they intend to legitimize the Yuon invasion. Fourth, they intend to legitimize Le Duan. For these reasons, we think that ASEAN's stance which rejects the propaganda is right, and we wholly support this stance.

**Q:** When you gave your earlier answers, I thought ... I mistakenly thought ASEAN's proposal is far better than that of Vientiane. However,...

**A:** ASEAN's proposal is different from that of Vientiane in terms of context, image, assignment and protocol. The image of their proposal is to encourage others and ASEAN to recognize the Indo-Chinese Federation and HENG Samrin (ហេង សំរិន), to recognize their invasion, and to isolate Democratic Kampuchea. Therefore, this is contradictory to ASEAN's secret stance, and ASEAN, as far as I know, does not agree on this issue.

**Q:** If ASEAN's proposal could be implemented, will Democratic Kampuchea lose anything or not?

**A:** We from Southeast Asia propose for a safe zone inside Cambodia's territory so that people can come to receive the international aid in the zone. People from every places come to the safe zone. We agree with this idea.

**Q:** Since the morning, you have talked about the Yuon tricks in the process of meetings at the United Nations and you have talked particularly about the diplomatic strategies. Based on your estimation, I want to ask you whether it is possible in the upcoming future that Yuon will have any plan of action or political, economic and military strategies? If they have, what will they do?

**A:** As you may have observed, Yuon policy has subsequently opposed ASEAN. Their stance is to oppose ASEAN. They considered [ASEAN] as reactionary and imperialist forces, and they, the socialist, must fight against the imperialist force.

**Q:** If...

**A:** But in the face of their deadlock on the battlefield in Cambodia, they have used their tricky plans one after another since late February, April, May with Heryobin (ហេរីយ៉ូប៊ិន) going around to Southeast Asian countries. Later on, Heryobin Pham Van Dong, and the Cuban foreign minister all went to India one after another. This is a smiling diplomatic maneuver. After that, Thach (ថាច់) came to visit some Southeast Asian countries and Bangkok. This is a smiling diplomatic maneuver. Nonetheless, these maneuvers were doomed to failure, since the ASEAN countries opposed the plans. Now their military situation during this rainy season is becoming worse and worse.

0:32-0:46

For this reason, they have to work harder on their tricky plans. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap went to Moscow to find the way out through diplomatic means. Then, they would work out their maneuvers. I think that their effort to carry out activities along the Thai-Cambodian border is a maneuver and is psychological warfare. Importantly, it's psychological warfare to serve their diplomatic maneuvers to project an image that they are still strong, that they control the entire country, and that they are at the Thai border. All these are planned and organized before the General Assembly of the United Nations to serve their tricky purpose, that is to have Democratic Kampuchea's seat unoccupied, while in fact they are facing a deadlock on all battlefields in Cambodia. I do not know if you have met my Defense Minister?

**Q:** Not yet. What if?

**A:** When you meet him, he'll tell you more about the practical situation. Second, like the Vientiane Meeting, all are their subsequent maneuvers aimed at serving their goal of having Democratic Kampuchea's seat unoccupied.

**Q:** As far as the internal maneuvers and domestic politics are concerned, could you estimate what the Yuon have been doing in Phnom Penh before the meeting at the United Nations?

**A:** They are making their effort, but I could not tell you what effort they are making. However, whatever they do or whatever tricky plan they have, they are still plunging down militarily in the battles. I firmly believe that the world know the Yuon clearly. They know how tricky the Yuon have been when the past negotiations and promises of the Yuon are concerned. For sure, the world cannot believe these maneuvers. I hope and believe that the world will not be cheated by the maneuvers of the Yuon or the Soviets.

- Q:** There have been rumors about an election, about the reshuffling of the Cabinet of Ministers, and about the announcement of a new communist party. Are the rumors true?
- A:** They have long announced about the election, but they cannot organize it.
- Q:** Why can't they organize it?
- A:** It's because of the practical situations. First, they are not the owner of Cambodia. They are facing deadlock on all battlefields. Two hundred fifty thousand Yuon troops (250,000) are facing deadlock in all battlefields. Second, the Cambodian people oppose them. These are the reasons why they cannot work out their tricky plans.
- Q:** Regarding the expansion of government and Cabinet of Ministers, is that the same?
- A:** Expand what? Who will participate with them?
- Q:** There are no participants, right?
- A:** They cannot expand their government. In contrast, the puppet government has become eroded gradually since its members are deserting it.
- Q:** What about the announcement of the new communist party?
- A:** They also have the same problems because, as I have mentioned, the contemptible HENG Samrin and his cliques have few members. They do not have any roots in the Cambodian society. They are different from LON Nol.
- Q:** Are they weaker than LON Nol?
- A:** LON Nol in the 1970s... Yes, they are far weaker. LON Nol in the 1970s and in the later periods still maintained roots in the Cambodian society, had systematic structure of government, and had LON Nol's army. Those government and army were in existence, though they eroded gradually. On the contrary, HENG Samrin has only himself and few people who have been installed to power by the Yuon. There is no one else except Yuon army. The Yuon decide everything.
- Q:** There is another issue. Recently, the Yuon have made a new accusation of the transportation of ammunition via Thailand to Cambodia. In truth everyone knows about this. There is undeniable evidence...
- A:** There is none.
- Q:** If they completely deny...
- A:** I want to confirm that it is not true. The Thai government has maintained a neutral stance regarding this issue.
- Q:** Will it be better if they do not maintain a neutral stance?
- A:** But the Thai government maintains a neutral stance, and I respect this.
- Q:** Since the morning you have talked about battlefields in Cambodian territory. I would like to ask you what battles have taken place recently or which battlefields have become hotter? And why have those battles taken place or become hotter?
- A:** As I have mentioned, the battlefields where there are intense fighting are those from Koh Kong, and some in the central zone, in Ratanakiri, and in Mondulhiri.
- Q:** And what about...?
- A:** First, on these battlefields our fighting has become more effective since we are more familiar and get more experiences in guerrilla warfare against the Yuon. Second, we can carry out fighting activities deeper and deeper into the interior areas, and at the same time we can fight more actively along main roads such as National Road Number 5, National Road Number 6, the railroad, and in some towns.
- Q:** How about in the eastern and southwestern parts?
- A:** In the eastern and southwestern parts, there are militia activities. If compared with the activities here, they are not the same as the activities here. However, there has been some progress because the United Front, as I have said, has organized and strengthened and expanded in all villages, communes and districts. These are the



reasons why the fighting activities against the Yuon through militia attacks have become better and better. Other places are also the same. In the eastern part, we have our force operating militia activities to the north of Road Number 7 in the areas of Tromoung and Memot. In that eastern part, we carry out the least activities. We only have a secret militia base there.

**Q:** In...

**A:** The east

**Q:** In...

**A:** In the eastern part. The important thing, as I have said, is that my army has strengthened and expanded systematically in all sectors. First, communication through communication radios and footpaths have been made available in all military units. Second, we have gained better fighting experiences. We use three combat strategies—cutting off transportation links; using landmines, wooden poles and crossbows, felling trees across roads, and surrounding enemy positions and firing at them. If they do not leave their positions, we approach their positions and fire at them everyday. For some favorable places and locations, we use 60 and 82 mm mortars to bombard their positions. We do not bombard their positions heavily, just one or two shells at irregular times to make the situation tense, constantly tense, inside the positions. In short, when combat becomes more effective, soldiers become more disciplined and systematic, both the army and the militia.

**Q:** There is another issue regarding your previous interviews which have caused some doubts about Democratic Kampuchea's role in leading the present resistance. I would like to ask you that, based on the experiences of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, it was possible only when the CPK led the people's resistance. Are there any changes or not regarding those experiences?

**A:** At present, all decisions are made collectively by the government based on the United Front policy program. It's a practical situation.

**Q:** And what are the party's roles in the government?

**A:** The party does not have any role in the government. Its role is to educate people to have strong patriotic stance and to be abide by the United Front's policy program because it's a life and death issue.

**Q:** Nowadays, the elements in the government are the same. There have been no changes since December last year, right? Aren't there any new comers?

**A:** There have been no changes yet.

Slide B

0:00-0:15

**Q:** So I would like to ask you a question. When past governments were announced, something was done. This time I work on biographies of the people whom I met or those in the government, which is now in February. In fact, I exclude March, but there is one person who does not need to be included. POL Pot does not need to be included because he is already a pure person. However, there are two more persons, Ta Mok and Ta Pok, whom I do not have information about the biographies of their past resistance. Can you give me some information about the biographies of both persons' past resistance?

**A:** I have no grasp on the biographies of those two persons.

**Q:** But they are members of the Central Committee, right?

**A:** In the Military Committee.

**Q:** Now let's talk about the issue of drawing on the experiences between 1975 and 1978. I would like to ask you questions, some of which may be so direct. Nevertheless, I would like to ask you because I want you to explain me so that I can understand.

Based on my interviews with people since my arrival at the border last year, a majority of people think that the 1975-1978 regime was a traitor regime. Why? They think so because the regime caused the deaths of many people from starvation and killing. What is your response to the opinions of the majority of people?

**A:** I would like to tell you that in fact there were no such policy, no line, no systematic killings. Based on the concrete truth, what they said are not true. Some people may have been unhappy or disappointed with this or that. In fact, no such thing happened. However, on whether there were people whose lives were affected or not, yes, there were. Nevertheless, the dimensions were not those of mass killing. If mass killings had really occurred, there would be no people supporting us with manpower to wage war and to fight the enemy Yuon to put them in a deadlock for over one year and a half like this. The enemy Yuon have two hundred fifty thousand troops. This is a great number if compared with the number of my people. If compared with the US population and if Soviet invades America, it is equal to 10 million soldiers. Two hundred fifty thousand troops to the population size of my people are equal to 10 million Soviet soldiers in America to the population size of American people. Therefore, it is a huge number. How can we have manpower to fight against the Yuon when they come in such a huge number if we do not have the manpower from the people? This question can be taken into consideration. However, there were innocent people whose lives were affected. I would like to stress that they were affected by Yuon agents by Khmer people who were Yuon undercover agents in our authority lines. Those people held important positions. In order to understand this issue, you need to know our past. Because of short time, we can continue our talk.

Now I would like to brief you. As you may know, during the First Indochina War, there were Viet Minh cadres and army carrying out activities in Cambodia and controlling resistance movements in Cambodia. It was then when they established their agents to serve their Indochina strategies. Since then, year by year those agents had gained more and more important positions and they had worked undercover in our movements. In 1975, it was those people who obtained important positions. They exercised their power. Some of them had the major power to distort our line, making some people in the areas they were in charge of unhappy and affecting the lives of innocent people. What did they do all these things for? They did these to isolate our Democratic Kampuchean government from the people. Then it would be easy for them to stage a coup. This was an attack on us from the inside out. It was an attempt to attack us from the inside out. Nonetheless, we fought constantly against these attempts and defeated them. Until 1977-1978, we managed to deal with those people completely and brought order back to the country. Thus, the people were very satisfied. This is the truth, and I would like to tell you that HENG Samrin, for example, was the commander of a division that had been organized by the Yuon.

**Q:** Since the 1970s?

**A:** Since the 1970s. I fought against him to force him to return the troops.

**Q:** When did he escape to Yuon territory?

**A:** In 1977. It was in 1977 or 1978 that we started fighting.

**Q:** Was it before the event of SAO Phim (ស្រែក ភីម) ?

**A:** During the event of SAO Phim, he escaped to the Yuon.

- Q:** You have just mentioned that those people had distorted the line. I would like to ask you whether those people played a role in the formulation of policy?
- A:** Yes, they had because they were important people in charge of important positions. Thus, they participated in the formulation of policy. Since the 1960s, we formulated independent lines and principles in attempting to control the destiny of the people's movement independently. At that time, those people were there. They were Yuon agents. They served the Yuon Indochina strategy. However, they did not dare to oppose openly because the people in general support the line of independence/mastery and self-effort, not like Laos. The masses gives their support and contribution. Therefore, they did not dare to oppose. They adapted themselves, and gradually they achieved more and more important positions. Between 1975- 1978, they carried out their actions.
- Q:** Talking about the lines, which aspects of the lines did any of those people strongly influence?
- A:** In fact, those people did not have any strong influence. Outside, they simply adapted themselves, but inside they secretly destroyed and distorted the line.
- Q:** In 1975, what percentage of them were in the senior ranks of the party, in the Central Committee, or in the Standing Committee?
- A:** There were many.
- Q:** Half?
- A:** Less than half in the Central Committee, but nearly half in the Standing Committee.
- Q:** Nearly half. Who were they?
- A:** I do not want to mention about this issue here, and this is not the right time for us to discuss conclusively about our experiences because we are busy with war with fighting to defeat the Yuon. We will deal with this issue gradually. If this issue is discussed, there will be an endless debate regarding what should be done. The most urgent issue now related to the people's survival is to sharpen the force to resist Yuon invasion.
- Q:** When was a Party Congress last held?
- A:** The year before the Yuon invasion.
- Q:** In 1978. That was the fifth. And since then, there have not been any more?
- A:** Not yet.
- Q:** Were there any reshuffles in the Central Committee or the Standing Committee after the Congress?
- A:** We did not have time to think about it because each of us was busy fighting against the Yuon and the situation did not allow us to hold it.
- Q:** Based on practicality, do you mean that the issue was not completely addressed because a congress has not yet been held?
- A:** Not yet.
- Q:** But you have mentioned that some experiences had been gained, the good and bad experiences.
- A:** There was normal discussion about the experiences, and it's clear. After several rounds of discussion, we found out that the lines of 1975 to 1978 could not be used to lead the socialist country and to build socialism anymore.
- Q:** The lines could not be used because of new period, new location, or new situation now. If going back to the same situation, period and location at that time, whether they could be used or not?
- A:** The lines could not be used, as I said this morning, because we have a Yuon communist party before us that pursues their Indochina Federation strategy actively. Like what you have said, they are hard-lined, thick-faced, and struggling to grasp all

the available opportunities. We tried the Soviet way out, but failed. We tried the way out of 1975-1978, but it also failed. The experiences are clear. Therefore, there is no way out except for the new political line, the United Front policy, which is the life of the nation. If we blindly pursue the socialist revolution and the building of socialism, both Democratic Kampuchea and the nation will die. After several rounds of discussion, we have agreed strongly on this issue.

- Q:** Has the change of line come from the changes of time, location and situation, or from the previous experiences, or from the first change, or the second change or both? Has it come from the changes of time and location, or from the previous experiences?
- A:** It has come from the practical situation that socialist revolution and building socialism were not possible.

0:15-0:23

Based on the practical situation, we attack the Yuon and when the Yuon withdraw their army from the country, how many of my people will survive? And among those survivors, how about their health? They are weak and thin. Can we mobilize people to build dams and dig canals like we did in 1975-1978? No, we can't. Based on the practicality, we cannot. This manpower cannot work any longer. In the period of 1975-1978, they were physically strong. Now they cannot work anymore.

Therefore, in order to rehabilitate the economy and build the country, we have to improve the people's living condition in a timely manner. The most urgent needs for the people are their health and food. We need aid from abroad and we purchase privately. We need Cambodian and foreign investors to invest in the country. Through this investment, we will have machineries to replace the human labor, which we can solve the problem. This is a practical issue. The strategic issue of Yuon invasion remains and prohibits us from doing anything. We all see clearly that however we love socialist revolution, we cannot pursue it. Now, if we want to pursue it, it will not be possible and the mobilization of people to fight against the Yuon is also not possible both within the country and from abroad. In the future, if we do not adopt the United Front policy program and if the Yuon attack us, we will not have the forces. Though people in the country and from abroad support it, it's practically impossible. As I have said, the manpower of people is very weak.

- Q:** Since the Yuon invasion, have the senior leaders of the party made self-criticism? Because according to rumor, they have. Is that true, or not?
- A:** I have already told you about the reasons and about the reshuffle of political leaders. The reasons are like that.
- Q:** The day I had a talk with Mr. NIK Măn (និក ម៉ាន់), he told me that, according to his interviews, there were some people who were Yuon agents who had accused others of working as Yuon agents so that the latter would be killed. I would like to ask you if, among the party's world renowned leaders who have died since 1975, were there any of them who were innocent? Were they killed because they had been implicated? Or were they killed by Yuon agents?
- A:** The case did not occur to senior leaders, but it occurred to some cadres.
- Q:** Cadres...
- A:** Because the Yuon agents had accused them abusively.
- Q:** What level of cadre do you refer to when you say "cadre"?
- A:** Important level.
- Q:** There aren't any.
- A:** No.

- Q:** Do this means that looking at the number of all those who were killed, no one at all who died is presently seen as not having been a Yuon agent? Was there sabotage within the party?
- Q:** Speaking from present perspective, there were none who were Yuon agents. Based upon previous experiences, we also find it hard to say. Based on our objectives and our estimates, we have fundamentally solved the problem. But if asked whether they are totally gone, this problem...
- Q:** What I wanted to ask was at the time was about anyone who was accused of being either CIA agents or Yuon agents. I want to ask if any them were accused of being Yuon agents in order to kill them, in order to kill true patriots? Did that happen among the upper echelon?
- A:** Yes. There was a comrade in west. He was an old man. He was accused by the Yuon agents. They were responsible for that. They accused him. However, they were not successful because we investigated the case in a timely manner. Regarding this issue, we understand it better now.
- Q:** There is only one more question. Between 1975 and 1978, people talked about a type of socialism. I do not know what it is called in Khmer, but as I may understand, the Khmer called it “Integral Socialism (សង្គមនិយមអង្គភាព)”. It is the building of a society totally. It is called in French “Socialisme Intégral”. Can you explain me the meaning of the terms?
- A:** We have never used the term “Integral Socialism,” and we cannot give a name to it. We did things based on the real situation that we were able to control and for the purposes as I mentioned this morning. We earned our living in accordance with Cambodia’s available resources and built the country and improved the living standard of people based on our own available natural resources and effort.
- Q:** Thank you.

**End of Tape 6**