

Appendix D

I. THE LAST PLAN

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Summary of answer by Chhuk, secretary of sector 24 on 23 September 1976 and of the 19th answer by the same person personally written on 23 September 1976. This summary constitutes the basis.

2. The answer of Isoup Ghancy of the ministry of Foreign Affairs has some similarity regarding an assault from outside and a collusion between the Vietnamese, Soviets, Lao, Thais and the U.S. imperialists.

In brief, we should say:

B. SUBSTANCE OF THE SUMMARY

1. The Soviets are the head of the treasonous machination.* The Vietnamese were the implementers.

2. The U.S. imperialists collude with the Soviets by compelling the Thais to provide supplies to the Khmer Serei in Thailand.

3. Inside the country, the CIA agents and particularly the Vietnamese expansionists cooperated to implement the same scheme in constant contact with outside.

EX.: Chhuk was connected to Be Mab. The group of Khuon connected with the Vietnamese and particularly the Thais through Sot, secretary of sector 106 and through the group of Say in Northwest. The group of Say related directly to the Thais. The group of Hang were in touch with the Thais, the Vietnamese and also through the Lao.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEME

1. Secretly by murdering or abducting members of the Organization during festivities or during the trips, and so on.

If this succeeded, they would replace the Organization nationwide by secret local appointments,** thus avoiding turmoil both inside and outside the country.

2. If this first case was not successful, they would resort to spreading rumors, sabotage, manifestation, banditry which would lead to partial insurrection.

EX.: — spread rumor on existence of tiger as a superstition for insecurity in Kompong Som;

— Chakrei group exploded grenades behind the royal palace, fired on the national museum in early 1976;

— banditry of the groups of Nhem and Nhek, in sector 37, western region, and of the group of Sreng in the central region;

— manifestation staged in muk kampoul district in November 1975.

* The Lao would openly join hands with the Vietnamese in case of need.

** Legally, they used the trick of sending people to further study when arrest was needed, or they caused insurrection by a string of traitors at any one place, or they simply attacked, in accordance with the local realities.

3. If the 2nd case still did not succeed, the VN troops and the traitorous forces outside the country would brutally invade Kampuchea and install their administration on the way.

— swift attack followed by swift withdrawal—as in Angola and the CSSR in order to avoid criticism from the world opinion.

— If they did not completely succeed, the eastern side of the Mekong River would be chunked off and Svay Rieng town proclaimed as temporary city while continuing the total takeover.

— If the operation totally failed, the faction which was uncovered should go abroad while the other part, still intact, should continue to take cover in the CPK.

4. Their desire was to at least hamper, harass and destroy the economy and slow down the national construction of our revolution if they did not succeed.

II. INSTALLATION OF THE NETWORK AND BUILDING OF THE CIA AGENTS AND VN ANNEXATIONISTS

1.

They used the legal means of placing their agents in order to take over the revolutionary power to occupy ranks and functions in the party and administration, which enabled them to carry out activities to protect their men already exposed.

EX.: The groups of Chhuk and Chakrei operated that way in sector 24, and division 170.

The line of Koy Thuong, former secretary of the northern region, also did the same.

According to part evidence, wherever the traitors had been in control long, they set up their network in clumps.

2.

All forces—which had had some sort of conflict with the CPK both in the management, the individual duty and so forth were rallied.

EX.: As contained in the answers by Veng Ky, alias Net, worker in the rubber transportation in the eastern region, on the statute of the Laborers' Party (document dated 9 July 1977).

3. Mode of Operation

A. PERIOD BEFORE 18 MARCH 1970

They managed to control the leading machinery so as to be able to dismiss revolutionary cadres or organize various treacherous activities. Among other things, they cooperated with the ruling class by tipping off information that led to the arrest of revolutionary cadres or by recouring to assassination.

EX.: Sophan said that Chhuk ordered the imprisonment of Rat in order to facilitate the management of the affairs in sector 24. After 17 April 75, Rat came to the foreign ministry.

EX.: The groups of Keo Meas and Ya competed for the control of the Pracheachon group and sent Vinh In to control Kampujbotr lycee.

EX.: Sreng was in touch with Prey Chor district governor S. Hok in order to carry

out suppression drive against revolutionary localities and rally demoralized elements to build up anti-revolutionary forces. E3/527

EX.: In their propaganda, they showed the enemy's superiority and that the revolution was in difficulties that would never end. They said that one should walk with its two feet and look to the winning party. This was the CIA propaganda.

In their part, the VN agents called for foreign support. For instance, they said that before long those who were trained in Vietnam will return—who were skillful in various techniques—that the VN army was great and strong, that we should wait until the VN army fought for us, and that we could not fight as we had nothing.

B. THE 5-YEAR PERIOD OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

1. Their main strategy was to control the army.

EX.: The groups of Koy Thuon, Chhuk and Tim planned that way.

2. Using various pretexts, they used their rights to dismiss revolutionary cadres at will, sent them to death or had them assassinated on the battlefield. This occurred in the areas where the traitors were in complete control. Then they replaced them with bad elements such as former bandits, security workers, soldiers, and hooligans in the army and the localities.

EX.: They made all necessary preparations to take power after Lon Nol was overthrown.

C. PERIOD OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

1. Anytime the Angkar asked for cadres, they took the opportunity to send their agents.

EX.: The group of Chakrei sent his men into the air force and artillery. The group of Khnon took control of the trade ministry.

2. Rank, honor and class differentiation were vaunted.

EX.: They said that after waging a long revolutionary struggle you will remain combatants; they frightened those who had relatives in the bad elements; they did not undertake orientation course for the combatants, etc., but turned them into traitors.

4. Stanning Up: Percentage of the Traitors

A. COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BASES BEFORE 18 MARCH 70

1. *The Pracheachon group*: Keo Meas, Ya and Norn Suon were the chieftains. They rallied a number of the former Khmer Issarak executives such as Chhuk, secretary of sector 24; Hang, secretary of sector 103; Nhek, secretary of sector 37; Sok Boutchamroocun, sector 25. Keo Neas (generally called as bang Achar) was very influential. He was a VN lackey—to him, anything Vietnamese smelled good.

2. *The group of former combatants trained in Hanoi*: The chieftains were Son Ngoc Minh, Mey Pho alias Yat and Keo Mouny. They became 100 percent Vietnamese and had nothing left as Khmers. They were subservient lackeys of the Vietnamese.

3. *The Khmer Serei or the People's Movement*:* This group was dispersed everywhere but was constantly organized by the CIA.

1. A faction lived in South Vietnam and in Thailand, headed by Son Ngoc Than.

2. Another faction was inside the country and led by Hang Thun Hak. It was subdivided into two sections:

— one, already exposed, was composed of Hang Thun Hak in the administration, and Khieu Chum and Pang Khat among the monks; they lived under Sihanouk's administration.

— a second section, still remained underground, took cover in the revolutionary ranks at the secret arrangement of Hang Thun Hak, through the network of 'Fiv OI—which included Koy Thuon, former secretary of sector 304 and new men such as Ke Kim Huot, Khok Pen, Chca Huon, San and Hoeng in Northwest, and Saing Rin in sector 33 for example.

The network of Khieu Chum included achar Ven of monastery Kamsan, achar Hay Ei—a man of Chakrei—of monastery Stoeng Slot.

3. The Vinh Kinh faction—based at the onnalom monastery—was in close and constant contact with the Vietnamese. This faction was the oldest of all. Vinh Kinh was, as Son Ngoc Thanh, one of the main Khmer Serei leaders. It was made mainly of people from Kampuchea Kraom and was also subdivided into three sections:

- one section stayed with the Viet Cong such as Vinh Kinh;
- another section, led by Ya, took cover in the CPK and included Ly Phen and achar Kang in Southwest, and Sophan in (?sector) 170.
- still another section infiltrated the Hanoi-trained group and included Son Sary, alias Prev, and Son Sovat.

4. Another faction of Son Ngoc Thanh group was in France and was also mixed with the group trained in Hanoi. It included Roat Samoeun, alias Ros and Haing Narin, alias Rat.

Stand of the Hanoi-trained group and Keo Meas group toward Khmer Serei or the People's Movement.*

According to the answers given by Son Sary alias Prev and by Chhuk, secretary of sector 24, since before the Geneva Conference, former resistance groups had always accounted that Son Ngoc Thanh group was a nationalist one. They had purported to rally them. They had always been impregnated with this thinking.

EX.: Son Sary, introduced by Vinh Kinh, wrote about his relation with Haing Narin that they had relations with Son Ngoc Thanh. Through this contact Haing Narin also grasped the depth of the matter.

EX.: Chhuk's group cooperated with the Khmer Serei in Thailand. Vinh Kinh, on behalf of the VN, rallied Son Ngoc Thanh. Through this contact Haing Narin also grasped the depth of the matter.

EX.: For his survival, Norn Suon agreed to join the CIA while in jail—according to his answer.

4. *The intellectuals*: This group coexisted with Sihanouk's administration. Some who had been formerly progressive did this for fear of death.** Others, the CIA agents, pretended to be progressive and infiltrated the revolution to gather information. They included Toch Phoen, Uch Ven, Mey Phat, Hou Yun, Hou Nim, Ham former secretary of sector 15, Tum, secretary of sector 22, Sok Krong, Som at the general staff. The party found out since May 1977 they were CIA agents.

5. The officers—CIA agents—who were trained in the United States and then

* In his answer, Bun Sany talked about this view expressed by Mey Pho, Son Ngoc Minh, Keo Mouny and others.

** When the revolution was in power, these people rushed in to compete for title and function.

ordered through the repatriation to return in order to spy on the Kampuchean revolution following the liberation on 17 April 1975. They included Phuong Phanh, colonel; Sim Silena and Ung Veng Huot.

Their mission was to establish contact with Koy Thuong, Norn Suon, Phok Chhay and Cheng Sayumborn. (As we can recall it, they were also bang Lin and Li Phen.)

6. The capitalists such as Chong, former deputy secretary of southwestern region, were CIA agents infiltrated since before 1954. He was a Thai national living in Koh Kong province and was uncovered in 1974.

7. The pro-Soviet overseas students: agents of the KGB, they returned home in order to join hands with the Vietnamese.

In 1965, they established a Khmer Communist Party with Hak Sieng Lay Ni as the secretary but failed. They were from various countries such as Hak Sieng Lay Ni and his group from the Soviet Union, Toch Kham Doeun and his men from France, Aing Chou Bi from the USSR. Some of them under strong pressure from the ruling class became CIA agents, such as Ieng Seiha and Aing Chou Bi. The party exposed them in 1977.

8. Apart from this, there were also agents from other countries: Sien An SDECE France; Boun Sany—a former resistance man and an agent of the French rubber plantation; Chhlong Phean HPCB East Germany.

9. The Chinese residents: originated from the KUO MINH TANG, they came as expatriates from China. Their origin went back to before 1944. KMT men controlled, managed and established all Chinese associations, schools and hospitals.

Before 1956—that was before ties were established with China—they operated in the open. After Sihanouk's forbundance in 1956, they went underground and conducted seemingly revolutionary activities.

They had, in the main, close association with the VN revisionists while pretending to have contact with the Chinese embassy for the sake of their business. Main instructions were passed from Taiwan through Hong Kong.

Later, the majority of the KMT members turned into CIA agents. This was first discovered by the party in Feb-March 1978 while they were plotting to overthrow the party on 17 April 1978 together with the VN assault from outside.

Their principal bases in Phnom Penh were Tuan Hua and Chin Hua schools, the Chinese hospital, and others. Beside these, they also had bases in Battambang, Kompong Cham, Kampot and other provinces. But most important of all was Tuan Hua school—which was the largest school and was connected to all other bases in Phnom Penh and the provinces. Teachers were all sent from Saigon.

B. THE LAST COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BASES ESTABLISHED BY THE TRAITOROUS NETWORKS

1. The line of Chong, deputy secretary of western region
 - a. sector 11 liquidated in 1974
2. The network of Saing Rin, secretary of sector 33, Southwestern region, eliminated in early 1975
3. The string of Noun Soun alias Chey, secretary of sector 25, southwestern region, wiped out in late 1975. Also included Leat, San, Soeun of division 703; Chamreun, Huot Se and Sok, in sector 25

4. The network of Ham-Keo-Neou, committee of sector 15, Western region, eliminated in early 1976
6. The line Kap-Kandor-Yim of achar Ven, sector 31, Western region, eliminated in early 1976
7. The network of Koy Thuon, former secretary of Northern region, eliminated on 17 Feb. 1977
- division 310, 450 and 920 (100 percent of the battalion level, some of the company level), tank unit
 - region 304, division 117 (100 percent of the district members and colonels upward)
 - sector 106, division 335 (100 percent of communal and colonel level upward)
 - the former trade ministry
 - sector 505, Ap Kang, deputy secretary of the sector
 - sector 105, Mey and Khamphoun, sector committee
8. The network of Say, member of the northwestern region (Ros Mau alias Say [Khmer script]), eliminated in June 1977
- division of the Northwestern region: San, Neou, Khleng (Nong Sarim alias San), committee "Kor"
 - sector 1: Chea Huon, Vanh secretary
 - sector 5: Men Chun, Hoeng, secretary
 - Ke Kim Huot alias Sot alias Man, secretary of sector 7
 - sector 4: Khék Pen alias Sou, deputy of sector
 - sector 6: Oum Chhoeun alias Me, sector member
9. The network of Tum, secretary of sector 22, liquidated in April 1977
- sector 22: 100 percent of the sector and district committees
 - regiment 152: 100 percent of the regimental, battalion and company level
10. The line of Ya
11. The line of Hang, secretary of sector 103, wiped out in Jan. 1978
12. Various ministries of the Angkar:
- Toch Phocun, alias Phin, secretary of the Public Work Ministry,
 - Hou Nim alias Phoas, secretary of information, eliminated on 10 April 1977
 - Sin Dara alias Sok, former secretary of the city, former secretary of electricity, liquidated on 7 March 1977
13. The network of the Chinese residents, wiped out in Feb. 1978
- Nget alias Hong, chief of the Chinese community
 - Ko Min, in Kratie, Chinese from Saigon, combatant during Son Ngoc Minh time
 - So Chea alias Sar, trade ministry
 - Khmau, industry committee
- The KMT big shots in Phnom Penh were:
3. for the KMT group
- Before 1944, only the KMT party existed. After the Japanese defeat in 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek group founded a three-principle youth organization, similar to the Communist Youth of Kampuchea. In Cambodia, before 1956, they existed in the open. Later when Sihanouk estab-

lished relations with China, they operated under the VN revolutionary brand. In 1958, they wore the Kampuchean revolutionary tag. In China, men from Taiwan infiltrated since after 1949 when the CCP took over the mainland.

Summary regarding the planning will be presented in section IV.

III. INFILTRATION IN AND DEVIATION FROM THE LINE OF THE CPK

A. Long-Standing Infiltration

1. ORIGIN OF THE INFILTRATION PLAN

a. From the answer given by Son Sary alias Prev—which we summarized on 16 May 76—we noted that between 1952 and 1954, Vinh Kinh travelled to Dangrek range to meet Son Ngoc Thanh personally or through messenger. First, Vinh Kinh obeyed Son Ngoc Thanh very much. Later, he opposed him and designated Son Sary and Son Sovath to infiltrate the Vietminh in 1954 entrusting them with keeping contact with Roat Samoeun and Haing Narin, former students from France and also Son Ngoc Thanh's men.

Through this connection, it was clear that the CIA had this plan since Roat Samoeun and Heng Narin joined the Vietminh in 1954 or even before.

b. Concerning the Vietnamese: after the Geneva Conference, some former resistance men went to Hanoi while commander Sim Sat was assigned as a messenger between the VN at the border and Keo Meas in Phnom Penh. He carried both messages and gold. In 1957, Sim Sat brought in two Vietnamese.*

As far as we can recall, referring to answers given by Chhuk and Ya in Oct 76 on bang Phim's treason: "following the Geneva Conference, bang Phim undertook a training in Hanoi as the other fellows. After a while, the VN party sent him back to take control of the party in Kampuchea because the VN did not trust Tou Samut who was in close and permanent contact with the brothers who had returned from France (particularly bang I). Bang Phim then returned with Boun Sany—who did not say so— in 1956.

We do not conclude on the truth of this answer. It was beyond our understanding. But we note that the VN might have a plan for infiltrating their elements in the CPK in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference.

SLOGANS FOR THE INFILTRATION STRATEGY

- the way the weevils bore the wood, or
- the way oil permeates.

2. TRUE NATURE OF THE INFILTRATION PLAN

According to the enemy's successive answers, those who talked more clearly about this plan were the Khmer Serei or CIA agents such as Chakrei, Sophan, Li Phen, Son Sary alias Prev and Koy Thuon. The name of the VN network still evaded us as we had no document to certify it. Both documents on the VN henchmen showed the founding of another party—summary of which will be given in section V.

3. THE CIA STRATEGIC LINE (UNDEFINITE PERIOD)

* to Phnom Penh, who persuaded Sim Sat to join the Pracheachon group. Achar Kang also declared that they were constantly in touch with Ti Kam in Phnom Penh. Chhan said that while in jail his father introduced the VN to him.

The group of Sophan, subdivision 170, admitted this strategic slogan: "the buffaloes hide themselves to sharpen their horns and will come out when the water submerges the reed," meaning that they were hiding and building up their strength to introduce it in the CPK. When Kampuchea will become prosperous, revolutionaries will get excited and increasingly do away with their proletarian position. Then the inside men will rise up and crush the revolution from within.

This goal—based on the answer given by Son Sary alias Prev—was to infiltrate all conflicting parties, to create scuffle to split each of them, to rally the strength for CIA, to incite quarrels between various factions in order to weaken them all, and finally, their men who were hiding inside joined hands to smash all sides thus winning the power forever, particularly definitely abolishing communism.

EX.: The strategy drawn up by Vinh Kocung when he infiltrated the Vietminh in 1954 was to hide in the Vietminh, in the Sihanouk administration and in Saigon.

Whenever the opportunity arises they should simultaneously rise up to gain the power absolutely from the Khmer Serei.

EX.: According to the plan drawn up by Li Phen and passed on to Son Sary in 1974, elements should hide in both the CPK and the VN newly-founded party, and rally forces to launch an assault in conformity with the aforementioned slogan of injecting poisonous substance in all the nervous system.

4. SUBSTANCE OF THE INFILTRATION PLAN

a. While the Kampuchean revolution had no power, a number of their elements worked as commune headmen in order to first protect their groups and also cooperate with the ruling class to persecute, disperse and then get rid of genuine revolutionaries thus leaving room for apparently-revolutionary men.

EX.: Chhuk denounced Roat

EX.: In 1967, bang Phuong persuaded Chhaom Savat to become a village headman to protect bang Phuong's men and get rid of other components (based on answer by Chhaom Savat, secretary of Chhlong district, sector 21)

b. At the same time, they fomented economic sabotage against Sihanouk's administration thus causing budget crisis (such as the import of non-utilitarian commodities) and compelling Sihanouk to ask for US aid. In this way, they would advance toward taking over from Sihanouk—according to Toch Phoeun's answer.

c. If the Kampuchean revolution failed, they would unite to search and smash all revolutionaries for good as was achieved in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference (Koy Thoeun's answer)

d. If they failed, they would turn to their own strategy

5. LONG-TERM PLAN

To oppose communism from one generation to the next, continue to do it in successive generations. If it does not succeed in one generation, do it in another.

B. Deviation from the CPK Line

In general, the CIA enemy talked about the deviation from the party's line to the left or to the right in order to create trouble to or hamper its implementation thus preventing the progress by great leap forward.* Their slogan was to learn from the revolution and strike it back.

Their strategic aspirations were:

* Details of the tactics will be presented in section IV.

1. overthrow the CPK and install in lieu a free regime.
2. if this did not succeed, distort the CPK line and deviate it into revisionism like that of the VN and the Soviets.

These were the CIA abject goals.

Apart from this, they also followed many less important slogans such as: grow rice both in the dry season and in the rainy season, obtain the rice from the Angkar and the seed from the people.

In summary, the VN and CIA used the same deviationist strategy. According to the answers given by Koy Thuon, Chakrei and Tum, we had the following periods:

1. BEFORE 18 MARCH 70

The group of Koy Thuon engaged in the struggle using noisy means in order to alert the enemy thus giving it the opportunity to destroy the revolutionary movement. Apparently very revolutionary, these means actually led to the suppression of the revolution by the enemy. According to the answers provided by Chhuk, Chhaom, Savat and Tum, the traitors' networks in the eastern region strived to build up their bases by using revolutionary means. Their true action was to cooperate with the ruling class through replacing village and commune headmen previously discarded by various methods.

2. THE 5-YEAR PERIOD OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The group of Koy Thuon in sector 304 created an atmosphere of pacifism, luxury and excitement entertained by arts, girls, reception and festivities; fostered house alignment and planting of banana trees along the streets; stimulate prestige, ranks and relation with the enemy.

It gathered tens of thousands of people to dig a canal down from Phnum Kulen, to clear the bush for planting banana trees while giving no thought to the battlefield.

The traitors' networks in the eastern region deviated from the lines and used the slogan of burning to calcination and puffing back raw.

EX.: Chakrei ordered Prayuth to launch the units against the enemy's bullets during an attack and retreated without considering properly the conditions which resulted in great losses. He said:

The group of Tum in sector 22 first established a cooperative at the village level and then collectivized all goods without educating the people. When told to relax, they stopped working.

3. PERIOD OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

At the Angkar directive to launch offensive in rice production, the groups of Oeun and Suong slowed the provision of rice to the combatants, carried the sick to work the land; mixed seeds; improperly transplanted; etc.

Chakrei's group said: "transplant in the dry season and the rainy season" etc.
1962: Sien Heng, Say and Ta Chea killed Tou Samut.

1956: The Soviet party publicized the resolution adopted at the 20th congress. The CPK opposed it. Toch Phoeun, Chi Kim An, Keo Meas, Ya, Sien An, Chey Suon and others fully supported it as they believed that the Soviet party was older and thus was more experienced. Class division in the Kampuchean society was non-existent. The Kampuchean people need peace and should not be led to war. Sihanouk was a progressive king with whom we should continue to unite. They conferred disorderly to pick up one of them to be the secretary of the party.

1964-65: Hou Nim, Hou Yut, Phok Chhay, Vann Upsovan at the trade youth founded a new party.

4. THE KMT PLAN

1949: Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan. One year later, he prepared a strategy to reconquer China with the assistance from the United States, Japan and the Philippines—countries around Taiwan. They attempted to close sea lines in the China Sea with the US 7th Fleet. They caused trouble in Korea to create more difficulties to China, particularly in solving the people's livelihood. This was aimed at sapping the people's confidence with the CPC and thus creating opposition to it. They would launch attack from outside while the Taiwan remnants fought from inside. But this design failed.

1972: Nixon and China issued the Shanghai joint communiqué in an attempt to establish diplomatic tie. Taiwan then announced relation with the Soviet Union in preparation for the American withdrawal. The Soviets agreed with this strategy of surrounding China. Taiwan has long understood that itself and the revisionists could coexist and together with them would win the power back.

After 17 Apr 75: Kampuchea was liberated. Taiwan was again interested in Kampuchea because of its importance. If Kampuchea collapsed, the revolution in Southeast Asia will lean toward the VN. For this reason, Taiwan cooperated with VN against Kampuchea.

This KMT plan was uncovered in March 1978, which set 17 Apr 75 as the day for attacking the party. This plan was exactly similar to that of the CIA and the VN.

IV. THE CIA AND VN PLANS AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF OUR REVOLUTION (BASED ON KOY THUON'S ANSWERS)

In all stages, each traitors' network attempted to assassinate our brothers who were the standing members of the CPK central committee, particularly brother I and brother II.

A. Before 18 Mar 70

1. THE CIA PLAN

— Before Koy Thuon moved to Kompong Cham, Hang Thun Hak asked him to report on the brothers' names and their meeting places. At that time, the infiltration plan had this goal only.

— In 1960, immediately after joining the party, Hang Thun Hak and Phoc Kly asked Koy Thuon to establish a people's revolutionary base in Kompong Cham. The task was to struggle hard, infiltrate deep in the leadership and seek means to destroy the revolutionary strength.

— In 1964, the meeting of the party's central committee decided on the readiness to counter any eventual coup mounted by the Americans. Koy Thuon's men then intensified their activities against the revolution to help the coup.

— One month before the coup was carried out, Hanh Thun Hak summoned Koy Thocun, Doeun and Sreng to a meeting with Siruthy— a CIA agent in Phnom Penh—in order to prepare for motivating the masses to support the coup, to arrange for wiping out the revolutionary forces by persuasion and by force, and to drive the Vietcong troops out of Kampuchea.

Turn also admitted receiving directives from bang Lin on this question.

2. THE VN PLAN

Answers given by the trainees from Hanoi served as a basis. In his answer, Koy Thuon also mentioned about this plan. But we had no proper documents, because compiling documents and interrogations conducted at that time were not designed for the future but only to serve the present. The VN group, just as the CIA, planned to hinder our revolutionary movement. They said that they will help us after liberating South Vietnam. In this way, it will swallow up Kampuchea by giving power to the Hanoi-trained people in cooperation with the VN army, just as during the time of struggle against the French.

The inside-men also conducted activities to undermine the revolution, build their bases and made propaganda on an attitude of waiting for the guys from Hanoi and waiting for the help of the VN troops, and to despair from the line of independence prompted by the CPK. The chief-executants of the VN plan were Son Ngoc Minh and Keo Meas—the latter moved to Hanoi in about 1968.

3. THE SOVIET PLAN

Answers given by the students from the USSR—KGB agents—provided the basis:

— The Soviets planned to control the students sent there during Sihanouk's time through the Marx-Lenin club.

— In 1965, the KGB founded a Khmer CP with Hak Sieng Lay Ny as secretary. They sent some of their elements* to fight Sihanouk, who were instead closely watched by his administration. Therefore, their activities consisted only to rally the students in various countries, including Toch Phoeun in France and Aing Chou Yi in the CSSR. They also approached Thiourn Mumm.

B. The 5-year War of National Liberation

1. THE CIA PLAN

— Following the coup d'etat on 18 Mar 70, the anti-coup demonstrations were tumultuous. Men of Koy Thuon and Tum could not check this movement and let it go as they were afraid of being exposed. Koy Thuon and Preap met Hang Thun Hak and were given the following plan:

— expand Lon Nol's sphere of influence; cooperate with the governors of Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Siem Reap provinces.

— establish the traitors' cells in the VN army and the Kampuchean revolution and establish a new traitor state power.

— organize spying networks in the liberated zones, snipe at cadres, lob grenades into significant installations.

— cause the conflicts between the people and the VN army, between the revolutionary forces and the VN army, and take control of the revolutionary army.

— establish relations with Ba Nge, chairman of the VN public relations of region 304— a veteran CIA agent in the VCP central committee.

— in the United States, CIA sent Huot Sambat to penetrate the GRUNK in Beijing.

EX.: Koy Thuon was uncovered, dismissed and replaced by another traitor. Therefore, the traitors were continuously dismissed and replaced.

* such as long Seha

EX.: In 1971, during the CPK central committee meeting, Tum talked bang Phim (?) to become VN satellite because of the directives from bang Piem to oppose the VN, etc.

— In early 1974, Koy Thuon worked with Hang Thun Hak who asked him on the relation with Keo Meas, Ya and Chong—presented as CIA agents in 1964. He then presented a plan for the founding of a new party in lieu of the present CPK. Through this new party, CIA will introduce the VN-type revisionism and the United States will provide support. Koy Thuon was told to work with Keo Meas, Ya or Ha Ngc.

Another plan was to expand the enemy's control.

— In June 1974, the battlefield situation changed. Hang Thun Hak was frightened. He ordered Koy Thuon to counter it vigorously, to report on the military installations, on the number of divisions and on the resident of our brothers. Koy Thuon gave incoherent report which delayed the end of the traitorous clique. He made some impediments and launched some attacks. As the battle in other fronts was raging, he launched his men in the assault in early April 1975, as he was afraid of being exposed.

— *Plan in the case of a defeat:* According to the answers given by technicians, public servants and soldiers in Phnom Penh, they were prepared to use the (third force) in particular to smash us while our army was entering Phnom Penh. But this plan failed because wherever we reached we immediately evacuated the population thus dispersing their forces among the populace.

2. PLAN OF THE VN PARTY*

a. Before returning home, the men trained in Hanoi were told by the VN party to

— make effort to control the army and the localities; three VN divisions will back them; plan the action as during the time of struggle against the French

— not to forget the party outside the country (namely Son Ngoc Minh and Keo Meas)

— establish with former resistance men such as bang Phim, bang Nhim, bang Si Ya and Chong, but first meet Ya. These are summarized from the incoherent answers given by Son Sary alias Prev on 13 May 76.

b. During the coup d'etat, Koy Thuon worked with the Angkar. Later, Ya gave him two introductory messages to contact Sau Hoeung and Ba Nge. Khuon provided the party's documents to the VN steadily. In 1973, Ya told Koy Thuon that the VN helped found a new party with Keo Meas as the president.

On 5 Apr 74, Ya told Khuon that the Hanoi's men such as Mey Pho, achar Vorng, Chhan, Yos, Phim and Vi held a meeting with Ya to oppose the CPK. Son Sary alias Prev also admitted that in Jun 74 and Aug 74, Haing Narin met Mey Pho in Kompong Thom to discuss the founding of a new party.

c. In mid-1974, the party's central committee met to formulate a plan for the final assault in early 1975. Following the meeting, bang Phim met Tum and told him that (according to the recorded answer by Seat Chhe alias Tum on 3 Nov 77 at end of pp. 26 and 27):

— the CPK was short of ammunition; chance for the liberation was slim and it

* More answers will be added in section V.

was not possible to completely liberate the country by the 1975 dry season. In case, the traitors' networks should absolutely protect the liberated zones in order to maintain their influence in preparation for the complete liberation. Attacks should be so arranged as to delay the liberation until 1976 when the VN party will join in. The VN troops will launch their assault as in 1970.

If the revolutionary army could liberate the country in the short term, then the traitors should accommodate themselves and continue their hiding.

— On this plan, Tum should report to Khuon.

d. *Scheme to take power from the CPK immediately after its victory.* Basis: answer from the group of Suk, sector 25. As we recall it, during our interrogations, the network in the North and the group of Chakrei also mentioned this.

They would take advantage of the army's relaxation to foster a demonstration from sector 25 into Phnom Penh, supported by the traitors hidden in sector 25 and in division 703, to be ready to abduct our brothers in Phnom Penh and proclaim the power of their group. This will be carried out with the cooperation of sectors 24, 15 and others.

The men from sector 25 talked and gave no ground for analysis.

3. THE SOVIET PLAN

Immediately after the 18 Mar 70 coup, the Soviets would send Hak Sieng Lay Ni to join the FUNK. They introduced him to Ney Saran alias Ya and to the Hanoi-trained men. Reports to the KGB should be transmitted through the VN, Cuban and other embassies.

C. The Period of National Defense

We have earlier summarized the enemy's last plan on pages 1 and 2. Now we give the details of what we have grasped.

1. THE OUTSIDE FRONT

— CIA: they sent Lon Nol's officers—who were trained in the United States—back to Kampuchea through the 'repatriation of patriots' label. These officers included Phuong Phanh, Ung Veng Huor, Sim Silena and Kim Phoeuc Tocung, who should contact the CIA network inside the country—composed of Koy Thuon, Nom Suon, Phok Chhay, Cheng Sayumborn, Li Phen and so on. First it was to infiltrate and then to collect information and pass it on to outside. Thailand also sent men steadily through various ways.

— The VN did the same thing.

EX.: They sent back Li Bun Chheang—who had fled Kampuchea in Apr 75—on 9 Sept 76 through the refugee repatriation. Li Bun Chheang was a CIA agent and a soldier. Nguyen Yang Lay sent Li Bun Chheang with the mission of carrying the plan of a VN aggression and other directives to the men inside to be ready for making propaganda in support of the VN troops during their invasion. These inside men included (Toch Phoeun: Phin), minister of the public work.

According to the aggressive plan, the VN used the CIA men in VN and Thailand to first cause trouble and, once they got deeper, the VN troops would assault and control Kampuchea as the savior.

2. INSIDE THE COUNTRY

All traitors' networks were ready to plot against the CPK.

a. After the liberation, while the party asked for manpower to establish various

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ministries, Koy Thuon and Chakrei took the advantage to send in their men, thus placing them everywhere, at various extents, around the party's leading machine in Phnom Penh.

In addition, they rallied agents—who were formerly evacuated from Phnom Penh. Men such as Socu Vasi alias Docun did the job.

b. At various sectors and regions under their control, they did the same thing.

In Northwest, Khak Pen alias Sou and Men Chun alias Hoeng noticeably gathered the evacuees, all CIA agents, to run various technical services, control mobile units, etc. (? according to the investigation committee on the CIA network). In so doing, they tried to establish a treacherous state administration within the revolutionary state power or to create a state within a state, according to Chhuk's words.

c. At each place, special force was created to carry out assassination or subversion. Banditry, vices, pacifism, rumor spreading and frightening were boosted so as to create a feeling of insecurity among the people.

d. In implementing their scheme, they resorted to intensive, hasty, all-time activities using every means in line with their saying: if we cannot do much do a little and act according to the abilities.

3. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN

1. As to the extent of the cooperation between the Soviets, the VN and the CIA we are not yet able to grasp it for lack of evidence. But based on the information provided by the enemy's answers such as:

— that of Son Sary alias Prev, infiltration was made both in the CPK and the new VN-established party in order to strike down both organizations.

— that of Koy Thuon: he did not like the VN, but he must cooperate with them to found a new party because their interests met.

— that of Lem Sim Hak alias Sei who said that lately the United States used the VN with the Soviet agreement because the United States had no troops to fight in Kampuchea.

— that of Li Bun Chheang saying: the VN planned to use the remnant CIA forces in Thailand and VN to launch the first attack, and then they launched their assault in line with the thought: let the others dry up the water, and the VN pick up fish or dry fish still spawn.

All these answers provided that the Soviets, the VN and the US were cooperating and tried to play up against each other through various pressure against each other but not through negotiations at all. A victory scored by any side will benefit all according to their contribution.

2. The situation was now such that the VN were going to grossly invade the country. Thus, their last scheme became obsolescent. We had no light yet regarding this new plan.

(?) the problems of the Indochina federation and the CP of Indochina.

D. The Leaders of the Coup d'Etat

1975: they were Liev Sutsophonta, Norn Suon and Sok, sector 25

1976: they were Chhuk and Li Phen.

proxy leader: Ya

Direct executants were Chakrei, Sophan of division 170

In Apr 76, Chakrei was uncovered

on 28 Aug 76, Chhuk was uncovered

on 20 Sep 76, Ya was exposed.

Apr 77: the leaders were Khoun, Docun, Sreng, Toch Phoeun, Say from Northwest on 30 Sep 77 they were Tum.

proxy: bang Lin and bang Si

Apr 78: leaders were bang Si, bang Lin. The clan included Hang, Chan, Chea, Yi, Hong, Chen and Say from the industry (?ministry).

V. ON THE OTHER PARTY FOUNDED BY THE VN AND CIA

A. The Name

The enemies admitted many names such as the New CP, the CP of the Revolutionary Kampuchea, the Workers' Party, the People's Party, the Socialist Party and the Laborers' Party. The majority said it was the Laborers' Party of Kampuchea.

B. The Founding Date

1. In November 1961, Keo Meas asked Um Neng to convene Norn Suon to a meeting at the residence of achar Sieng alias Ya. Present were:

a. Keo Meas

b. Norn Suon (who admitted to be the secretary for agriculture)

c. Ya

d. Um Neng alias bang Vi, now in the Northeast.

At the meeting, Keo Meas declared the the Pracheachon group will be reorganized into the Pracheachon Party with himself as secretary, Norn Suon as deputy secretary, Ya as a member of the standing committee, and bang Si and bang Vi as members. Bang Si was not present but had explicitly advised him beforehand. Keo Meas set 1951 as the founding year.

2. The groups of Son Ngoc Minh cared for by the VN and that of Hak Sieng Lay under the Soviet auspices, were staying outside the country, and had no contact with the people. They entered the country with the assistance provided by the traitors inside the country and Ya as the contact.

3. But according to the situation in 1974 and from the answer given by Koy Thuon, Son Sary alias Prev and Tum (see pp. 17 and 18 of our summary) the new party was only about to be founded.

4. The intellectuals such as Toch Phoeun, Hou Yun, Hou Nim, Phok Chhay and Vann Tisovan also organized a grouping in 1964-1965. But after 18 Mar 1970, the CPK was very strong. The people rushed to join the party, so did the intellectuals who then worked in the party's ranks. In Sophat's words: they were acting in the CPK gloves.

We noted that the establishment of so many groups was due to the ambition of various persons who actually did not enjoy the people's support, and thus failed.

C. The Line of the Treacherous Party

In general, they claimed that the party followed the revisionist line of the VN, listened to them and followed them as their professor. On 9 July 77, Veng Ky alias Net, responsible for the river transport of the rubber plantation in the Eastern region, said about the statute of the party as follows:

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1. Those who actively opposed the CPK will be given the membership of the Laborers' Party of Kampuchea;
2. The soldiers, commando members, CIA agents who actively opposed the CPK will also be taken as the party's members.

D. The Leaders of the Treacherous Party

1. Until now, we have no document on the matter.
 2. High-ranking leaders of this party—arrested or dead—were:
 - a. Son Ngoc Minh, dead in VN in 1973
 - b. Kco Meas, arrested on 25 Sep 76
 - c. Ya, former secretary of the Northeastern region, arrested on 20 Sep 76
 - bang Vi
 - bang Chea
 - bang Se
 - bang Socung
 - d. Koy Thuon alias Khuon, former secretary of region 304, arrested on 25 Jan 77
 - e. Norn Suon alias Chey, former secretary of sector 25, arrested on 1 Nov 76
 - f. Suos Neou alias Chhuk, former Secretary of Sector 24, arrested on 28 Aug 76
 - g. Prasith alias Chong, former deputy secretary, region 201, arrested in 1974
 - h. Soeu Va Si alias Doeun, former member, region 304, arrested on 16 Feb 77
 - i. Chor Chhan alias Sreng, former deputy secretary, central region, arrested 17 Feb 77
 - j. Bou Phat alias Hang, former secretary, sector 103, arrested in Jan 78
 - k. Seac Chhe alias Tum, former secretary, sector 22, arrested on 30 Apr 77
 - l. Pa Phal alias Sot, former secretary, sector 106, arrested on 21 Feb 77.
- In addition, they also incriminated incoherently such persons as:
- a. bang Phim
 - b. bang Nhim
 - c. bang Si.