

IV. 12 May 78

CAMBODIA

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PAST YEAR'S NATIONAL DEFENSE EFFORTS REVIEWED

BK120130Y Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1100 GMT 10 May 78 BK

[Educational program: "Democratic Kampuchea's National Defense Situation From April 1977 to April 1978"]

[Text] What was our national defense situation during the past year? During this period we vigorously and strenuously fought against all enemies--domestic and external--and achieved complete victory.

1. The defense of the western border: This year there were some clashes, but we were in full control of the situation and had no cause for concern. We are now capable of defending this border, and we will be even more capable in the future.

2. The defense of the eastern border: The defense of the eastern border has been a matter of vigorous and strenuous battle because Kampuchea is bordered by Vietnam on the east. The Vietnamese want to take our territory and turn Kampuchea into a satellite, making it part of Vietnam. It was for this reason that during the past year a number of serious and violent battles were fought against the Vietnamese.

During the period from 17 April 1977 to 17 April 1978, fighting took place continuously in small, medium and large-scale battles. The level of fighting actually increased this year. One special feature of the fighting against the Vietnamese was the fact that it had been much more serious than in previous years. This was because, not having their forces inside our country, the Vietnamese had to attack us from outside, and launching attacks from outside requires a larger number of troops.

During this period, especially in November and December--the first phase of their large-scale offensive--the Vietnamese used up to nine crack divisions to attack and break through our eastern border. These nine Vietnamese crack divisions did not include their [word indistinct], regional forces district forces or guerrilla units, just armed forces units. Among these nine divisions were many elite divisions, among them the 9th. The Vietnamese 9th Division was an elite unit during the fighting against the Americans, and was also engaged in the 1977 offensive against us.

In November and December the Vietnamese forces invaded our territory in Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham, Khang Kaeut, Takeo and Kampot, as we have reported. The Vietnamese attacks were smashed by our forces. In Kampot, the Vietnamese forces penetrated and remained in our territory for more than a week and then were crushed by our forces. In Svay Rieng, they stayed for about 1 month before being smashed by our forces. In the area of Kompong Cham, Khang Kaeut, which includes Ponhea Krek, Memot, Toek Chreou districts, they penetrated and stayed for more than 2 weeks, but were smashed and routed by our forces. In short, we smashed and drove the Vietnamese aggressive forces out of our territory on 6 January 1978, killing and wounding 29,000 of their troops and smashing five of their divisions. Being smashed means being disintegrated, not being able to operate and having to be re-organized.

This was our opening victory in the first phase. At the time we attacked the enemy forces and achieved our first victory, we had not yet properly organized our forces. Like the armed forces of the party Central Committee [kaolang robas kangtoap robas machempak], our forces in each region were not fully organized and prepared for such large-scale fighting and troops and weapons were not yet fully prepared. However, we succeeded in smashing the Vietnamese forces and forced them back across the border on 6 January 1978. This was the first phase in the defeat of the Vietnamese forces.

INVESTIGATOR NOTE:

DOCUMENTS WAS READ TO WITNESS
IN PARTS IN KHMER LANGUAGE
THESE PARTS WERE:

- THE TITLE LINES

- Page 2 (H2) Paragraph ⑤

- Page 3 (H3) Paragraph ①②③

Attachment to DC13 interview of SA SIEK 24/25 Feb 09
DC13 investigators CHANDARAVAN CHAY and THOMAS KUHNEL

witness: *[Signature]*

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The Vietnamese force then attacked in the second phase. This phase of their offensive started toward the end of February 1978, and was designed to prepare conditions for smashing us in March and then occupying our Kampuchean territory in April. The Vietnamese wanted to celebrate the Kampuchean new year in place of the Kampuchean people in April. That is why the Vietnamese engaged 11 divisions in this phase, 2 more than in the first phase. ①

What happened then? As soon as we had achieved our 6 January 1978 victory, we did not let the Vietnamese initiate further attacks against us, but we continued launching attacks against them. We launched a series of attacks until the end of January. We also attacked them in February. The Vietnamese forces became weaker, losing a number of troops. They were forced to send additional troops in order to launch attacks against us. In March, however, the Vietnamese did not have the capability to attack us; instead, we continued to attack them. In March the fighting was serious and fierce, because on some fronts divisions of troops were engaged. Since each front involved a number of divisions, this was by no means a small war. ②

Even though the Vietnamese suffered defeats in January and February, their defeat in March was much more serious. Because of their heavy defeat in March, the Vietnamese did not have the strength to attack us again in April. The Vietnamese admitted on 30 March that they could not attack and take Kampuchea in one single stroke, because their forces were reduced and insufficient for launching another offensive against Kampuchea. This is why they turned to guerrilla tactics or began using smaller attacks. Their large-scale offensive plan had been defeated so they turned to smaller attacks. But just as they were defeated in their large-scale offensives, they will suffer much more serious losses in their smaller attacks. ③

But how did we defeat the Vietnamese? On this question, the entire party, army and people share the view that the reason we triumphed over the Vietnamese was because we had earlier defeated the U.S. imperialists, and the Vietnamese were not as powerful as the U.S. imperialists. Even with this in mind, there were still some who maintained that Vietnam was a large country with a population of 50 million. And how could Kampuchea, with its population of only 8 million people, defeat Vietnam? In terms of numbers, we could see that our population was smaller than Vietnam. How then did we defeat the Vietnamese? We defeated them because we had to defeat them. This is the main point. We have not yet discussed our methods. It was absolutely necessary for us to fight to defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. We must live independently and by ourselves. We cannot afford to live under subjugation. This was the stand of victory. This was not a stand of submission, but a stand of victory and significance for us. ④

On the basis of this stand, we drew up the plan of our fight, we implemented the people's war and effectively implemented the combat plan in order to defeat the enemy. The party instructed that we must try to destroy as many of the enemy as possible and to preserve our forces to the maximum. We were small in number and we had to attack a larger force. Therefore, we had to preserve our forces to the maximum and try to kill as many of the enemy as possible. This was our slogan. In terms of numbers, one of us had to kill 30 Vietnamese. If we could implement that plan, we would certainly win. We would defeat Vietnam, regardless of its size. Any country which dares to aggress against Kampuchea will be defeated if we abide by this plan. So far, we have succeeded in implementing this slogan of 1 against 30; that is to say, we lose 1 man against 30 Vietnamese. Thus, our losses are one thirtieth of those of the Vietnamese. ⑤

Attachment to OCIS interview of SA SIEK

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Using these figures, 1 Kampuchean soldier is equal to 30 Vietnamese soldiers. Then how many Vietnamese are equal to 10 Kampuchean soldiers? The answer must be 300. And 100 Kampucheans are equal to 3,000 Vietnamese; and 1 million Kampucheans are equal to 30 million Vietnamese. If we have 2 million troops, there should be 60 million Vietnamese. For this reason, 2 million troops should be more than enough to fight the Vietnamese, because Vietnam only has 50 million inhabitants. We do not need 8 million people. We need only 2 million troops to crush the 50 million Vietnamese; and we still would have 6 million people left. We must formulate our combat line in this manner in order to achieve victory. (1)

This is the combat line to be implemented on the battlefield. We must absolutely implement the slogan of 1 against 30. If we cannot implement this slogan, we will not achieve victory. This matter does not concern only the armed forces, the entire party, army and people must become fully aware of these lines, views and stand. (2)

How well did we implement this combat line in achieving victory? In brief, the 1 against 30 target was attained. We would like to emphasize that the Vietnamese suffered defeats in their attacks against us in November and December. They were also defeated in their attacks launched in February, March and April. (3)

How will they attack us in the future, and how will we handle it? We must look at the prospects. In order to do this we must review past events and look into the future. Did the Vietnamese succeed in beating us? They have wanted to turn Kampuchea into their satellite since 1930. In 1945 we joined in the fight against the French. The Vietnamese then tried to conquer and annex Kampuchea the easy way. Did they succeed then? No, they did not. Did the Vietnamese succeed in conquering Kampuchea in 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1975? No, they did not. For this reason, we should not adopt a defeatist view. We must review our history. Have the Vietnamese succeeded in swallowing Kampuchea? No. They wanted to swallow us in 1970, but they could not. They entered into negotiations in 1973 in an attempt to swallow us, but they did not succeed. They again tried in 1975. Their plan consisted of capturing Prey Nokor [Cambodian name for Ho Chi Minh City] first and then attacking Phnom Penh in order to impose their control over us. Again they were a step behind Kampuchea. Kampuchea achieved victory over them. After our victory, the Vietnamese tried to stage a coup d'etat, and attacked us; again they were defeated. They were defeated in 1975, 1976 and again in 1977. Their April 1978 attack was also defeated. (4)

So, we should read history and be fully confident. We must not believe the lies and confusion of other people who wonder how we, with only 8 million people can defeat Vietnam with its 50 million people. We must not believe that we cannot defeat Vietnam just because we have approximately 100,000 troops against Vietnam's 1 million. They thought so, but they did not understand the historic conditions in which we had scored past victories and because they did not understand the plan that led us to victory. (5)

What was our plan and how did it solve the problems? The Vietnamese have almost 1 million troops. How did we solve this problem in order to achieve victory in our fight. What was the solution to the problem of using a small force to defeat a larger force? It was necessary that the smaller force know how to use effectively the power it had to defeat the larger force, as we mentioned earlier--that is to say, 1 against 30. If we can use one against 30, we will certainly win, even if this fight lasts 700 years or more. But, if we do not adopt this line, we will not win. Therefore, we must: (6)

Attachment of OCIS interview of SA SIEK

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1. Be resolutely determined to defend our territory. Defending Kampuchean territory means defending the Kampuchean race. If the Vietnamese succeed in conquering the country, the Kampuchean race will be completely destroyed within about 30 years. So it is imperative that we defend Kampuchea.

2. Be confident we can defeat the Vietnamese.

3. How do we defeat them? We must understand and know how to use a small force to defeat a larger force. We must use 1 against 30. This is just a number fixed by the party, but in concrete terms, some of our comrades could fight 1 against 10. We would certainly win with 1 against 10 or 1 against 5. Some of our people have already fought 1 against 20 and some have even tried to fight 1 against 50 or 1 against 100. They had no problem and were victorious. This is the combat plan.

To implement the combat plan is to apply the science of people's war to solve the problem, because we must use our smaller force to defeat a larger one. We achieved victory because we properly solved this problem. This is what happened in the past and it is happening now.

What must we do in the future? We must:

1. - Believe we will be able to continue to fight as successfully as we have in the past.
2. Have confidence in the implementation of the same combat plan--1 against 30. Some of our units must fight 1 against 40 and others must try 1 against 50.

The Vietnamese are facing difficult conditions; that is why they have suffered military, political, economic and diplomatic defeats. The entire world knows that Vietnam has aggressed against Kampuchea; everyone says this.

The fighting in the future will remain tough; however, we are prepared for it. During these past 3 or 4 months of fighting the Vietnamese aggressors, our armed forces have developed tremendously, increasing fourfold. This has been the first change.

The second change has been the fact that the number of cadres has increased. In order to develop the armed forces, it is necessary to have cadres. After 1 or 2 months of fighting our cadres can handle battalions. After the same period of time those who were in battalions can command regiments and those who were in regiments can command divisions. We have used our army cadres in the development of our armed forces throughout the country. That is why our armed forces are in control of the situation from (Kantuy Neak) area [words indistinct], from the tip of Ratanakiri down to Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Kratie, Smol, Memot, Prey Veng, Romeas Hek, Prey Veng again, Kandal, Takeo and Kampot. We can smash an enemy regiment attacking us on one front in 1 or 2 days.

In brief, our armed forces are powerful. In some areas, our armed forces attack the enemy like thunderbolts. Why are our armed forces so powerful? It is because we have powerful army cadres. Powerful army cadres make for powerful combatants because combatants are under the guidance of the cadres. These cadres are powerful because they are army cadres who have been properly selected in accordance with the lines set by the party and who implement the plans of pure army cadres. These cadres are extremely powerful. They are powerful, but they never engage in battle without serious planning. They are powerful and can fight effectively. They have succeeded in preserving their forces to the maximum and in destroying a large number of enemy troops.

Attachment to OCIG interview of SA SIEM

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The Vietnamese invaded our territory. They penetrated into Svay Rieng, including Prasot, Chantrea, Kompong Rou and Samraong districts. In Kompong Cham, they entered Momot, Toek Chreou and Ponhea Krek districts. In Takeo, they penetrated into Kach Andet and Kirivong districts. In Kampot, they thrust into Kompong Trach district in November and December. We pushed them back. But even after we drove them off, we kept attacking them. [words indistinct] we did not use large forces; we used crack forces to smash the enemy. With this performance, there should be no concern about annexation of our territory by the Vietnamese.

These combat plans are extremely effective; therefore, we should implement and maintain them. The determining factors--the party cadres and army cadres--must maintain these plans. If we do not follow these plans, many of our forces will be destroyed.

Our victory over the Vietnamese is regarded as a great victory equal to that achieved over the U.S. imperialists. Vietnam has worn the label of revolution, and it is known throughout the world as a powerful country. The Vietnamese armed forces have until now been regarded as the fourth most powerful armed forces in the world. We do not regard the Vietnamese armed forces in this manner.

In brief, as far as national defense is concerned, we have scored a significant achievement. We have done our national defense duty through stubborn and strenuous fighting. After achieving victory in the fight against the U.S. imperialists, our forces showed themselves strongly during the fighting against the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have used large numbers of forces. In the first phase, they used 9 divisions, and later 11 divisions. This is a large number of troops. This is a big war and our forces have achieved a great and wonderful victory. This proves that our forces fight like thunderbolts. Our comrades have never hesitated.

In order to attack the enemy like thunderbolts they have adhered first to a strong and resolute stand; second, to the correct combat plans; and third, to the concept of the permanent presence of commanders in their units and on the battlefields. Unit commanders must be present on the spot in order to grasp the situation on the battlefields, such as on the battlefronts in Kampot, Takeo and the eastern fronts. The commanding officers must be always present so that whenever the enemy attacks, we will know immediately and order the units to counterattack. And after the enemy forces are smashed, we can organize the units for immediate pursuit. As the enemy forces flee, we can order our groups and units to follow them. We can follow and attack the enemy forces until they are routed and forced back across the border. This is what we call the thunderbolt attack.

This system of command will never lose a battle. It will always win because it allows up to the minute monitoring from first-hand reports of the situation. But this system does not study the situation only through reports; it is aware of the location of each battalion, and each enemy position. Whenever a question on the situation is asked, no one in the unit is at rest--everyone is in motion. The command is always aware of the position and location of the 1st Battalion, the 2d Battalion, the 3d Battalion and of the enemy position. It knows how the 3d Battalion is progressing at the front, how it attacks and pursues the enemy. It also knows how far and in what direction the 1st Battalion must move. All forces are permanently on alert. The enemy cannot resist, because our command operates in this manner.

Attachment of CCCJ interview of SA SIEK

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When this system of command is in operation, orders from the division command to regiments, to battalions and to companies are not needed. If we have to wait for reports from platoons to companies, from companies to battalions, from battalions to regiments and from regiments to the division command, and then if orders from the division command have to go through the same number of levels, we will give the enemy forces time to prepare attacks against us. While we are drawing up plans, the enemy forces are ready to attack us again.

Thus we can see that the command of effective cadres is an important factor. This is true in both the army and the economy. We should not wait until the dam bursts to gather people to contain the water. We should work in the same way in regard to the economy, that is, we must always be in control of the situation and prepared. For this reason, we must have a firm belief in our masses, our armed forces, our party, our line of people's war and in our combat lines. Whenever the enemy, from far or near, conducts propaganda campaigns to deceive us, intimidate us and make us fear them, we must counter-act them. We must not allow these germs to attack the masses, our party or our armed forces.

We must purify our armed forces, our party and the people in order to continue fighting the enemy in defense of Kampuchean territory and the Kampuchean race, for if we fail to do so, our race will disappear. Do we want to see the end of the Kampuchean race? If we do not try to defend our territory, we will lose it and our race. The Vietnamese would bring in 1 or 2 million of their people into our country every year, then we would lose our territory and our race would be completely swallowed up. This is our belief.

The cadres in our party, government ministries, offices and army will gain maturity in battle. The fact that the Vietnamese have attacked and aggressed against us has strengthened our revolution and rendered our armed forces and people even more powerful.

Do you appreciate the people's anger which has been reflected in the interviews and radio broadcasts? What about the voices of the old men and women who talk over the radio? What about their angry voices? We must study and understand how angry our people and the youth on the frontline are, both male and female.

All of them are filled with indignation, because they are the direct victims of the enemy's acts. The Vietnamese thought that they would gain through what they have done, but in fact their acts have only served to heighten the flames of anger among our people and our armed forces, thus strengthening our revolution. They could not weaken our revolution. They would have weakened our revolution if we had surrendered, but instead of surrendering we have become even stronger. We have been able to defend our country and will be able to do anything. However, we can only carry out our construction task provided that Kampuchea is preserved. If we lose Kampuchea, what will become of our national construction work? Thus, as we have succeeded in defending Kampuchea, we will certainly be able to do anything.

Attachment to OCIS interview of SA SIEK

Tham Thi
KUEHNEL *Henry J.*