FILENAME: SAE.001

Responses of CHa~N SaM alias SAE, Secretary of the NEW NORTH ZONE, or ZONE 801

"The History of SAE's Own Traitorous Activities from the End of 1973 Until His Arrest on 15 August 1978" (Part II)

10 September 1978

In late 1973 SAE met with CHONG at the Zone meeting and told him about courier arrangements with SI, to which CHONG agreed. CHIM was the courier making personal contact with LETTER K and CHEY SUON. He was appointed because he was a former link of CHEY SUON's wh~n he had been in the city in 1956.

In July 1973 there wasia meeting at the Office of ON. Those attending were: LETTER K, CHEY SUON? SI, CHONG, ON and SAE. At the meeting LETTER K talked about the establishment of traitorous networks in the SOUTHWEST. At this meeting to set up a committee ON was brought into it, too. This was because previously ON had been in LETTER K's section and it was suggested that he be put into the SOUTHWEST Committee. CHONG was appointed Chairman, SI Vice Chairman, and SAE and ON Members. Once it was established its contact hi~her up was with LETTER K. LETTER K said it was necessary to continue the struggle demanding legally that KAH KONG be made an autonomous Sector in direct contact with the CENTRE. Because he feared being unmasked, LETTER K had not intervened to help by making the suggestion on CHONG's behalf. There was repeated anti-CPK activity, which was done in legal and overt form, particularly be exagerrating /bamphloeh/ the line. For example, the CPK wanted organizing done according to the Party's class line regarding class strata of poor and lower middle peasants, but SAE went and appointed only middle and upper middle. If he employed the p~or class, he mostly took lumpen poor. As regards the question of organizing, SAE did the opposite of the CPK organizing line always in order to create confusion with regard to classes vis-a-vis stance and line, making the Party lose its class nature, making it into a wavering, fluctuating Party. This is because a Party must have a firm class stance, otherwise it will fall into the trap of being won over by the CIA. SAE made good people fall from the Party and made things so that bad people stayed in it. After the meeting, LETTER K and CHEY SUON went back to SECTOR 25. ON stayed on. SI and CHONG went back to the Zone, and SAE went back to KAMPOT. When CHONG was arrested, SI came personally to see LETTER K. SAE knew this as he was in the same committe. SI came to tell SAE in KAMPOT. SI told him in April or May 1974. At that time went to the state salt fields, coming from the Zone to KAMPOT. SI said he had come to meet LETTER K in SECTOR 25 in order to make contact with the top links, because before CHONG had met personally with LETTER K, and now that CHONG had been arrested, SI was being promoted to be chairman and had to go up and make personal contact with LETTER K. LETTER K gave instructions that now that the KAH KONG plan had beend defeated it was necessary instead to set up a fallback base, with SI, NHOEK and C~HAN in charge of setting it up. VON agreed to this when SI went to meet him after the arrest of CHONG. This would be a fallback base for struggle if things were unmasked, with its forests and seacoast. The linkage higher up was with the Labour Party, with LETTER K liaising with PHEUM via CHAKREI and CHHOUK.

In February 1974 SAE met TEU KAM at AMLEANG, at a safe house of CHONG's. Attending were CHONG, SI and SAE. They met in order to make a plan to prolong the war. The meeting was in early 1974, and it was about struggling

to prolong the war so that it wouldn't be won before the Yuon, so that the Yuon would win first and would have a free hand to come at attack Kampuchea. That was all the plan was at that time, and then SAE went to the Zone meeting for 1974. The Zone met twice a year, early in the year and late in the year. After the

meeting SAE went back to his place. CHONG reported personally to LETTER K about this meeting. The reason for putting forward this plan was that Lon Nol and the Americans were near defeat, and if Kampuchea won first, the CIA would be defeated, whereas if the Yuon won first, the CIA wouldn't be defeated because there would be the Yuon to fall back on. SAE struggled powerfully to delay things. For example, in late 1974 MOK stipulated that the enemy in the KAMPOT position was not to be allowed out of it at all. If the enemy was able to get out, SAE would be responsible to the Party, and that meant tightly surrounding the enemy and preventing it from going anywhere else. If it got out to anywhere else and attacked someone else, that place would have to take responsibility. Seeing this was the way things were, SAE opened a way to the sea, and seeing that this route to the sea, the enemy used boats to get in. It used about two hundred of its troops and its boats to launch a storming attack in the vicinity of 25, where there was a shortage of troops, so it withdrew troops from there(?). It couldn~t get in anywhere else, so it withdrew from there as the route to the sea was passable(?). At that time SAE ordered CHaN, the commander on the sea, to withdraw. The boats could get in. MOK summoned SAE in to blame him for this. SAE's pretext was that the enemy shelling had been too heavy, forcing a withdrawal, and as soon as there had been a pullback, its soldiers had come in by ship. At that time SAE was in contact with an enemy captain via the son of a subdistrict chief. In 1974, dacoits were created in the PHNUM TAKAEN area. The subdistrict was directly in charge of them. The dacoits were remnants of the TAKAEN soldiers who had been attacked in 1970, and the subdistrict chief was the old society one. The action was making unrest to delay things by making the army go looking for them. A half a month was spent looking for them, after which they were all captured and brought back. The forces over with ON were KH-EM /Secretary of the PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR/ and So~K /Secretary of SIEM REAP SECTOR/. They were CIA built up by ON. SAOM and Krou Ke~~T, the current Secretary of SECTOR 25, had been CIA since they were schoolteachers.

In 1975 SAE was joint commander on the frontline of the battlefield. As 1975 was the year of liberation of the entire nation, when KAMPOT was liberated, SAE knew that the enemy throughout the country had given up the ghost, and that if he didn't attack during the time of victory he would have no prestige in the revolution, he forced himself to go all out and attack too. On 17 April 1975 PHNUM PENH was liberated. SAE heard this broadcast over the radio as did the enemy, and SAE increased his threats against the enemy, so the enemy let him into KAMPOT town. At that time SAE didn't give a damn about war booty, he didn't pay any attention to rearranging and storing it properly, but was lax about this, letting anybody take what they wanted, thereby endangering a quantity of the party's war booty. In particularly, he let bad elements cut up tires for shoes.

SAE repeatedly treated power and authority as his private property and was greedy about material things and womenflesh. He violated eight women. Immediately after liberation, SAE arranged to evacuate the people, letting the villages and subdistricts make the arrangements. Some evacuated people were sent into the jungle, making a number of them die of malaria. Others were sent near to the border, making a number of them escape to Yuonland. The big civil servants and commissioned officers were gathered up and put altogether in a secure place. The enlisted men and the petty civil servants went into the cooperatives. A differentiation was made among those concentrated in the Security place as to which were to be cleaned up and which kept, and which were to be hidden. However, later it turned out that it was not possible to hide those which were supposed to be hidden, so all

of them were cleaned up. Among the evacuees there were Yuon who were sent over to the Yuon, between the two armies, our army sent them over to their army according to an agreement between both sides' Sectors. Contact with the Yuon thereafter was particularly with TEU KAM. He met with SI and they discussed how contact should be maintained.

so that it would continue for a long time and not be unmasked. So the means of contact was that SI turned over V1NH EN to TEU KAM. VINH EN was a TEU KAM person. VINH EN had been evacuated from PHNUM PENH to the WEST ZONE and was with SI. SI had VINH EN melt in with the Yuon, because at that time the only people that the Party allowed to go were Yuon. Khmers couldn't go. VINH EN melted in with the Yuon and when by truck to Yuonland. There was a fixed location along the sea in VEAL RENH where VINH AN had direct contact with SI, near the border. SAE had the opportunity to meet TEU KAM after liberation before SI did. This was when TEU KAM turned thetrcops back over to the Kampuchean side, the ones who had been captured on the islands. SAE went to receive them with TEU KAM in June 1975. He said he wanted to meet SI. Later CHHAN made contact via fishing boats. PHEN was the person in charge of contact in KAMPOT. SI was in charge of contact by sea.

A half month after liberation, CHEY crossed KAMPOT by car travelling from PREY NUP to SECTOR 25. He lunched with SAE and brought up the problem of veterans of the struggle. He said he just didn't know what their destiny was going to be. SAE said the two of them weren't the only veterans. There were a lot of others, and whatever happed to the others would happen to them. CHEY said he was bringing this up because he was afraid it wouldn't be any different than it had been with th~ Ha Noi group.

Later SAE had has wife take a letter to CHEY in which SAE told him to get in direct touch with VON and ask him now that the country was independent, how was the CIA going to proceed. At that time, CHEY told SAE that VON was now in PHNUM PENH, and that he would contact him and let SAE know. After that, CHEY went to PHNUM PENH too, to be in charge of the money storehouse.

Finally, in July 1975, SAE met LETTER K during the meeting of the CENTRE. SAE told him there were forces in KAMPOT which currently belonged to the CPK but which would turn in the days to come. SAE met SI often. After independence SI came to his place two or there times. SI spoke of contact with TEU KAM, but said it was now more important to talk about building up forces, particularly army forces.

When the railways needed people for the railways, PRANG's group came to find some, but SAE didn't know him well. LETTER K had told SAE about PRANG in 1960, when PRANG was a railway worker. Later, SAE met PRANG in around August 1975 when he came to repair the railway bridge at the East KAMPOT market.

In late 1975 the Party arrested the link-s of the So~K group, CHAMRAOEN in SECTOR 25. At that time, SAE didn't know what was up. He only heard about it from LETTER K and CHEY SUON and their group, who regreted this. He said initially they wanted to have some preventative plan, but they were afraid of being unmasked, and then later the arrests took place. They didn't dare to cover things up, fearing this might lead to chaos and the arrest of everybody. At this time he was at the CHAKREI TING factory. SAE was going by car to PHNUM PENH to meet MOK at BAEK CHAN for a Zone meeting.

In early 1976 the plan was to arrange to complete putting up paddy dikes everywh~re. There was thought only of the rear battlefield. In 1976 a coup committee was set up. SAE didn't attend but SI told him about it. YA was its chairman, THUCH its vice chairman, and the others were CHEY 5UON, CHHOUK, SI and CHAKREI. Th~ troops in PHNUM PENH of CHAKREI and EUAN would attack. The troops helping from behind would be those of SDAONG in SECTOR 25 and CHHOUK in SECTOR 24. This first plan was defeated when the Party arrested CHHOUK, CHAKREI and YA.

RiN, the Chairman of the KAMPOT SECTOR Security, had been a veteran of the struggle before. When he had tried to re-enter the maquis, he had been arrested by

the enemy, and then after the coup he was released. SAE took him on as a traitorous link from that point, and made him Chairman of Sector Security. Later he went to TAKAEV. SAE instructed RIN to first examine the backgrounds of the individuals in security and then build them up into forces for carrying out further activities. In KAMPOT, the district security sent people to the Sector Security, and anybody who could be used for activities was kept and the rest were cleaned up. Anybody who was already exposed and obviously in opposition was cleaned up. The arrangement was that the others would be sent back into the cooperatives. He lo-ked at these persons, and if they were the kind who wouldn't change their treasonous character, were degenerates, thieves and plunderers, womanflesh types who had abandoned their wives, they were to be kept on as traitorous forces.

Once SAE met CHEY who told him that SAVAT was also CIA.

Later a new coup committee was formed, and SI told him about the plan for a coup in 1977. LETTER K didn't participate in so many traitorous meetings, SI said, because this would bring suspicion. The Chairman of the new comm ttee was PHEUM; the Vice Chairman NHEUM, and the Members were SI and PHUONG. This coup also did not succeed. One reason was that THUCH and his links were arrested.

SAE travelled to SIEM REAP in March 1977. On the way he stopped off to rest in PHNUM PENH. He then stopped over to rest in KAMPUNG CHAM, where he worked with POK, and he then travelled with cadres who worked in SIEM REAP. Once arrangements were made, they arrived in April 1977. Then in May 1977 the Organization cleaned up the SoT/SEAN network, and they were sent to the Organization one after the other. After the clean-up in May 1977, arrangements were made to put in new traitorous forces, that is, starting in May 1977. These arrangements were discussed with SoK /Secretary of SIEM RE~P SECTOR/, SEUAN and KHO~EM. This meeting took place at the SIEM REAP SECTOR office, and those there were: SAE; SOK, Secretary of SIEM REAP SECTOR; KHOEM, Secretary of PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR; and SEUAN, Commander of the Division of the NEW NORTH ZONE. They agreed to put in traitorous forces previously built up, starting with KRALANH district and then proceeding to the other districts.

From early 1977 through 1978, SAE had SEUAN carry out anti-Party activities according to his instructions. He made more than one hundred troops defect to the In Tam group, even taking some guns with them. They went three, four, five and even ten persons at a time. They went in order to prepare forces for the future.

In May 1977, SAE had SEUAN give instruction to the Thai Revolution. However, these instructions were legal. There wasn't yet the courage to given any instructions different from those of the Party. This was because these guys came frequently to meet BROTHER I and BROTHER II. So if the instructions were wrong it would result in unmasking. The instructions were that as these were Thai people it was therefore necessary to lead them with a broad united front. There had to be singing and dancing, football and pingpong. Let these things continue. Allow them don't prohibit them.

In July 1977 SAE summmoned SEUAN to a meeting at SAE's place, telling him to go make contact with CH~UM, an old CIA link who was Chairman of the KAMPUNG CHAM rubber plantations. SEUAN made contact with CHEUM and also reported on the attack on Bl~T, which was that when he was still Division Commander, he secretly kept a woman who was the younger sister of a traitor

infiltrating the SOUTHWEST undercover who was still working with BIT.

After that SAE made contact with traitorous elements who were district secretaries and deputy secretaries in SECTOR 43, instructing them to carry out activities.

Later SEUAN reported that CHEUM had contradictions with POK on personal matters, that is, the matter of status and prestige. POK had appointed him Chairman of

the rubber plantations, but he wasn't really doing what he was told and was objecting. Later, SEUAN reported to SAE that POK had a viewpoint of putting up a woman in a house near the rubber plantations which he visited every once in a while, but that SEUAN didn't know whether this was true or was a provocative story aimed at personal struggle or maybe causing fissures within the Party.

In July 1977 when the PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR was made a part of the NEW NORTHERN ZONE, SEUAN gave Hâng more than 50 guns together with ammunition. SAE didn-t know about this, SEUAN did it on his own. Previously SAE had told SEUAN that HânG was an old CIA link, but when the new Zone was set up, the Organization told SAE that he should keep him under consideration. At that time SAE didn't yet know that the Party had HANG under surveillance. When HâNG was arrested, SEUAN was afraid that H~NG would implicate him during interrogation. That's when SEUAN came to tell SAE that he had already given HâNG more than 50 guns. SAE told SEUAN not to worry, that even if this came out in interrogation, his only error was not having told his superiors. Later, SAE reported this matter to the Organization, who remained silent. At that time, he was in SECTOR 5 and SAE was accompanying him. SAE told him at NHEUM's house because SAE was afraid it might entnagle him. HâNG had given these guns to dacoits in the vicinity of PREAH VIHEAR. The administrator of these dacoits was "Ba-31", that is, the PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR worksite. Later, SAE pulled "B-31" back from that location because it was further forward than the tro~ps. The organization orderd a general pullback to from 10 to 15 kilometers from the border. HâNG came to tell SAE that the setting up of "B-31" was just a pretext. In fact, these guys were themselves dacoits and were also hiding food supplies and producing for them as well.

SAE said the Organization had now given instructions and there was no choice but to pull them back. If there wasn't a pull back then we would be unmasked. If this place was to be prepared, a decision had to be make to turn it over to the IN TAM group in the DANG REK area, that would be easier, because we wouldn-t be exposed so easily.,

When the withdrawal took place, HâNG took the guns from there and gave them to the dacoits and terrified a number of them into going into the forest, too, to go join the IN TAM group. Some of the guns were brought back. The Organization knew about this matter because SAE told him so that SAE wouldn't be implicated. There were more than 100 guns there, some of which had been taken from SEUAN and some of which were HâNG's.

In February 1978, SAE met NHEUM at his house in SECTOR 5. SAE introduced RIN to him, saying that previously RIN had been with SAE in KAMPOT, had been the Deputy Secretary of KAMPOT SECTOR, SAE~s Deputy, and was now being transferred here, and was an older traitorous link

Starting in March 1978, after the Party cleaned up the traitorous network of HâNG from the Sector down to the districts and the various offices and services, SAE made arrangements to put in place his own traitorous network. This was discussed with So~K and KHOEM. SAE met SOK at his house at the SIEM REAP SECTOR Office in SAUT NIKUM. The NORTH ZONE had two Sectors. The PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR had KHOEM as Secretary, KHOEM having come from KAMPUNG SPEU. The SIEM REAP SECTOR had SOK as Secretary. KHOEM had orginally been built up by ON. The Deputy was REUAN, who had been built up by SEUAN. At the Office arrangements were made with the persons there. At that time the Organization didn't want anybody new brought in from elsewhere, but wanted SAE to take on those already there. The selection was left up to KHOEM and

REUAN.

During the period when SAE was in the SIEM REAP SECTOR and the NEW NORTH ZONE, he was in direct contact with LETTER K. He met LETTER K directly during CENTRE meetings, although the rest periods were short, lasting no more than

ten or fifteen minutes. No couriers were assigned because LETTER K's house was right next door to BROTHER II's house, so a courier wouldn't have been able to get in.

As regards ministries, offices and security police, in May 1977 SAE began making arrangements. Initially he took on SOK and SEAN persons. Then in June 1977, there were responses from SOT and SEAN and all of them were arrested. It was only in June 1977 that there was reorganization. Requests were made for some persons from the KAMPOT SECTOR, and some combatants who were with SAE were also selected. The arrangements were made for the ministries and offices

Then in April 1978 it was necessary to removed LEAP as chairman of the NEW NORTH ZONE Fishing and send him on leave to do production in SAUT NIKUM district. The reason for this was he conducted traitorous activities and was exposed. He had been threatening the people who were fishing. ~is intention was to attack and force the people away from the revolution, to make the people lose faith in the revolution. He even hit the people.

SAE instructed Security that anyone who systematically betrayed the Party and had already been exposed could not be kept but would have to be cleaned up. But anyone who had betrayed but was not yet unmasked and could potentially be kept and built up into a traitorous force for us should be kept alive and and released to go to the worksitesat PHNUM KRAOM or in the districts. A number of others went to the cooperates, but these were few.

In April 1978 SAE had discussions with KHOEM at the PREAH VIHEAR SECTOR Office about arrangements for the ministries and offices since the arrest of HâNG, because almost all of those in them were implicated in HâNG's answers, but at the time there was a shortage of people. At that time SAE decided that it was sufficient for the moment to arrest only the important ones and let KHOEM administer things while gradually building up forces and putting them in place. No Security was set up in PREAH VIHEAR because no one could be found to do it, so those who were implicated in HâNG's answers and their clique were all arrested and sent to SIEM REAP Security.

Later, in March 1978, the Committee remained the same, and it was rearranged. This committee was preparing an attack from the outside as well, and was going to decide on the attack from the inside, too. The external attack would rely on the Yuon, with the EAST being attacked first. The appointment of this latter committee took place at a meeting in the EAST in the vicinity of TONLE BET. Those attending were: 1. PHEUM, Chairman of the EAST; 2. NHEUM, Secretary of the NORTHWEST; 3. CHa~N, Deputy Secretary of the EAST; KâN, Deputy Secretary of the NORTHWEST; RIN, Secretary of SECTOR 5; 6. SEUANG, Chairman of the Military for the WEST; 7. RâN, Secretary of SECTOR 13; 8. VI, Secretary of the NORTHEAST; 9. SAE; 10. PHUONG, Chairman of the State Rubber Plantations; 11. SAY, INDUSTRY; 12. PâNG, Chairman of Ministry S 71; 13. SI, Secretary of the WEST; 14. YI, Secretary of SECTOR 505; 15. LIN, Member of the EAST; 16 AN, Chairman of the State Industry Ministry. This meeting set up a coup committee chaired by PHEUM, with NHEUM as Vice Chairman and SI and PHUONG as members. At that time LETTER K was still hiding his face and didn't go for fear of being unmasked. Part of the plan was that the Ministries on the inside would carry out assassinations of the leadership. The plan failed and PHEUM ran away and killed himself.

In late April or in May 1978, a courier from the NORTHWEST brought SaV TREUANG. NHEUM sent word to SAE asking him to help hide SAV TREUANG. SAE

asked LEAP to hide him below KAMPUNG KHLEANG in SAUT NIKUM district. He came with his own rice, and SAE didn't find out what NHEUM wanted him to do there before NHEUM was arrested by the Organization.

After the arrest of NHEUM, SAE went to make contact with RIN and had RIN go tell KOE. The contact was about what arrangements should be made now, and that they should wait for LETTER K to gather everybody for a meeting and then take it from there.

After the failure of this plan LETTER K gathered forces once at the June 1978 meeting in PHNUM PENH. Those attending were: 1. LETTER K; 2. SAE; 3. CHAN; 4. KOE, Deputy Secretary of the NORTHWEST; 5. RIN; 6. RâN; 7. SEUANG; 8. VI. LETTER K's instructions were there had been failures in the past, but if we didn't meet we would still undoubtedly die someday. Maybe everything had been unmasked now, but it could be that the CENTRE STANDING COMMITTEE still didn-t believe it. He said he could have especially been unmasked by CHAP, SAY, SEAN, SECTOR 106 and CHEY SUON.

This meeting took place about ten days after the meeting of the CENTRE.

Liaison with the Yuon was to be left to the EAST, since it was close. CHAN would arrange for the contact. Now that SI and SDAOENG had been arrested, RâN would make the arrangements for force building in the SOUTHWEST. It would be SEUANG in the WEST, VI in the NORTHEAST, KOE in the NORTHWEST, CHAN in the EAST, AN and PRANG in PHNUM PENH. The arrangements were to be in line with what was said by LETTER K at this meeting in late June 1978 after the CENTRE meeting.

The leadership of the Labour Party was LETTER K, SAE and CHAN, just the three of them.

There was no where to run to because there was a lack of food supplies. It was impossible to escape. If one ran away to Thailand it was still a liberated *zone. If one escaped into the forest there would be a lack of food supplies. HâNG had tried to make contacts in Laos but failed. On 15 August 1978 SAE was arrested by the Organization. When he came to the Organization's Office, he saw LETTER K once. They ate together, but there were a lot of others around, so they didn't talk about anything.

10 September 197