

A STUDY

**LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ELDERS OF FORMER
GENERATIONS**

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Foreword

The following text was the collection of the historical events that were encountered heard, researched, and analyzed and summed up for the purposes of serving the ideal of national reunification and reconciliation.

With hopes of receiving extensive and profound collaboration.

We all are living for the well-being of the nation.

A researcher

INTRODUCTION

In 1863 French colonialism came to Cambodia in the form of a protectorate.

Armed movements to fight the French emerged in many independent groups. Almost all these groups were led by former monks, because at that time monks were educated: they had the highest educational knowledge. After leaving the monkhood, they were still living in close contact with the masses during easy as well as during difficult times. This is why the masses believed in and trusted them.

In 1945, struggle movements emerged once again. This time, the movements differed from the previous ones as follows:

- The Issarak group had almost been royalists
- The Issarak group of SON Ngoc Thanh had tendencies towards America.
- The Issarak group of SON Ngoc Minh was a communist movement.

Between 1949 and 1953, France gave autonomy to Kompong Thom and Siem Reap provinces, and then to Battambang province. The Royalist Issarak in these provinces delivered their units to H.M. the King.

In 1953, on the 9th of November, France gave independence to the Kingdom of Cambodia, to the Cambodian King, His Majesty Preah Bath Samdech Preah NORODOM Sihanouk Varman.

The SON Ngoc Minh Issarak, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, explained to its ranks, "The independence that the French handed over to Cambodia was the trick of using palm leaves to wrap palm sugar." This was because Vietnam needed Cambodia to contribute in continuing the Indochinese war.

In 1954, the French army was defeated at Dien Bien Phu, the Indochina war ended, and the Geneva Conference began.

On 20 July 1954, Geneva Conference decided that:

- The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party shall dissolve its ranks, dissolve its army, and dissolve its liberated zones, and join and live within the national society.
- An International Control Committee for shall be established with its composition from the Free World and Communist countries to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the Agreement.

Observation: The Geneva decision was in principle to reunify the Cambodian nation to live under the roof of the Monarchy.

In implementing this agreement HO Chi Minh decided:

- To withdraw SON Ngoc Minh to Hanoi and leave SIV Heng to take the responsibility for the inside of the country.
- To withdraw 1,700 Cambodian combatants and cadres and take them to study in Vietnam..

Also in implementing this agreement, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party at the initiative of Pol Pot, decided to split its forces into three:

1. Overt forces for standing in the elections, the so-called "People's Group";
2. Secret forces, meaning Pol Pot and the Party leadership;
3. Semi-overt forces, meaning a number of cadres who were assigned by Pol Pot to join and live inside the Democratic Party.

In 1954, on 8 September, the Manila Conference created SEATO, which was a defense alliance.

In 1955, on 24 April, the Ban Dung Conference adopted a Five-Point Peace Principle.

In 1955, on 15 May, H.M. the King of Cambodia issued a communiqué to designate Cambodia as a country that retained a policy of neutrality and was not under the military protection of SEATO.

The King also announced his abdication.

The security situation inside the country at that time was as follows:

1. The Issarak of SON Ngoc Minh had been already solved through the Geneva decision. The SON Ngoc Thanh – the Free Khmer rebels (ឧទ្ទាមខ្មែរសេរី) - had been evicted from the Dang Rek (Mountain) and had fled to seek shelter in South Vietnam.
2. The rebels in the jungles who kidnapped people for ransom were suppressed.

From 9 November 1953 through 15 May 1955, a period of one year six months and six days, all the dreams of the elders of former generations starting from the Krâla Haom Kung era (សម័យក្រុងហោមគង់) had been realized by a single Cambodian who had just given Cambodia its independence and made it a country of national reunification, security, and peace that was just starting to show its face and its presence in the international arena. This issue was not so ordinary, because this had to pass through a savage storm by SEATO.

Our Khmer people of this generation and subsequent generations recognize that they have obligations to study to seek to understand about the causes of failure and victory of the people of former generations.

Observation: In China, DENG Xiaoping spent the last 20 years of his life collecting his lessons learned and raising a new work-plan as his heritage for posterity. Successful children of this generation have profound pride in their elder “DENG.”

Both LON Nol and POL Pot faced bitter failures during their lives; even though they have departed this world, they left behind no ideals or thoughts to enlighten posterity.

The case of LON Nol is outside ECCC jurisdiction, but he was also an elderly person of Cambodia.

The cases of POL Pot, NUON Chea, and UNG Choeun are cases within ECCC jurisdiction. Among them only NUON Chea is still alive, but he has not yet done anything at all to give anyone hope.

CHAPTER ONE

Summary of Kampuchean History

According to Personal Research

I. To Have Peace and Security There Must First Be Progress

A. Domestic Progress:

This is about the progress in building up of human resources through expanding the educational field and creating light industries.

In 15 years, from 1955 to 1970, the educational field progressed very rapidly. The movement of building up of human resources who were petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia accordingly had momentum.

Light industries are a seed bed for growing industrial workers. Just one textile factory in Kompong Cham had over 600 workers. In the whole country, there might be from 6,000 to 10,000 workers who were making efforts to grasp their specialties everyday. At the same time with the birth of workers, there were also national capitalists. Industrial workers and national capitalists were human resources.

B. Progress in the International Arena:

After the Ban Dung Conference, five neutral statesmen, NERU, TITO, SUKARNO, NASSER, and SIHANOUK, did their utmost to expand the ranks of neutral countries until

they became the Nonaligned Movement (ចលនាមិនចូលបក្សសម្ព័ន្ធ). The Nonaligned Movement was an assembly of the poor and weak countries, but it consisted of many countries and required the attention of the free world and communist countries.

People of many countries knew of Sihanouk before they knew of Angkor Wat.

II. Political, Economic and Ideological Aspects:

A. Political Perception of the Kampuchean People:

The Cambodian society was comprised of five social classes. Eighty five percent of the population were peasants. The Cambodian peasants were Sihanouk and CHUON Nath loyalists. No one could impact these two dignitaries without the Cambodian peasants protesting in response.

B. The Production Movement in the Decades of the 1950s and 1960s

In a production movement, all participating parties must rely upon one another, but each of them must not be obsessed with their earnings.

My father was a clerk at Fishing Lot Number 6 Company. My father needed the Company in order to live, and the company needed my father for their work. My father wanted to have additional earnings. However, the Company could not provide him with enough income.

Besides the patron and the clerk, there were also workers and reciprocal laborers [អ្នកប្រវាស់]. The patron was a share holder who knew how to go down close to the work. The patron was a national capitalist. The mutual laborers were peasants who lived in the same village as the patron. After finishing the rice farming work, the workers rushed out to fish.

This company had 10 worth 100,000 Riels each. The patron had only three and a half shares. Six shares were in the hands of the children and nephews of a top government official. This company paid 100,000 Riels each year as tea money when bidding on fishing lots.

A worker's salary was 300 Riels; 1,500 Riels for the clerk, and 3,000 Riels for the patron. All of them ate company meals. The patron and the clerk each had a small cup of coffee before they started to work before gruel time. This company worked only for six months during the fishing season. The profit per a share was 100,000 Riels.

Observation: In 1965 a construction worker, also known as weekly coolie, had meals at his/her own expense - 20 Riels in a day. At that time, good quality rice cost 2.5 Riels/kg, pork: 20-25 Riels/kg, noodle soup: 10 Riels/plate, Gold: 3,300 Riels/Damloeng, Peugeot bicycle: 7,500 Riels.

C. Seeking to Understand Ideology in the Decades of the 1950s and 1960s

National capitalists were not the life-and-death enemies of the worker class; they were clever in performing their work. Rattanak Sambath of the Pailin Rose romance – a capitalist in the literature book – was a bright man in his profession and was smart in selecting the successor. However, he was smeared by a 1960s film commentary of the Soviet Union.

For the “on credit” agriculture [កសិកម្ម “បណ្តាក់”], it was a great burden on the poor peasants, but the cost of a pair of shorts that Pol Pot raised in his 27 September 1977 speech was exaggerated.

For any class, it should not be raised or brought down wrongly regarding its true nature. Before 1970, the Communist Party of Kampuchea smear campaign had greatly impacted class. After 17 April, a pervasive and frightening campaign of screening/purging appeared.

Before 1970, the Party had explained to its ranks that the feudal power-holding class implemented a policy of impoverishment, hooliganism and debauchery, and fascism. By 17 April, this had become apparent. The core message of this explanation was the tactics to

overthrow Sihanouk following a clear plan (Documents កំណត់ 166 ERN 00078015 and កំណត់ 693 ERN 00003140-141).

Clarification: Prior to 1970 the Party used the term feudalist power-holding class in place of the word Sihanouk.

III. LON Nol and POL Pot

A. LON Nol

LON Nol was the leading student of the first class of active officers. He believed in the modern weaponry, combined-arms war, and magical spells. He had a constant political ambition, to establish a presidential style republican regime. He rejected national reunification. The direction he set was to bring down the monarchy by means of coup and to smash the communists through combined-arms war.

Lon Nol was a serious man. His library was big. Whatever books he had, he read them all. The book “The New Khmer Way” [ដំណើរខ្មែរថ្មី] that he wrote was not paid much attention to.

Lon Nol was only interested in assembling armed forces and the upper strata who were soldiers, police, secret police [nokorbal] , parliamentarians, government officials and all the provincial governors in order to use these forces to grasp power in the way a crocodile wolfs down its prey [តាមរបៀបក្រពើត្រចាក់ចំណី].

Lon Nol did not consider the peasants at all. He did not understand that no matter how good political ideals were, it was still imperative to have the national power, meaning the peasants, more than 85% of the population, understand and absorb them first before that force would support him

B. Pol Pot

Pol Pot was a self-isolated communist.

Since 1968 when he had had the opportunity to share ideas with Soeung [ស៊ីង], a mastermind of Cultural Revolution, he set himself up as a pioneer of the international proletarian revolution movement. He designated very many strategic enemies: the imperialists, colonialists, revisionists, idealists, the Indochina Federation, the imperialist lackeys, feudalists, capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie.

Tactically, Pol Pot instructed us to make a clear distinction between the overt and the secret. Do not say what should not be said, What should be said, must be said in a moderate way. He instructed us to be flexible according to the actual circumstances such as raising the flag of protecting neutrality, for example.

The direction of Pol Pot was to build revolutionary forces in the countryside, to use the countryside to surround the cities to liberate the country through people's war.

As for war, Pol Pot was a capable Supreme Commander. The documents "People's War," "Guerilla Tactics," "A Number of Party Policies" ["សង្គ្រាមប្រជាជន" "យុទ្ធវិធីសង្គ្រាមល្អប" "គោលនយោបាយមួយចំនួនរបស់បក្ស"] written by POL Pot met the necessary needs.

POL Pot was meticulous in his work. Each time a battlefield was opened, the maps were always in his personal possession.

C. Summary

On one side were LON Nol and SON Ngoc Thanh; on the other side were POL Pot, NUON Chea, UNG Choeun. All of them used war as their means to fight and break the opposing parties.

IV. After Geneva, the Initial Work of the Party

At first, the Party re-linked the work networks for the cadres.

In 1956, the Party assigned the “secret protection units”, i.e. assigned men of the Party to work as militia of the enemy, armed with enemy weapons, to protect the cadres when traveling.

Clarification: The cadres of the Party Center had many others means of protection, among which money was the most significant – when the enemy chased them, they dug out the money, all 100 Riels notes, from a bag and threw it on the ground.

In 1958, the Party started to create militia units.

On the people’s work side, the Party began by organizing overt organizations to camouflage the semi-overt activities. The child-delivery association, death association, paddy-rice association and the reciprocal labor groups were legal and open organizations in which one, two, or three new cadres could learn on how to organize, to propagandize/educate, to organize overt activities. All of these were to connect emotionally with the people. The semi-overt activities were to propagandize by word of mouth about the local news and revolutionary theories. Finally, they organized groups to study progressive documents.

Clarification: The paddy-rice associations and the reciprocal labor groups were the buds/shoots of the cooperatives.

POL Pot competed with Sihanouk to take peasant forces through the tactic of nibbling away one of two at a time. However, the coup on 18 March 1970 caused Pol Pot to gain entire blocks of forces.

V. Pol Pot and the leadership level of Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party prior to 17 April 1975

Two overt cadres namely NOP Bophan (ណុប បូផាន់) and NUON Suon (នួន សួន) were imprisoned [and/or] killed by the enemy. Eight secret cadres who had leadership roles within the

Party were all raked away (កៀសចេញ), kicked out (ផ្ដើលជើង), [and/or] smashed (កំទេច). They are:

1. SIV Heng (ស៊ីវ ហេង) was raked away in 1960.
2. TOU Samuth (ទូសាមុត) was smashed on 20 July 1962.
3. PEN Yuth (ប៉ែន យុត) was recorded in a document as being a traitor – disappeared.
4. SITHON (ស៊ីម៉ុង) alias Mon (ម៉ុង). Pol Pot wrote that he was a traitor, but was kept and used by SAO Phim (សោភីម).
5. Yong (យ៉ុង) was smashed by KOY Thuon (កុយ ធ្នូន) at the order of Pol Pot.
6. MA Màng (ម៉ាម៉ង់) was smashed in 1968 at the summit of Oral Mountain (ឱរ៉ាវ៉ា).
7. KÈV Meas (កែវ មាស) was kicked out abandoned in Preah Vihear in 1973.
8. Prasoeut (ប្រស៊ីត) alias Chong (ចុង), a Deputy Secretary of the Southwest, was smashed in 1974.

Medium-ranking cadres who had gained eight years or more Party seniority were abandoned by the Party because the 1960 Party Statute stated that: “For any Party member whose Party seniority reaches ten years or more, the Party will examine Central Membership for them.” LY Nguon (លីង្គូន) of Kampong Seila (កំពង់សីលា) and Tao Chhum (តោឈុំ) of Prek Russei (ព្រែកបូស្សី) wanted to rejoin the Party but were rejected.

The 1971 Party Statute abandoned the seniority requirement, but instead took up the “Ten Qualifications” in its place (D00674, ERN 00053020-023). This was done with the intent to get rid of the old cadres whom the Party did not want to join the Center.

VI. Counter-Revolutionary Activities and Revolutionary Activities from 1956 through 1966

In Phnom Penh, after the conception of SEATO, the activities of an American Military Assistance Mission appeared along with those of a gang of teenagers, the so-called Phkay Preuk (ផ្កាយព្រឹក-morning stars) and White Bike (កង់ស៊ីវ) Solex.

Subsequently, events that people still remember well occurred:

- SÂM Sary (សម សារី) was exposed and successfully escaped.
- A coup d’etat planned by DAP Chhuon (ដាប់ ឈួន) failed.
- A spy named PHAM Vinh Tong (ផាម វីញតុង) sent a plastic explosive into the Royal Palace and killed a person (មឃរ៉ែន) there.
- Bernard LABAT and SONGSAK Kitiphanit (សុង សាក់ គីទីផានិត) destroyed the national budget.
- “Chhèb” (ឆែប), a Taiwanese spy, came to implement a plan to lay a mine along the road to Pochentong in an attempt to assassinate Preah Mohaksattrayani and Liv Sav Chi (លីវ សាវធី), but the plan failed.

- Leaders of Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) such as PREAP ឃុំ (ព្រហ្ម ឃុំ) were convicted and sentenced to death by a Martial Court.

Note: PHAM Vinh Tong and Chhèb were detained in Central Prison until 3 April 1970.

In 1963-64 global events were turbulent, including:

- 22 November 1964 – KENNEDY was assassinated in Dallas.
- 1964 – America directly intervened in the Vietnam War.
- In Laos, there was a coup de'etat by Khorng Le (ខង ឡែង).
- In Thailand, Sarit THANARAT (សារិត ថានារាត) died.
- In Vietnam, DUONG Van Minh (ដួង វ៉ាន់មិញ) staged a coup de'etat to eliminate NGO Dinh Diem's family.

Khmer students at the time called all these events “America changing its horse.”

All this was a clue that a coup de'etat might be imminent in Cambodia.

In September 1964, the Party mobilized all the forces it was able to build to spread leaflets, in general in an attempt to inform the people that Lon Nol planned to stage a coup-d'Etat. This first distribution of leaflets drew wide public attention. Subsequent distributions of leaflets were carried out in the style of raids spreading four to ten to twenty leaflets here and four to ten to twenty leaflets there. During the harvest season in the countryside, leaflets were inserted into bundles of rice,

Note: After the first spreading of leaflets, over 10 leaflet throwers were arrested by LON Nol and were detained. Other progressives rose up in succession and joined the revolution, in the spirit that they refused to remain quiet any longer.

VII. LON Nol Forces and POL Pot Forces prior to the Coup

The 1966-1970 legislature of the National Assembly was the political force of LON Nol.

The 1966 LON Nol Government was born in a political context where the situation in Southeast Asia was boiling: the war in Vietnam was escalating, the Coup-d'État in Indonesia was killing people. LON Nol inaugurated his government with a starting act to implement a plan to hold control of rural areas militarily, cruelly suppressing the peasant opposition.

The Khmer Workers' Party (បក្សពលករខ្មែរ), since it still had few militia forces, decided that peasants and revolutionary forces evade the war. In Samlaut (សំឡូត), peasants fled up Veay Chap Mountain (ភ្នំវាយចាប).

LON Nol was compelled to dissolve his 1966 government, but he actively continued his vicious campaign everywhere.

In 1967, the Party concentrated on expanding militia units. In late 1967, it had a militia unit at every strategic site, sufficient to attack and fix the enemy soldiers in place; then they attacked the Bai Damram Post (ប៉ុស្តិ៍បាយដំរាំ) on 18 January 1968, which opened the way for a Peoples' War, a war of national liberation.

By late 1968 in the Northeast Zone, an area the size of Kompong Chhnang Province had been liberated.

VIII. Coup Activities of LON Nol:

In September 1969, LON Nol created a Coup-d'État government named the “National Salvation Government (រដ្ឋាភិបាលស្រោចស្រង់ជាតិ).” He implemented a step-by-step plan as follows:

- Monopolize purchasing rice from all districts, according to the tactic: control the rice, prepare for war;
- Murder a number of elites by intrigue -- the Supreme Patriarch CHUON Nath, was the ultimate elite whom they did not dare spare – apart from him there were: SREY Vèn (ស្រី វ៉ែន), SĒNG Sun Thai (សេង ស៊ុនថៃ), and BÈN Kabau (ប៉ែនកាបូ) ;
- On the National Assembly side, they removed KÈV San (កែវ សាន) and placed ÌN Tam (ឺន តាំ) as Acting President of the National Assembly;
- On 8 March 1970, they fabricated a story about an invasion of Vietcong forces having been fought by Cambodian Military forces and a number of weapons had been captured;
- On 13 March 1970, they carried out a demonstration to attack the Embassy of Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Office of the Representative of South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government.
- On 18 March 1970, they had soldiers fully equipped with weapons round their chests surrounded the National Assembly in many layers. They had ÌN Tam (ឺន តាំ) lead a meeting of both houses of parliament in order to raise a censure motion to withdraw their confidence in Sihanouk, during which they asked TRINH Vanh

(ទ្រិញ វ៉ាញ) to speak first. Finally, ǺN Tam threatened, “They already control all the weapons!”

Sihanouk was removed from his position as Head of State and from the Chairman of the Sankum Reastr Niyum (សង្គមរាស្ត្រនិយម), and CHĒNG HĒng (ចេង ហេង) was placed as the Head of State, and ǺN Tam(អ៊ិន តាំ) as National Assembly President and as Chairman of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum.

Note: During the above meeting, only PHUONG Sān (វ៉ុង សាន) did not dare insult Sihanouk strongly, but he was shouted at by the others.

IX. LON Nol Forces and Sihanouk and POL Pot’s Forces:

A. LON Nol Forces:

- Forces that supported LON Nol were very few. The officials at the district levels were waiting for the opportunity to flee to their respective provinces. The officials at various provinces and ministries supported LON Nol, but not with all their hearts; to the the contrary, they had their stomachs and their faces, and they brought them to LON Nol for solutions.
- After UM Manorin (អ៊ុំ ម៉ាណូរិន) was placed in detention, the police forces were integrated into the military forces. Both the soldiers and the police were promoted one rank, but still there were deserters. This required LON Nol to grab new soldiers. Primary schools in Phnom Penh became new military camps.
- In March that year, SEATO provided one shipload of new weaponry and ammunition that had been completely transported and stored by 1 April 1970.
- Immediately after the Coup-d’État, he declared that this war was a war to drive out the Vietcong and Vietminh. “Only Cambodians must live on Cambodian territory.”

He had them gather up and arrest the ethnic Vietnamese residents and repatriate them to their country. To the contrary, he set up urgent diplomatic relations with the Republic of Vietnam. In May 1970, NGUYEN Van Thieu (ង្វើន វ៉ាន់ធីវ) arrived in Neak Loeung (អ្នកលៀង) to help in giving advice for that site which was of military strategic importance. NGUYEN Van Thieu (ង្វើន វ៉ាន់ធីវ) also dispatched his military forces into Khmer territory using a slogan of chasing out the Vietcong. But later on, they were condemned by the Kampuchean people in general, because these military forces had impacted the property of the Kampuchean people and the pure traditions of the Khmer women.

- In order to restore his popularity -- the popularity that he had never had at all -- LON Nol released all political prisoners on 3 April 1970.
- On the international stage, LON Nol received little confidence. Among the Free World countries, France for example showed its confidence by placing only an interim Chargé-d'affaires -- Thailand only assisted in giving him magic scarf.

Note: France and Thailand two among the eight countries that had created the SEATO -- the airfields for the America's B-52s were in Thailand) -- the B-52s that flew to drop bombs for 200 days and 200 nights on the Kampuchean people, were flown out of U-Tapao Airbase.

B. Sihanouk Forces:

The forces that supported Sihanouk were peasants. Kampuchean peasants did not possess any significant property; they only had their physical and mental strengths and their lives for their Samdech Euv (King Father).

As for the Coup-d'Etat that they had just heard about from Khmer Rouge propaganda, now they saw clearly with their own eyes. Seeing LON Nol insult Sihanouk very rudely, they grew even angry, and they rose up in protest until the clashes descended into violence during which they killed hard-line propagandists such as Representative KIM Phon (គីម ផុន), SOS Sa-Un (សុះ សាអ៊ុន), and District Governor CHI Bunthân (ធី ប៊ុនចុន), etc. They then paraded to

Phnom Penh to protest, but they were suppressed by LON Nol. The LON Nol soldiers fired their guns onto people's demonstrators and killed many East of the Chruoy Changvar bridge.

C. POL Pot Forces:

The revolutionary militia units that had raided the LON Nol's military forces since 1968 now rushed out of the jungles, came down from the mountains, and came to liberate the villages and districts that had previously been their bases and the areas surrounding them, then set up their district, Sector, and Zone level authorities there. Those were their firm strongholds until 17 April.

D. Sihanoukist-POL Pot Forces

Sihanoukist forces in the countryside were hesitant to join the army. This was a golden opportunity for POL Pot. POL Pot had marshaled soldiers as battalions since July 1970. Liberated areas linked together as a framework on four-fifths of the country's territory had also served in the position of a rear battlefield since that July. The rear battlefield was firm because it had many people, a large territory, food, state power, the army and the Party leadership. These were under the leadership of POL Pot and NUON Chea.

Inside the country, Sihanouk's presence had declined significantly. A study session of 1973 presented that: "We are the doers. We are the eaters. Leave Sihanouk to sit as chairman for us."

X. Developments of People's War

In 1973 LON Nol demanded peace negotiations. The Americans afterwards brought up direct negotiations with the other Khmer side.

POL Pot kept on thinking of attacking:

- On 1 January 1975 POL Pot launched the final storming attack.
- On 25 January 1975 POL Pot seized Neak Loeung.
- On 1 April 1975 LON Nol left to live in America.
- On 12 April 1975 the American ambassador returned to his country.
- On 17 April 1975 POL Pot entered Phnom Penh.

POL Pot defeated LON Nol due to two key factors:

The first was the political influence of Sihanouk's national reunification.

The second was POL Pot himself as commander-in-chief, who knew how to lead People's War.

Even though his victory over LON Nol had not yet reached its first anniversary, POL Pot staged a coup against Sihanouk on 30 March 1976 (693, ERN 00 003 140-141). Base-echelon Sihanoukist forces, that is to say the peasants, had all become revolutionary forces.

On 21 April 1976 POL Pot decided to classify Khmer diplomats from overseas or the higher-echelon Sihanoukist forces into four categories (D00694, ERN 00 019 144).

X [bis]. The Party's Stance toward the Petty Bourgeoisie

“Rejecting petty bourgeoisie” was not precisely written in the Party documents. The 1976 Party Statute states, “Oppose the revolution of the petty bourgeoisie” (D00674, ERN 00053010). The Communist Party of Kampuchea was different from all other parties on issue of rejecting the petty bourgeoisie.

Observation: Eight years after the founding of the Peoples' Republic of China, Mao Tse-Tung continued to instruct the entire party in the document “On Correct Solutions to Conflicts Among the People” to take a positive stance towards the intellectuals.

Within the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the political life of the petty bourgeoisie was sharply challenged by the trend of pro poor farmer ideology. They encountered life-and-death difficulties beyond their imagination.

From 1960, many petty bourgeoisie people who believed that the purpose of revolution was to liberate the people, to save the people, and to serve the people joined the political struggle movement both openly and secretly. They did not have any concerns about their livelihoods; they loved peace, needed justice, and wanted to the living conditions of the people, including their own, to prosper.

In 1967, the petty bourgeoisie people who had been exposed during the struggles in the cities were evacuated to the liberated areas for their safety and to contribute to strengthening the militia base.

In particular in the Southwest Zone, the policy of rejecting the petty bourgeoisie people had been implemented by UNG Choeun since 1967. He said, “When you produce rice, you have rice to eat; when you read books, you eat paper.” The Zone Secretary, MA Màng (ម៉ាម៉ង់), challenged this concept. He said, “Our peasants can be compared with grass. Grass grows well

only on the areas fertilized by the cow dung.” In 1968, MA Màng was murdered on the top of Aural Mountain in the form of being given wrong medications by a medic.

In 1968, POL Pot published the document “Revolutionary Morals,” the core message of which was: “Wherever you are, you are mentally and spiritually committed to serving the workers and peasants there.”

Observation: “Revolutionary Morals” was translated by François PONCHAUD for his book “*Cambodia: Year Zero*”. He confused “Sacrifice” with “Labor.”

From 1968 to 1971, UNG Choeun removed four cadres: KHÈK Pèn (ខែក ប៉ែន), KÈ Kim Huot (កែ គីមហួត), CHEA Huoch (ជា ហួច) and UM Chhoeun (អ៊ុម ឈឿន) from the Zone within 24 hours and rounded up other cadres and isolated them.

In 1971, the Party decided to establish a Special Zone and to collect the people who had been isolated by UNG Choeun to work in the offices within the Zone.

In 1973, the *Revolutionary Flag Magazine* wrote, “Whoever comes from a social class will become a cadre representing that same social class.” At that time, the ranks of some cadres were lowered in the Southwest Zone while in the Special Zone some decisions were made by the Party to send some office cadres to be tempered in the northern areas of the Tonle Sap Lake.

After 17 April 1975, KOY Thuon and pretty bourgeoisie people who were under his supervision and re-education were collected and sent to Phnom Penh to work in various ministries.

On 1 January 1977, the Party started to single out KOY Thuon’s networks and the forces of middle-class peasants linked to KÈ Pauk.

On an unknown date, HOU Yuon, a famous intellectual, was smashed because his revolutionary stance could not catch up with the movement. HOU Yuon was only responsible for

low-level cooperatives. Other famous intellectuals such as CHĂO Sēng, HOU Nim etc. were arrested and sent to S-21.

By 6 January 1979, only four petty bourgeoisie intellectuals remained in the Party Center, namely POL Pot, IENG Sary, SON Sen and KHIEU Samphan. No other intellectuals were allowed to be members of the Party Center.

Observation:

1. After 17 April, a strategic slogan states, “Great movement, great masses, great magnificent leap.” Move forward by leaps and bounds to reach communism quickly.
2. Around 1977, POL Pot raised the view of the situation of international revolution, saying, “In the past, there has not been proper experience in maintaining state power.”

Post 7 January 1979

- In 1983, Pol Pot announced the dissolution of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and his retirement and delegated all leadership roles to SON Sen. However; the real power was still under POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Choeun.
- In 1983, a training course explained, “Socialism and communism are not our objectives. They are just the means to construct the country.”

Observation: This explanation was totally contradictory to historical materialism.

From 1989-90, POL Pot seized an opportunity to conduct a training course for cadres in charge of economics. At that time, there were various strange concepts such as:

- Peasants were feudalists. When you talk about peasants, you refer to feudalists.
- Poverty was not a precondition to encourage people to run to join the revolution.
- The middle stratum could maintain a stance of both economic and political independence.

Based on this theory he taught, the situation should have develop to enlightenment.

The reality was exactly the opposite of the expectations:

- In 1994, POL Pot removed SON Sen from the movement.
- In 1997, POL Pot smashed SON Sen and his family.
- In 1997, UNG Choeun carried out a coup against Pol Pot using the slogan “to protect the cause of Son Sen.”
- In 1998, Pol Pot died.

POL Pot was defeated by UNG Choeun due to Pol Pot himself. In the strategies of revolutionary movement, Pol Pot always used the forces known as muscle forces (កម្លាំងសាច់ដុំ) to screen and smash the non-muscle forces. Eventually, he was all alone in the middle of his pro poor peasant ideology.

XII. Vietnam’s Arrival in Kampuchea during the LÊ Duân-POL Pot Era

A. Period after the Coup of Lon Nol

After 18 March 1970, Lon Nol rounded up and deported Vietnamese nationals. Vietnamese troops who took refuge in Cambodia defeated the Lon Nol authorities at district levels and established a provisional authority.

This provisional state power belonged to the Vietnamese Workers’ Party. However, in appearance it was Cambodian:

- Cadres sitting on the Sector and District Party Committees were all Vietnamese with Khmer names.
- People sitting on the Front, Sector, District, Commune and Village Committees were all Cambodian.
- Cambodian troops who were mobilized by Vietnam were part of the Vietnamese party and under the control of Vietnamese Company Committees.
- Confiscated weapons and booty belonged to the Vietnamese party.
- Cash and taxes belonged to Vietnamese party.

This transitional state power was temporary. When the Cambodian Organization arrived, it had to be handed over to the Cambodians.

1. All troops who had been built by Vietnam as well as all confiscated weapons being used by these units must be transferred to Angkar;
2. The Front committees at all levels and the Khmer personnel working for Vietnam in the fields of party leadership and administration had to be transferred without conditions.

In reality the turn-over was conducted as follows:

- As for poor areas, the Vietnamese handed them over during July 1970.
- As for the lucrative areas where lot of taxes could be collected, the Vietnamese held on for a long time. There were many troubles. The hand-overs in some areas such as Sa-ang, Koh Thom, Leuk Dek, Kien Svay were extended until December.

B. Roles of Cambodian Liberated Areas

From July 1970, the Communist Party of Kampuchea controlled liberated areas and converted these areas into support bases serving the fighting movement in Cambodia and South Vietnam based on a principle of proletarian internationalism:

- Cambodia provided Vietnam with safe refuge and allowed Vietnam to purchase food and food transportation.
- Vietnam was tasked to provide training on artillery techniques, reconnaissance, and special operations to newly mobilized Khmer units and to transport China-assisted weapons to Cambodia.
- Vietnam had no rights to fight enemies inside Cambodian territory.

C. Negotiations and Non-Negotiations with America

In 1973, while LÊ Duân negotiated with America, POL Pot refused to do so.

At the beginning, both party secretaries clashed:

- A training course in 1973 stressed that Vietnam had an agreement with America to put pressure on Cambodia to join a negotiation in return for 200 million dollars. The

transportation of weapons for the final fight was delayed due to this pressure and ruse.

- A Vietnamese unit entered and attacked Pochentong Airport and left behind the bodies of soldiers on the airfield to confuse the world that even the battles in Cambodia were fought by Vietnam.

Later on, LÊ Duân asked POL Pot to send Vietnamese national residents back to Vietnam to participate in elections. POL Pot applauded the suggestion by saying that they should all leave quickly.

Since then, they stopped raising the danger of the presence of Vietnamese national residents in Cambodia.

Finally, both leaders, POL Pot and LÊ Duân, tried to end the war as soon as possible to show who could win the war first. Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos were liberated in April 1975 but Cambodia won its war 13 days earlier than Vietnam and Laos.

The great victory of April 1975 had a clear meaning: this transformed American political strategy in Southeast Asia. SEATO, which was founded in 1954 by EISENHOWER, was dissolved by CARTER in 1977.

D. The Cambodians Who Went to Study in Vietnam

Soon after arriving in Vietnam, these comrades were asked to change their Cambodian nationality to Vietnamese, live in Vietnamese territory, and study various subjects and act as Vietnamese soldiers. By 1971, when these students returned to Cambodia, they needed to change their Vietnamese nationality back to Cambodian. They needed to leave the Vietnamese Workers' Party and join the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Observation: When you joined the Communist Party of Kampuchea, you needed to comply with the Party Statute and its organizational structure.

Khmer cadres who returned from Vietnam or known as the "Hanoi group" had lived outside the country for 17 years and their world views and life views were totally different from

those of the people who lived in the country. Local cadres had the advantage over those from overseas because they considered the Party to be under their ownership.

Because those cadres had lower political capacity and were rather subjective, they were gradually removed. By 1974, the final year of removing cadres from overseas, none of the Hanoi group were seen in the military movement. After 17 April 1975, a small number of such cadres survived and were in the East, North and Northwest Zones. After 6 January 1979, only one was still with the movement.

These comrades belonged to the political forces of the Indochina Federation in terms of ideology. However, there was not a secret network of the Vietnamese Workers' Party.

E. Conflicts/Contradictions of the two parties in the time of LÊ Duân and POL Pot

- Overview

The conflicts between the Vietnamese Workers' Party and Communist Party of Kampuchea concerned the international communist movement, that is the conflict between gathering and scattering.

The Indochina Federation, which was owned by Vietnam, was not supported by Cambodia. POL Pot's style of independence-mastery, based on revolutionary dictatorship to address the conflicts among the population and depended on war to solve conflicts with Vietnam, caused the destruction of Cambodia and its people. When the fishing net was tangled, POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Choeun used scissors to cut it off.

- Actual conflicts

From 1970 to 1975, POL Pot explained the insiders that LÊ Duân had appointed himself as the owner of the Indochina based on the concept of "one party, one military ...".

However, on 14 May 1976 POL Pot explained that Vietnam had conducted training on the Indochinese concept constantly all along (700, ERN 00000 822) gain our gratitude and to gain advantage (ERN 00000 823) in the negotiations on the sea border.

The sea border, therefore, was the actual conflict. This conflict started in the time of NGO Dinh Diem.

- Indochina Federation Dangers

This was a fake danger fabricated by POL Pot to promote the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The ordinary candidates got confused the changes of its name and founding date.

The founding date of this party was changed from 23 June 1951 to 10 October 1951, 30 September 1951, and then to 30 September 1960. The name of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party was changed to the Khmer Workers' Party, the Kampuchean Labor Party, and then the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

The Party Congress which was attended by 20 representatives from various parts of the country and was conducted in the Railway Station in Phnom Penh was held for confused explanation. In fact, only a small party congress was held in Tuol Svay Prey on 10 October 1960 which led SIV Heng (ស៊ីវ ហៀង) to leave the party.

In 1953, POL Pot compared the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party to a Chrey tree seed taking root on a branch of other trees.

- POL Pot's political attitudes toward LÊ Duân

The troubles between Vietnam and Cambodia had come to a complete end. The political conditions that developed by 1973 favored equal communications between the two parties.

However, on 30 March 1976 POL Pot decided to evade and not to depart to visit Vietnam by using the pretext of his personal safety. (693 ERN 00003142) even

though NUON Chea on 14 May 1976 recalled that “LÊ Duân himself wrote hwanted to meet us on two occasions.” (700, ERN 00000 826).

- Screening/Purging (ការសំរិតសំរាំង) was the key measure of POL Pot.

In April 1976, there were two events:

1. On 2 April 1976, YIM Sambath (យឹម សម្បត្តិ) in Division 170 detonated grenades behind the Royal Palace;
2. On 8 April 1976, KOY Thuon who had committed moral offenses with a lady and had killed her husband was arrested by Pol Pot and placed under house arrest.

More than a month after these two events, on 14 May 1976 POL Pot led a meeting to analyze the Cambodia-Vietnam border conflict. At that time, POL Pot raised his view of the situation saying that border conflicts had universal characteristics: both socialist and non-socialist countries had such conflicts. One country could invade and seize another country by force only when there were sufficient internal forces inside the invaded country for the outside forces to attack (700, ERN 00000820).

After this meeting, the slogan was heard, “To defeat the Yuon, the Party must be clean, the Army must be clean, and the people must be clean.” He screened/purged the Party until only 13 members of the Center remained. The army, especially the Central Army, had almost completely dissolved.

Killing one’s own subordinates to defeat the enemy was not normal at all.

- Developments in the War between POL Pot and LÊ Duân

The war between POL Pot and LÊ Duân took root from the border conflict (700, ERN 00000810).

On 15 August 1977, POL Pot asked SON Sên to deploy troops at Neak Leoung.

On 31 December 1977, POL Pot declared a war against LÊ Duân.

On 6 January 1978, POL Pot held a meeting to declare victory over Vietnamese troops. At that time, POL Pot said, “The poor and lower middle-class peasants are the leading class.”

Observation: This was another new step of Marxism-Leninism.

On 8 January 1978, NUON Chea asked S-21 to record the responses of two Vietnamese prisoners of war per week. He broadcast them.

Note:

Some of the prisoners of war and Vietnamese civilians had been captured inside Vietnamese territory.

In August 1978, POL Pot conducted annual political training sessions. The contents of the sessions taught by POL were as follows:

- In 1979, we would defeat the enemy forces in An Loc (អាន ឡុក) and Loc Ninh (ឡុក នីញ) in Tay Ninh province;

- The criteria of the correct line was victory, i.e. “the line must win.”
- All of us needed to re-learn “Revolutionary morals.”

Observation: Later the smashing of MA Màng was for revolutionary morals. Later the smashing of SAO Phim was for revolutionary morals, meaning “Serving the people and the poor laborers with all your heart and having a constant burning anger against the enemy.”

On 30 September 1978, POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Choeun celebrated the 18th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. It was the first and the last

time when the three top leaders sat together on the meeting podium (E36, ERN 00 294 001).

On 7 January 1979 at about 11 p.m. Vietnamese tanks entered along Monivong Boulevard and arrived at the area in front of my house.

- Seeking to understand a number of world views concerning war

POL Pot, NUON Chea, and UNG Choeun chose war to resolve conflicts. On the contrary, Deng Xiaoping applied the words of Christ the Savior, “Love your enemy” (Mathew 5:44). If [he] had not strived strenuously to overcome and implement these words of Christ the blood of unknown tens of thousands of Chinese, Indian, and Russian people would have flowed and the national grudges would have continued.

Patriotic people do not choose war to resolve conflicts.

Previous generations caused the conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam and left them for us in this generation and our next generation to resolve. We must resolve them. No one else is in a better position to resolve these conflicts than us.

In addition, in the short term we all bear an obligation. We must join to achieve national reconciliation based on the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia dated 27 October 2004 to rest two wrong trends:

1. Creating risks to Cambodian people.
2. Throwing the responsibility on Vietnam and lower cadres.

Doing so is like covering the stench of an elephant’s corpse with two small leaves of tamarind.

Chapter 2

Seeking to Understand the Economic Line of Communist Party of Kampuchea

After 17 April, the situation of Cambodian society was as follows:

- All production means were in the hands of the Party.
- During the regime, “Everyone had to work at their full capacity the the required output.”
- Everyone had to make storming attacks, even though their stomachs were empty

I. The Evacuation and Screening/Purging of the People

The evacuation of the people was a pre-victory plan (ផែនការត្រៀមជ័យជំនះ).

All people living in Phnom Penh and the provincial towns were driven from their houses and sent to the countryside to live. Within the evacuation movement was a smashing movement. \

People who survived the smashing activities were assigned to be tempered in the cooperatives. High-grade cooperatives were expanded throughout the country by a decision made on 20 May 1975.

In the cooperatives, the new people were led by the base people (166, ERN 000 78 002) and all cooperatives were under the management of cooperative Party Branches. Eighty five percent of the Cambodian people were in the cooperatives.

Workers were all transported back to their factories by 31 May 1975. The workers lived in assemblies and worked on production in their respective factories under the management of union Party Branches.

Not a single one of the people lived freely outside a unit.

The State of Kampuchea was a state belonging to people, workers, peasants and laborers (D2/447, TSL ERN 00 089 845, Article 1 of the Constitution).

II. The Process of Strengthening the State of Democratic Kampuchea

In order to accomplish a new strategic stance (Party Statute ERN: 00053010, para 3), the Party applied two measures:

1. Evacuation

- In 1974, the people of Uddong were taken to Pursat;
- On 17 April 1975, the general evacuation took place;
- On 30 November 1975, people from the East were transferred to the North and the Northwest;

2. Smashing

Smashing was the implementation of revolutionary dictatorship in accordance with the principles of Democratic Socialism (693 ERN 00003136, para. 1).

Persons that had the authority to decide smashing included the Party Standing Committee, Zone Standing Committees, Office of the Center Committee, and the General Staff.

After 30 March 1976, two Zone Secretaries were arrested because they had autonomously decided to smash based upon individualism.

Documents D93/III, E3/86 and E52/4.62 confirm that only POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Chhoeun had the actual authority to decide smashing.

III. Building Agriculture during the Democratic Kampuchea Era

As for agriculture, the Communist Party of Kampuchea focused mainly on paddy, while some products, for example, silk were totally ignored.

Regarding paddy, the disseminated plan expected a yield of three tons per hectare. In order to achieve three tons, the key factors were water, fertilizer and seed; but in practice, the Party turned instead to focus stoming attacks on paddy dike systems

that required huge and dynamic manpower, and this led to shortages of manpower, water, and fertilizer that negatively impacted three tons per hectare. As a result, the Centre had to intervene on a weekly basis (693 ERN: 00003136, para 2).

Agricultural development had to be based on collectivism and machinery; that is paddy fields should be large so that agricultural machines could operate at their full potential to increase production; and reduce capital investment. This is the principle of profitability. In Japan during the 1970s, each paddy field covered an area of over 400 hectares producing eight tons of paddy per hectare per season.

Observation: To technically expand paddy fields, and build dyke systems and irrigation systems, requires capital, machinery, and an appropriate timeframe.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea replicated the model of “Ta Chay’s Big Production Unit” by mobilizing manpower throughout the country to make non-stop storming attacks to build paddy dyke systems. Just a year later on 21 April 1976, POL Pot invited foreigners to visit for a month around the areas of the Tonle Sap (Doc 694 ERN: 00019143144) to show off his socialist construction at great leap speed.

Observation: Three tons per hectare was not transparent.

IV. Comparing Building Agriculture under two Political Regimes

1. Under the new democratic regime of MAO Zedong

In “New Democracy” written in 1940, MAO Tse Tung valued the four social classes—labourer, farmer, petty bourgeoisie, and national capitalist. This ideal was inscribed on the red flag with five stars, the national flag of the People’s Republic of China. The big star represents the Communist Party of China; the four small stars represent the four social classes.

Between 1966 and 1976, ‘New Democracy’ was crushed by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ that led to a national economic downturn and people’s livelihoods were badly affected.

In 1977, after the Gang of Four was arrested, Deng Xiaoping re-organized the Party lines.

In 2010, China became the World's second economic superpower and Chinese GDP was USD 3,000 per capita.

Observation: In 1997, Gary Tiffin, Dean of the Bible University of the Pacific presented that, "Chiang Kai-shek and his family were Christians. He took care of only Christians, not farmers; thus, Almighty God gave the people of China to MAO Zedong." Tiffin further explained that, "Deng Xiaoping was a good Christian, but he preferred to keep it a secret."

2. Under the democratic socialist regime of POL Pot

The democratic socialist regime of POL Pot had the following characteristics:

- Only the social classes of labourers and peasants were acknowledged (The Khmer version of the Party's Statute, page 2, lines 4 and 5, Doc 674 ERN: 00053010);
- The economy was the training arena for labourers and peasants to hold leadership positions by using model districts (693 ERN: 00003136, para. 3), study tours (693 ERN: 00003137, para. 4), and the Ten Qualifications (Doc 674 ERN: 00053020023);
- They did not apply the theory of product distribution according to the socialist regime because once a reliable product distribution was implemented, it required money, and private ownership would emerge. Instead, they applied the theory of the communist regime—"each person was provided for according to necessity." The important thing was food, not health services or education.

At that time, the rice ration came in two categories:

- Among ordinary people, particularly the hard-working and dynamic forces, would be granted 2 cans [of rice] while Force No. 1 got 1.5 cans.
- Among the army, particularly the hard-working and dynamic forces would be granted 2.5 cans [of rice] while Force No. 1 received 2 cans (Doc 677 ERN: 00019126).

Comparison: During the 1960s, a worker in a fishing lot, in addition to free meals, was paid 10 riels (enough to purchase 3 to 4 kilos of rice = between 10 and 13 cans of rice) per day.

V. Seeking to understand capital for building the country

Resources to build a country consist of four types: means of production, manpower, skill/knowledge, and capital.

a. Means of production

Means of production refers to all types of means for production including paddy fields, plantations, small and big factories, manufacturing halls, all types of means of transport and natural resources above and underneath the country's soil.

- Pre-17 April 1975

Some factories such as the weaving factories of Kampong Cham were state-owned. Electricity of Cambodia (EDC) was a joint-stock company between the State and private investors. Chip Tung weaving factory was owned by a private individual. Agricultural land and plantations belonged to private entities. They could either be private companies or private individuals. The Tonle Sap belonged to the State, but was exploited by private contractors.

- Post-17 April 1975

All means of production belonged to the Party (Constitution, Article 2, ERN: 00089845). Since ownership belonged to the Party, so did their hoes, knives, and axes.

None of the Marxist-Leninist parties was of this type anywhere else on this earth. The scheme produced total and extreme effect on the objectivity of POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Chhoeun; and this led them to be obsessed with a dream of a dynasty of slave masters.

b. The Labour Force

The labour force policy in that time came in two forms; and they were completely separate from each other. They were collection and thorough selection which was a complete replication of the “Cultural Revolution.”

- Collection

It aimed at collecting the labour force throughout the country by means of forcible transfer, defrocking Buddhist monks, closing schools, closing hospitals, and closing all other occupations irrelevant to rice production, rubber production and cotton production; everyone was collected to work paddy fields and to be tempered.

- Screening/Purging (សំរិតសំរាំង)

People were screened/purged in the cause of class to defend the fruits of the revolution. To protect against the petty bourgeoisie and capitalists rising up (Party Statute ERN: 00053010).

Those 1.7 million people smashed here surely loved peace, needed justice and wished to have a prosperous livelihood. If POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Chhoeun had been even a little clear-sighted, these forces certainly would have been very dedicated ones, and anything could have been accomplished. If they were to carry dirt, on a daily basis, they would have been able to move

1.7 million cubic metres of dirt from the ground; this amount of dirt would have been one metre deep on a land area of 1.7 million square metres which would be 1.5 larger than the Angkor Wat compound.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea must be held responsible for the lives of these 1.7 million people.

Speaking only of the labour force, this clearly shows that our country and nation lost a great deal, meaning the loss of the labour force, the loss of physical labour and mental labour.

c. Human Skill/Knowledge

Scientific and technical knowledge as well as other skills that had already been acquired by people and serve as renewable resources for mental labour were lost forever from our country after 17 April 1975.

- Small numbers of capitalists and intellectuals fled overseas and used their skill and knowledge to contribute to the development of their new countries and their homes.
- Capitalists, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie who remained in the country were all smashed by the Party; and those who survived were those who had hidden their identity and background and blended themselves among cooperative members.

This took root from the extreme stance of the Party in order to protect the revolution's accomplishments.

In his statement on 17 April 1978 delivered at the Olympic Stadium, POL Pot claimed, "What could be more scientific than defeating our enemies in the battles we have fought and enjoying rice from the fields we have worked."

In claiming this, he wanted to announce that he was the most knowledgeable person and he could accomplish anything.

Cambodian society in such a regime could be compared to an old metaphor of “A blind elephant being guided by an insane mahout.”

d. Understanding capital

Capital refers to the monetary or financial reserves.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea rejected private ownership in any form. Even though currency notes were printed, they were never used. The price table dated 1 May 1976 was only for trade between state and state (693 ERN: 00003140).

Saving and expenditure policies usually were one way or another.

- The first bias: Expenditures too high

Spending too much and/or owing others too much is a very difficult problem to resolve.

For example, in the current situation everyone still understands this universally; Greece’s debt worries the European Union, and the EU is trying to resolve the issue. At first, as a host country for the 2004 Olympics, Greece spent too much. After that, Greece applied a policy to increase buying civil servants in the form of demagoguery by providing them with 14 month-salary for a work period of one year.

- The second bias: Saving under the appearance of baking things until they are burned.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea strictly restricted the food ration provided to its people throughout the country in order to save rice for the exchange of currency. In order to save the purchased currency, the Party did not spend it to buy medicine; instead it closed down all health services. This saving stance in simple terms means baking things until they are burned.

Spending under the picture of demagogy was not good at all; but for the sake of to bake things until they were burned was a crime.

VI. Analyzing Class in Kampuchean Society during the Pol Pot Era

Prior to 18 March 1970, Cambodian society consisted of five social classes: feudalists, capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and workers. After 17 April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea maintained only two social classes—workers and peasants.

In the regime, peasants, youth, and everyone else were all turned into slaves for the following reasons:

- Everyone lost all private ownership.
- Everyone lost all fundamental human rights.
- The Party owned, managed, and arranged everything, including people, through Party members and cadres (Party Statute ERN: 00053034, Article 23, item 3);
- The Party owned every individual's life; thus, the Party could smash anyone at any given time without trial (693 ERN: 00003136).

The ranks of people who had dedicated their lives to join the revolution in order to accomplish the ideal of “liberating the people, saving the people and serving the people”, as can be seen in the verses of the song “The Red East” in the end all turned into slaves; thus, they eventually became speechless.

Feudalists who claimed ownership over slaves owned everything; and this was the new dynasty of POL Pot, NUON Chea and UNG Chhoeun who, at that time, were both cooperating with one another and using trickery to serve their respective benefits (E36, ERN:00294001).

Chapter 3

On Religions and Faiths of all Kinds

The Communist Party of Kampuchea eliminated religions and other faiths by applying an explicit and long-term scheme.

I. The forces of Buddhism and the direction of the solution

The life-force of Buddhism including both Buddhist monks and lay persons totaled over 85% of the entire population.

Revolutionary Flag [magazine] of 1973 explained that,

- The weakness of Hinayana sect of Buddhism is the belief of *dhamma*. Once a person believes in *dhamma*, he would not dare to struggle;
- The strength of Cambodian Buddhism is huge because Buddhists monks are closely related to farmers economically and politically; Buddhist monks are peasants' sons; thus, their stomachs link them to the peasants' cooking pots. If farmers decide to starve them, they would starve; and if they let them flourish, they would flourish.

Thus, collecting peasants' work force was a basic key.

II. The Work of Gathering up the Monk Forces

The gathering of Buddhist monks' force was a Party policy.

NGUYEN Thanh Son, who was the first to bring Marxism-Leninism to Cambodia, initially approached Buddhist monks. [For example], SON Ngoc Minh and TOU Samut were ex-monks. Later on, the two influential ex-monks did contribute to the building up of the revolutionary force.

After 1956, the activity of collecting Buddhist monks was only in the form of convincing one or two monks at a time into the revolutionary struggle.

a) Prior 18 March 1970

- In Phnom Penh, there were two locations where monks were developed: Wat Kamsan Samaki in Chbar Ampov under the Venerable. Abbot Eng Mak, and UNG Choeun's quarters at Wat Mohamontrey;
- There were many such spots in the countryside simply because in 1968 many Buddhist monks were defrocked and imprisoned at Prey Sar military prison;

b) Between 1970 and 1975

- At the grassroots, Buddhist monks started to leave monkhood and join the revolution beginning in 1973. Pagodas were left empty; nobody was there to take care of them; thus, it is hard to imagine what was lost during that time;
- In newly liberated zones, first the Party appointed chiefs of provincial Buddhist Committees through Buddhist monk conventions. Chiefs of Buddhist Provincial Committees were tasked to visit every pagoda in the province to mobilize monks to defrock and join the army. The spirit of compatriotism and concept of collectivism were widely taught for this sake. Buddhist monks were used to mobilize other monks; this method was applied in line with a Khmer saying, "Use a chicken to attract a chicken. Use a wild duck to attract a wild duck."

c) Post-17 April 1975

- In the countryside, all Buddhist monks had to be defrocked. Any *monk* who was stubborn would be smashed. Venerable PRAK Soy, head of Wat Treng Troyoeung, Touk Meas district was a clear example.
- In Phnom Penh and provincial centres, all Buddhist monk management ranging from chief of provincial committees to heads of pagodas, if they had not already managed to flee abroad, had to be smashed. They were smashed not because of political tendency or religious misconduct, but because they had played key roles in Buddhism.

Eventually, the Buddhist force turned into a force of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. No one ever dared to say, “Vindictiveness always disappears due to non-vindictiveness”. Everyone just had to focus on meeting the work quota assigned and maintaining “social class vengeance against the enemy” pursuant to the moral stance of the revolution.

The forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea shall be a pure tool embedded with the above-mentioned two essences.

“Revolutionary Morals” was a short and simple document, but with deep meaning.

III. On Pagodas and Buddhist Properties

All pagodas in liberated zones started to deteriorate, as did Buddhist properties since there were no longer any monks in the pagodas.

Post-17 April 1975

- In the countryside, any religious temples were smashed for steel for dam construction;
- In Phnom Penh, all Buddhist properties were dismantled or thrown away. Under POL Pot’s plan, two pagodas were to be smashed. The first one was Wat Saravan Techo, which was considered an antique. POL Pot ordered a

steel smelter erected in the middle of the pagoda; thus, the workers would have to pull down the Wat first. The second was the Watt Phnum stupa and pagoda, the symbol of Phnom Penh. According to POL Pot's plan, the pagoda and stupa were to be demolished and a monument for heroes to be erected (693 ERN: 00003137138) in their place.

Observation: The shrine of Nheak Ta Dong Keu, considered to be the protector of the Royal Flag was also smashed immediately after 17 April. The current shrine is a new one. This shrine strongly relates to Cambodian beliefs.

IV. Smashing the Old World, Building a New World

This was the most common saying of the Cultural Revolution that Pol Pot actively and quietly applied.

a) Abandon pagodas, establish cooperatives

Pagodas were the foundations of Buddhism, while the cooperatives were the foundations of communism.

- Rice associations and reciprocal groups were the buds/shoots of cooperatives;
- In 1972, experimental cooperatives in Preah Vihea were established
- In 1973, high-level of cooperatives were established in liberated zones
- On 20 May 1975, a decision was made to expand the high-level cooperatives throughout the country

In 1978, another step was made in order to improve the cooperatives.

b. Hold village meetings in place of traditional celebrations

In support bases, all traditional celebrations disappeared from 1971. Village meetings were agitated for continuously. Each meeting of this kind always concluded with a song "You Evil Spy"

c. Appreciate the merits of parents, teachers, professors, meaning feudalists

Before 17 April the method of disenchanting (វិធីបណ្តោយចិត្ត) was used by not mentioning this. Only after 17 April came the song “The parents create only one person; the Revolutionary *Angkar* creates a city of persons.”

As for deceased parents, *Angkar* used this and that pretext to refrain from permitting any of the funeral ceremonies that any human would deserve.

“Although the net has many holes, the elephant manages to get away; the basket with holes the size of a quail can store water.” (ញឹកពេកដំរីក៏រួច ជាលង្កែកក្រូចដាក់ទឹកបាន). [An ironic metaphor, “You have any reason to hide the truth.”]

In the elimination of Buddhist ceremony, POL Pot falsified history, for example:

- Article 20 of the Constitution was written fraudulently: “Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according to any religion and has the right not to worship according to any religion.”
- Although all monks had been defrocked and the pagodas had been dissolved gradually, POL Pot still strived to mask the truth. In an internal-party statement on 27 September 1977, POL Pot still exalted His Nobleman CHUON Nat in a fraudulent way.
- That POL Pot told LÊ Duân: “Eliminating Buddhism is a mass movement...” This was falsehood in order to gain a verbal advantage because actually no young girls went to coax monks into leaving the monkhood and serving the army like POL Pot had lied to LÊ Duân.

V. Regarding Reactionary Religions

The Party Statutes of all generations ('60, '71 and '76) defined that opposition to idealism was considered to be one's stance.

After 17 April 1975 there were two additional documents:

The first document: The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 20, reads: "Reactionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean people are absolutely forbidden."

The second document: The resolution of 30 March 1976 instructed that Catholic halls/churches be smashed. The smashing took place in 1977.

In summary, reactionary religion, analytically, actually referred to Christianity.

VI: Regarding Islam and the Cham

Our country of Cambodia knew very little about Islam. The Cham would have the fate of sinking or floating subject to Party policy:

From 1945 to 1954: The Party had a policy to gather up Cham forces.

From 1954 to 1970: The Party abandoned the Cham.

From 1970 to 1975: The Party still abandoned the Cham.

After 17 April 1975: The Party began to eliminate Islam.

The measure was to deploy the Cham to be among Khmer people and smash whoever rose up.

The message/document dated 30 November 1975 is evidence demonstrating that POL Pot and NUON Chea, in the name of the CPK, ordered the evacuation of Eastern people, including 150,000 Muslims, from the riverbanks and from along the border to the North and Northwest. (LN 0 001 045-01CPK-ERN 00 008 494).

VII. Eliminating religions was work of strategic characteristics

To achieve this strategy, the CPK implemented the following tactics:

- From 1956 to 1970: Screened-out/purged Buddhist forces and keep the other religions isolated.
- In liberated areas from 1970 to 1975: Continued screening out Buddhist forces actively and disenchanting people to forget all virtues whatsoever.
- From 17 April 1975 on, began to get rid of all religions and beliefs so that the CPK itself would rise to master the human mind in line with the stance of social class as stated in the summary of Revolutionary Morals by employing fraudulent practices, agitating for grudges and revenge and implementing smashing.

All dictatorial regimes are not so very different from one another.

VIII. The Virtues of the Four Religions

Truth, love, and forgiveness are the main virtues of the four religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism which are powerful without limit.

Two examples are given:

First, in Case 001, a widow, BOU Thon, appeared to testify. All those who listened to her testimony believe that this was the voice of truth.

True words inspire false words to become diluted.

Second, on 26 July 2010, a Khmer nun granted an interview to the Radio France International, saying: “Vindictiveness always disappears due to non-vindictiveness” (ពៀររមែងរងាប់ដោយការមិនចងពៀរ).

This is a voice of forgiveness, which defeats inflammatory ambitions.

These two ordinary people could do marvelous work because their minds mysteriously have the most supreme potential of a certain sort.

Observation: In the 20th century there were two politicians—Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and Nelson Mandela (1918...) who put the abovementioned virtues into practice.

The three virtues can serve as the strongest foundations for humans to group the four religions into a family in order to develop their centralized potential conducive toward national reunification and reconciliation.

Chapter Four

Seeking to Understand the Work of Deputy Secretary NUON Chea

I. General Aspects of the Work of the Party’s Secret Police [Nokorbal]

In the era of war, the Secret Police was established to interrogate spies and smash them. As long as they had entered a liberated area, anyone supposed to be a spy must be smashed. This was Party policy.

Seeing that I was hesitant and that had led to the phenomenon of the jail break in 1973. UNG Choeun instructed that with spies it be imperative to be strict in order to prevent the loss of liberated areas from one to another that had happened during the struggle period, the *Issarak* period.

After the birth of the Democratic Kampuchea government, the war-era Secret Police [nakorbal] should have been reformed, as in other countries.

Observation:

- In 1967 I watched a Chinese counter-espionage movie. I observed that methods used in tracking and research were scientific in nature.
- In 1977 POL Pot went to China for one month and three days on an official visit. Pon, who accompanied Pol Pot, told me that China worked very slowly before deciding to arrest a Soviet spy, only doing so upon discovering evidence and systematic sequels of stories.

China's counter-espionage policing technologies had already made strides far forward.

On the contrary, the CPK still maintained the organizational structure and technologies which had been used since the *Issarak* period. In operations, SON Sēn always instructed: "Don't be technological." Then, after the conclusion of POI Pot's visit in China, SON Sēn instructed that S-21 write about networks. The text written by Pon is registered as E5.2.29.

II. Concerning Party Work

On 9 October 1975 POL Pot affirmed that Deputy Secretary NUON Chea was responsible for Party work throughout the entire Party including the army (D00 677, ERN 00 019 108).

The Party's work was:

First, to induct new Party candidates on the basis of constant and good activities and fighting, on the basis on good social class, and on the basis of clear biographies (Party Statutes: D00674, ERN 00 053 013-016);

Second, to promote cadre ranking on the basis of the Ten Qualifications (D00 674, ERN 00 053 020-023) in which Articles 7 and 8 stated that the Party paid attention to revolutionary life views and revolutionary biographies; Articles 1 through Article 4 stated that the Party paid special attention to the history of activities;

Third, to implement discipline on any candidates opposed to the Party's political lines, the Party's ideological stance, the Party's organizational stance and the Party's Statutes (D00674, ERN 00 053 018-019)—This work also required that the history of activities be grasped.

In particular, within the Central Army, which was newly organized in July 1975, POL Pot also dictated in the document of 9 October 1975 that SON Sēn be in charge of political education and Party Deputy Secretary NUON Chea think about and grasp the biographies and life views through the cadres in charge of biographies and life views (D00 677, ERN 00 019 120).

In short, the Party's work required Party Deputy Secretary NUON Chea, in that position since 1960, to closely and continuously grasp the revolutionary biographies, the revolutionary life views and the history of revolutionary activities of Party cadre. Through this work, no one could grasp the biographies, life views, and the histories of activities of lower echelon Party cadres better than NUON Chea.

III. On the internal Party purge

POL Pot decided on 9 October 1975 that enemy responses would be not used as a basis (D00 677, ERN 00 019 122). He reasoned: "Spies answer in twisting ways. Finding their histories using our own networks is better. We cannot believe the enemy. The judgments, true or not true, are made using our network. [Translator note: Quotation not closed.] Our network means/meant NUON Chea.

The document dated 9 October 1975 (D00 677, ERN 00 019 108) appointed SON Sēn to be in charge of security.

There were 196 Special Branch offices including S-21. All the Special Branch offices sent confessions to the upper echelon. There were three confessions which did not belong to S-21 and which the court disclosed for me to explain. They were:

D58/ II from the East Zone

E52/4.62 from the Southwest Zone

D32/IV or called D42/IV from the New North Zone

Observation: These three confessions did not bear the annotations of SON Sēn. In particular, D32/IV was accompanied with a letter of New North Zone Secretary KÂNG Chap, dated 17 April 1978, and with an annotation by NUON Chea dated 19 April 1978 ordering KHAM Mi (ខាំមី) to be tracked.

And responses sent from S-21 which the court advised me to explain were E3/20, D93/III and E3/416, which SON Sēn annotated and gave to POL Pot directly, and E3/86, which SON Sēn annotated and gave to NUON Chea directly because POL Pot was resting. NUON Chea read and annotated it, giving orders to Sector 33 and Sector 35 as well.

A reminder of some dates:

On 15 August 1977 SON Sēn ceased leading S-21 directly.

The day of 25 November 1977 was the last day SON Sēn annotated responses belonging to S-21.

These dates lead to the conclusion that SON Sēn was tasked to summarize responses for the Standing Committee to decide until 25 November 1977. From 26 November 1977 on, NUON Chea received directly and monopolized tasks at the Party's Special Branch. Available annotations by NUON Chea represented decisions.

The work of the Party's Special Branch was in entirety under the absolute management monopoly of the Party, by the Party Secretary and the Party Deputy Secretary (Party Statutes, D00674, ERN 00 053 009).

SON Sēn was assigned up in order to reduce the burden of the Party Secretary and Party Deputy Secretary (D00 677, ERN 00-019 109).

Observation:

D93/III, in which POL Pot ordered SON Sēn to contact the East, serves as evidence of this statement.

IV. Concerning the Party High-Level Military Committee

The Party Statutes, in Chapter VI, Article 27 (D00 674 ERN 00 053 035), reads: “All three categories of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, regular [army], sector [army], and the militias must be in every part under the absolute leadership monopoly of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.”

Throughout its entire history, the Army was under the control of the Party, of the Party Secretary and Party Deputy Secretary:

- In 1958 each Zone began to build up militia units as instructed and led by the Party.
- In 1974, under the Party’s leadership, each Zone drafted soldiers and formed divisions, and began to make the final storming attacks on 1 January 1975.
- In July 1975 the Party took soldiers from each important Zones, amounting to two to three divisions to arrange for the Central Army or the so-called Regular Army.

The Party Statutes of 1976 decided:

- The militias are under the constant on-site control and direct command of the District Party Committee (Article 13).
- The Sector Army is under the constant on-site control and direct command of the Sector and the Zone (Articles 16 and 19).
- The Regular Army is under the constant on-site control and direct command of General Staff (D677, ERN 00 019 108, and ERN 00 019 120).

Per Article 27 of Chapter VI, the Party Statutes, all armies were under the leadership of POL Pot, and NUON Chea, who had served as the Party Deputy Secretary since 10 October 1960.

The Party's High-Level Military Committee included POL Pot, NUON Chea, UNG Choeun, SON Sēn and KÈ Pauk.

V. The Role of Party Deputy Secretary NUON Chea

A. Secretary POL Pot decided all work. Deputy Secretary NUON Chea followed up the implementation. This principle was a long-standing procedure (ERN 00 019 109, D00 677). This is just a reminder.

The message/document No 15 dated 30 November 1975 is a piece of evidence. This message was sent by SAO Phim to POL Pot. The Office copied it to NUON Chea to contribute to resolution.

B. All work, in POL Pot's absence, was decided by NUON Chea in the name of the Party (D00 677, ERN 00 019 112).

In particular on the work of screening/purging, see two evidential documents:

The first is E3/86: NUON Chea decided following the reports of SON Sēn.

The second is D32/IV: NUON Chea decided following the reports of KÂNG Chap.

Clarification: The People's National Assembly was fiction and nominal, without units and activities. All representatives were living with their people (D693, ERN 00 003 141).

V (bis). POL Pot was Master of the Party Line

In a study session in 1978, POL Pot made a presentation that in the CPK the doer was the one who compiled the Line. Making the Line was to push the movement and push the work.

Only using this context to reflect the Party's history will clearly indicate that it was actually like that.

Every year beginning in 1972, around June at the beginning of the rainy season, the Zone Committees would have to go and study with POL Pot for about half a month. Immediately after they had returned to their places, they shared work including opening sessions on political education for lower-echelon cadres, sessions on storming attacks in the rear, sessions on storming attacks and preparation for the frontline in accordance with the new Line, views on the recent situations, and the directions of the Party's new storming attacks.

At the grassroots in charge of political education were the Zone secretaries. The education would not last more than a half-month per year.

In the CPK, POL Pot was master of the Party Line. He held the exclusive right to put Marx-Lenin into lively practice in line with the actual situation of Kampuchea. (Party Statues, D00 674, ERN 00 053 010, Paragraph 4).

Summary

The track of Kampuchean history in the past demonstrates:

First, LON Nol was politically defeated by Sihanouk and in the war was defeated by POL Pot because LON Nol did not have support from the poor people.

Second, POL Pot defeated LON Nol because POL Pot could seek refuge under the shade of national reunification and manipulate Sihanoukist forces to turn revolutionary.

Third, POL Pot was defeated by Vietnam in the war because POL Pot destroyed his own forces and used war as the means to resolve contradictions.

Fourth, POL Pot suffered defeat in the hands of UNG Choeun because POL Pot erred in raising policies to marshal forces.

Fifth, Sihanouk was father of national reunification, whom we Cambodians remember with gratitude, but national reunification had loopholes due to which LON Nol and then POL Pot managed to stage the coup.

There are two paths. The first path is national reunification and reconciliation. The second is to seize forces and then attack everyone in a decisive manner.

With the proper criteria to determine the paths, there may be national peace, better livelihood for the people, and higher gross domestic product growth.

All the religions are national forces; only national reunification and reconciliation will lead to the will to consider grouping the religions into a family.

The End

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