

**Examination of the Reaction of Vietnam
During the Fifth Meeting**

The morning of 14-5-76

- Meeting of the Standing Committee: Afternoon and evening 14-5-76
- In attendance: Comrade Secretary – Comrade Deputy Secretary -
Comrade Van វ៉ាន់ – Comrade Vorn វ៉ន - Comrade Khieu ខៀវ – Comrade Hêm ហែម –
Comrade Ya យ៉ា - Comrade Chan ចាន់ – Comrade Sê សែ – Comrade Touch តូច Recorder

I. Report on the situation in the Fifth Meeting:

Comrade Ya យ៉ា: Reported to the meeting:

- Phann Hean [Phan Hien] ផាន់ ហ៊ីន expressed an opinion reading a typed text of many pages. They thanked us for the visit to Angkor and were impressed with our Organization which had concentrated on them. They said they had considered our opinions, about the visit, and about the stance of negotiation. They said some opinions were the same, some different. There were some opinions on which there was no mutual understanding.

Then, they recalled the subject of the visit and all their stances once again, saying they considered the events at the border as serious. On 7-5-76 they said our Army in Mondulkiri មណ្ឌលគីរី had attacked them seriously twice. They said that since March, we had caused eight clashes with them already. A number of them been killed or wounded. They proposed that there be no further clashes so that the negotiations not become clouded.

- Regarding the sea borders: They said they had examined our opinions on the 5th and the 8th, but they take their stance firmly that we had accepted their three conditions, yet later on we once again brought up the Brevier Line ខ្សែប្រីវីយ៉េ as the border. We said that this line was undeniable. [They asked:] What did that mean? We said that it was a just line. [They asked:] What does just mean? We said there could be further discussions. [They asked:] What did we want to say?

After this was said, they did not recognize the Brevier Line. They said legally, the Brevier Line had no basis at all. They said, if the Brevier Line was taken, this would have an impact their national sovereignty, and that was unacceptable.

They said the words of Tran Buu Kiem ត្រាន់ប៊ូហ៊ាម: First – To express purity of heart, support a neutral Kampuchea in opposition to the American Imperialists. Second -- There was no legal meaning upon which to base it, because there had been no signatures.

They explained again that the principle of dividing the water borders equally had to be taken, that this was the only reasonable thing. They said that we had expressed that an equal division left us no exit. They said there was no problem, whenever there was a border then there would be an agreement on communication routes.

They said they absolutely could not accept the Brevier Line.

- Regarding the land border: They said if there was to be an agreement there could be no going into the long history. They proposed that we express an opinion on this matter clearly so that technicians could work easily. They proposed that we explain the 100 000 map, [was it the map] of the French, or something else.

- On the time of negotiations: They proposed alternating days, working half the time to reserve time for examination and consideration.

It seems they strove to maintain a happy atmosphere during the meeting, [but] with the content of the presentations being serious, the situation was tense, but there were not any clashes.

After a short rest, we made a speech once again explaining our views and stances about the sea border. Then I explained the words:

- Undeniable: Since the line was made by the French, we had respected it all along. Now we respect it. Tran Buu Kiem ត្រាន់ប៊ូហ៊ាម, he recognized it.

- Justice: If each took one half, that would be unjust. Therefore, the map which you comrades have drawn for us designating the two halves was unreasonable, unjust. They reacted strongly. They were unhappy.

- Regarding stances: We explained clearly and properly. As for the 100 000 map, we said this was a map made by the French. We used it as a document for discussion, proposing some modifications. I explained that: the important thing was we took a stance of friendship and solidarity. If we so stood, we could solve any remaining problems.

I brought up the problem in Mondulkiri មណ្ឌលគីរី.

Later Phan Hien ផាន់ ហ៊ិន responded with his opinion that they would reexamine further, and he said that there was but one truth. [He] proposed that both parties go to observe in Mondulkiri មណ្ឌលគីរី.

He recalled the opinions on the water border were opposite from one another. He said the basis of our position was not understandable or acceptable. He said the land map and the sea line could not be compared to one another. He said the Vietnamese side absolutely did not recognize the Brevier Line. He reacted strongly about us saying the half-and-half map was unjust. He said if it were unjust, he would not have come to sit at the negotiation table. He said the Vietnamese Party and people and Vietnamese leaders had always been just.

[He asked] regarding the land border, did we use the 100 000 of 1954 or the French 100 000 map from the previous century? He proposed we explain clearly so that we could work.

In summary, they absolutely would not accept our Brevier Line. They insisted on dividing the waters half-and-half. Secondly, they proposed we explain about the land map.

After the conclusion, they proposed we go see a movie tomorrow afternoon, but they asked to borrow a projector. Finally, Tu Cam ទី កាម requested to express the opinion [asking about] the 100 000 map, which one did we use?

Comrade Chan ហាន់: On the sea border, if we cannot resolve this, this would lead to difficulties in the future. They explained that the presentations that morning should all be re-done.

Comrade Sê សែ: They said if we respond, don't maintain the same stance. They want us to modify our stance in expressing our opinions.

Comrade Nuon នួន: Request to report further: When China brought four boats to give to use, when on route in the Sea of Vietnam, Marines and aircraft fired for five nights and five days, but strafing fire not intended to hit, but to surround.

Ta Khun Chhang តា ហ៊ុន ឆាង said at a party: I do not like those who speak of friendship, they are just talking. Why cannot you see it when I advise just that much? So, this happened while we were negotiating, that is, five days straight, from the 2nd to the 7th.

Comrade Khieu ខៀវ: Along the border they keep on coming in non-stop. We did not go looking to make trouble with them at all. According to experience, if they come in, when we do not chase after them, and they do not go. But when we get strict, that's when they go. That is in Ratankiri រតនគីរី. In Mondulkiri មណ្ឌលគីរី, we do not attack them at all, we respect the instructions of the Party absolutely and do not let it get tense.

Comrade Secretary: Asking for clarification:

According to this discussion, do they want to prolong it, not yet want to break it off, or what? That's first. Second – Their opinions, following the instructions of their Party, but they prepare them, or what? Third – They hang on further to assess us, in case we change. Fourth – What is it that we should be concentrating on in these negotiations?

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II. Opinion and analysis

Comrade Ya យ៉ា: They may be stalling, masticating. This morning the atmosphere was tense but that did not lead to a break off. They still show they want to be quick. By June, both Organizations will meet one another.

In minor detail, they said that whatever else, our delegation should visit their country once. They would take us on a visit just as we had done for them.

Therefore, in this atmosphere, it can be seen that they want us to make concessions for them to make gains on the borders. The Vietnamese are still swindlers, unchanged.

Comrade Sê ស៊ែ: Discussion today show that still think they are a large country and have many people, and they still want to pressure us, as if they think we fear them. They said they we have impacted their sovereignty; they want more power. But this is their way of going on the offensive with us to make us look for a way out.

Comrade Chan ចាន់: As I see it, they do not yet want to break off the talks. But whether they are broken off or not, they wish to delay to report to their Organization, or what? As I see it, they will not yet leave.

The atmosphere this morning was different from that at any other time. The facial expression of Phan Hien ផាន់ ហ៊ិន was strange and pale, even when he smiled, it was not

fresh. The reasons: 1 – Because on the events at the border, we denied their accusations.
2 – Because our stance was firm and showed their position and their drawing were unjust.

Comrade Sê ត្រីវ័រ: They came in large numbers, I don't know who they all are, I have a hunch there are CIA elements too. I see from their faces, they are all cattle traders.

Comrade Nuon ឡុន: In my opinion, the negotiations this morning advanced to a point where they have maintained their stance and we have maintained ours. The important point is the sea. That they asked about the land, that is [coming from] their servants. They are strongly concerned about the sea. We have examined this already, there is nothing strange.

So has this matter grown tense, or what? As I understand it, the negotiations, they bargain this way, it is nothing. Before, there were clashes on the sea. Their side, we do not know their stance. Therefore, the negotiation may be an extended one.

But whether or not we reach a decision, we will maintain the Party's stance, not to let it break off, maintain the same atmosphere. Phan Hien ផាន់ ហ៊ិន is no deep politician. He is a negotiator playing law, capitalist law, negotiating with us like with the Americans. He perhaps does not understand about the matters of friendship and solidarity. He wants to pressure us in the negotiations. In their delegation, there is division as well. Therefore, we should be close to another one to divide them.

In summary, the negotiations today were not all that tense, just an expression of one another's stances.

Comrade Vorn វ៉ុន: My opinion is brief. Their position is demanding too much of us, that's normal in negotiations and bargaining. But that position is absolute. As I see it, they will not withdraw. So, the negotiations were unsuccessful and may be prolonged further. Their view is that they are a large country, and they will not bend to our position. As for us, we want to maintain our stance and defend our interests. As for them, they want to make gains off of us.

Therefore, the negotiations may be prolonged, but the situation should be maintained as it is, do not clash so that both side will be comfortable, so that we can strengthen and expand on our side. But this will not be easy. At the border there will still clashes, whether we reach a resolution or not.

Comrade Khieu ខឹម: I agree with all the opinions. It seems the stance of each side is absolute.

If we withdraw, we weaken and they make gains. Even though the language is ruder than previously, there is no desire to break it off. Like inviting us to watch a film, or proposing the system of work.

The Party examined this in advance. The important thing is the sea border. So, that is why they did not bring it up first. Only when we brought up the sea did they then take their stance.

Therefore, as I see it, our positions 2, 3, and 4 cannot be achieved. We can maintain the same atmosphere, but each side knows its own stance. If the negotiations are prolonged, that will lead to tenseness. I agree with Comrade Nuon ណួន that we should find a way. The point of Vietnam firing at boats is not a strong point. On the international stage, Vietnam still needs us. So they are not strong. We [should] find some way to end the negotiations and maintain the atmosphere as it is.

As for international law, when we really examine it, if we implement it we lose terribly. But the 1965 law says that the land has stronger rights than the seas. Our land mass is large but our waters small. Our waters are like a clam, and Vietnam and Thailand have taken all the ocean.

So, following this stance, we cannot solve this. We prolong this to build on our own and explain our opinion on the international stage. Vietnam does not gain anything. If they have a dispute with China again, it becomes even more complicated. In the present situation, if they attack and take our islands, it will be difficult. They threaten us, but there is still no agreement. We relax, do not curse, do not accuse them, we want to maintain the same atmosphere.

Comrade Nuon ណួន: Now the situation is that Vietnam needs us, this has not faded, especially with the non-aligned countries in the upcoming conference, they run to find a strategy like the Soviet strategy.

Right after victory, they were very arrogant. But recently, especially at the celebration in Prey Nokor ប្រៃសណីយ៍, they spoke normally, not arrogantly. Another thing, perhaps they did not dare, fearing impacting the Americans. But for another thing, they wanted to be polite with the non-aligned countries, and their attitude with the Soviets causes the non-aligned countries not to be warm.

It seems they still need us in the conference of non-aligned countries and are preparing for the conference in Havana ក្រុង ឡាហាវ៉ាន in 1979. Those matters are relative to them too.

There are two problems: If by prolonging the negotiations, we gain, then we prolong. But if we do not gain, we maintain the situation.

We know the true nature of their threats. Politically we still have the advantage over them.

Comrade Khieu ខៀវ: The response of Nguyen Giap ឡឺងយ៉ាប is an answer to China.

What Xuan Thuy ស្មួនធីយ just announced recently was a weak stance. Their situation is difficult. So they are not strong. Threatening with words, but standing on weakness, not strength.

Comrade Ya យ៉ា: The concrete problem is that they want to make gains regarding the sea. They want the islands, important points.

They take the same attitude they are used to taking in international negotiations to pressure us. They brag of negotiating with the Americans. Therefore, that is their system, they want to do as they did with America. I agree with Brother Nuon ឆួន, he is not a politician, but a technician. Lieu [Luu លី] Giang ឈីវ ហ្គាំង and Tu Cam ទី កាម are also not satisfied with Phan Hien ផាន់ហ៊ិន.

The negotiations have reached the point where they have clearly explained their stance and we have clearly explained ours. They disagree; they are greedy, and want their position. They need us, but they want concessions from us. Reaching this point, the atmosphere is still relaxed. We do not strive, and they do not strive. They still show a smiling attitude.

I agree if a way can be found to end it, we should find an end. They come in large numbers, and they sleep and eat in comfort. So, they prolong. So this bunch does not have any idea of moving quickly.

But, in the status of hosts, if we end it, I fear that is no political gain. But in my heart, I want them to go back. Suppose that this morning they had proposed to go back. Now, it seems that might not be easy.

Comrade Secretary: Let me express an opinion, but there is nothing any different than earlier, nothing any different from the opinions of our comrades.

Let me add to the previous opinions. Previously, we analyzed carefully both objectively and subjectively and raised methods short and long term, one after another.

Now I will bring up diplomatic study, especially studying negotiations with Vietnam.

1. Negotiations with Vietnam to resolve the border is a task of our revolution in the new era.

Previously, before liberation, we negotiated and solved things one way. Now, we negotiate and solve things in another way. The nature of the conflict is the basis, but the method of resolution is different. In a word, the situation of conflict is routine, [we] solve one thing, then another. That is, it is a standing conflict, speaking just about Vietnam. But as for other conflicts or the nature of our internal conflicts, they still have the nature of conflict.

We bring up a matter in order to master a conflict. We are not of the idea that we should have no conflicts at all. If we master conflicts, we analyze from every angle and use take measures from every angle as well.

Presently and in the future, there are and will continue to be conflicts. We must strengthen our stances. We must see this problem and be responsible to our Party and Revolution. If can strengthen our stances, our Party will have mastery, mastery in analysis and mastery in solving problems.

In the future, if we stand on this experience, we can go negotiate with anyone. So, this is a major study. The requirement of our Party is to build the Party inside the movement. This is one movement, the movement to solve national problems, like solving the class problem. This task falls upon all of us, and is the work of the entire Party.

Even if we do not solve it, we gain experience in conflict resolution through these negotiations with Vietnam.

2. Other conflict situations:

As we know, other conflict situations are more complicated than ours. This comes from the great powers struggling back and forth. Example: Yugoslavia យូហ្គាស្លាវី. Today Yugoslavia is in great difficulty because of the Soviets. Even though Yugoslavia contacts America, Yugoslavia wants independence. So it is a gaping hole for the Soviets in Eastern Europe. The Soviets attack Yugoslavia, especially internal attacks, attacks through the Party. This problem is serious.

Another example: Romania រូម៉ានី. Romania wants independence, not to be a satellite of America, China, the Soviets. Romania, as well as Yugoslavia, when compared to us, they are in greater difficulty. Recently, they announced absolutely their independence.

Example: Albania **អាណប់បាន** is similar. The Soviets do not attack from the outside, but they act and attack strongly from the inside. They assign some of their people in the Secretariat and members of the Politburo. So, Albania is in difficulty both to the East and the West.

But all these countries have maintained independence. The flow of independence strengthens and expands. They are in a difficult situation, but they know how to strengthen themselves. Even in the framework of Eastern Europe, the Soviet economic and political strength.

When compared to us, we have it easier. The countries of Southeast Asia, they African countries, they want independence. So the trend of wanting independence is changing in quantity and quality. So, Imperialist America, the Soviets, they cannot yet control. In the Middle East, America has no control, the Soviets have no control. Why? The flow of wanting independence, there is the stance and view of wanting independence. So there is resistance,

Look at the non-aligned countries, they are poor economically, poor financially, poor militarily, but the political strength to oppose imperialism and colonialism new and old is a strong force. Therefore, America, the Soviets, want to seize that force. Yesterday we spoke of India acting inside this framework.

In the international world today, countries, both socialist and non-socialist, have border conflicts, but that does not come to war because there are no internal forces rising up in opposition. To the contrary, if there are forces attacking within, that is another story. The problem of attacking from outside is not easy.

Therefore, when the international world is complicated, national conflicts are complicated. But inside the Revolution there are also national conflicts. The situation now is not one in which a country uses force to seize another country easily. Only after there are sufficient forces inside can the outside attack come. If there are no internal forces, the outside [attack] cannot come.

We bring up this subject not in order to analyze internationally, not to be optimistic or subjective. The measures are not subjective or subjectively optimistic. If the analysis is objective from every angle, the measures are revolutionarily optimistic.

Our difficulties are temporary difficulties. We have this strategy and direction, and things develop well. Especially in the Southeast Asia situation, the direction of developments is getting better, and the difficult situations have been crossed. The day they will attack and seize, that we cannot yet see. Even in Yugoslavia, even though Tito has died, the Soviets do not easily enter. The people of Yugoslavia would certainly rise up. Also, The Soviets have no gains, just losses. Easy or not, Yugoslavia goes to the West, looking toward America. Romania is the same. Albania, no matter how the Soviets apply pressure, will not go to America.

As for us, we are in this general situation.

3. Analysis of the negotiations:

According to reports, we see that their stance is normal, to take whatever is reasonable to them on their basis. Therefore, [they] present conditions and documents of all types that are in their interests.

The tactics of bringing up friendship, solidarity, equality, that is the line of activities, both the land border and the ocean border.

As for us, we stand for our interests as well. We do not bring up old matters. [We] Use old documents only to maintain the current situation, and make no new demands. The land remains the same, the sea the same, [we should] only say that regarding the land we will bring up some points for negotiation. The foundation is the same. We give some of the shell/rind, and some of the flesh of the fruit. That is what makes them unhappy. We stand on the Brevier Line to feed them some shell. They draw the Phan Hien ផាន់អ៊ិន line, the Viet Minh line, to give some shell to us.

The problem is this: They do not accept the Brevier Line, because if they do, they give us a foundation, a base. Therefore, it is natural that they want what is in their interests. Speaking in general, their Party is like that, to the point they have educated their youth for many years, from the time of Samdech Au and Ho Chi Minh, educated them on this idea of Indochina constantly. Even though the head and tail are somewhat disconnected, they try to put it together.

So, standing on this, will they agree to our Brevier Line, or not?

Now, in the immediate future, we see that this will not be easy. Two reasons: The major reason, the strategy of expansionism. They want the seas, they are greedy. The land is the same. The second reason: It may be tactical. If they raise it, they may get more than the Brevier Line, if not 50 percent, then 30 or 40 percent. If they don't get it this time, they will hold it for negotiation in later rounds in case they can get it.

A. Negotiation tactics: Bring up other things to us as weapons to pressure us further, like bringing up the situation in the Northeast. This is a ruse, a performance; we call it a weapon to attack us, to make us lose mastery.

Therefore, we do not panic about his. We tell them: Comrades you have documents, we have documents.

If the sea cannot be solved easily, is it essential in the future, or not? They show the nature of a large country, a threatening nature. But we have clashed before, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. So there is nothing strange about this.

We respond: As for this problem, this causes you comrades to propose it for negotiation like that. We understand it this way, and propose it for negotiation in this way. The stance of our Party has taught us to always stand on friendship and solidarity. What can be solved, we solve, what cannot be solved we will solve at a later day, standing on friendship and solidarity. Our stance is high politically. We do not threaten or intimidate.

In past experience, there has been this clash or that one, but both of our Parties stood upon friendship and solidarity and always came to a solution. As for this problem, we should be able to resolve it. [When] we respond like this, we do not lose advantage to them, just gain victory over them in accordance with our desire to relax the atmosphere.

Therefore, they use weapons to threaten us. Before when we were weak, they could not they threaten us. Now, we are strong. They are strong, but it will not be easy to swallow us.

B. The proposal to prolong negotiations, working one day, resting one day:

First - They want to prolong so we will become bored. They make slow preparations. Second – They want to gain from negotiations. Third – they want their political positions for Columbo កូឡុំបូ as well.

These past days were only sparring; it has not yet started. Now they know our stance. So they must set up their methods of work, because this is a new stage and it is somewhat deadlocked, and they must ask the opinion of their upper level.

C. Their opinion to divide the sea border in two first, then make an agreement on communication routes: They raise this to make a gain like in the French era. It was a stupid move.

4. Conclusions and measures:

A. Conclusions: We have reached the be quiet and delay stage. It seems they won't accept the Brevier Line. We will not back off from the Brevier Line either.

They have to find some other solution to serve their political needs. As for us, we look for a way to solve this for our reasons.

No matter what additional reasons we use, in the immediate future, there cannot be an easy solution to the sea border. So, their side, in order to get concessions from us, will bring up events, bring up debts of gratitude, and raise more threats if we do not back off the Brevier Line. If we go in this direction, we go into their trap, and this will bring on more tension. If we prolong, that will lead to losses. Keeping it connected is better. But however it ends, we have to consider it. This end is only a postponement. In later days, if we reconnect negotiations and call them in, they will not come to us. They will call us to them.

B. Measures:

First - We [will] respond the day after tomorrow explaining that we stand on friendship and solidarity. Our stance with Vietnam is not a strategy. We consider it a precious object which must be concentrated upon and maintained to become ever better. Our stance is somewhat higher than a strategy and their solidarity. Taking this stance, we strongly believe we can come to a solution. In past experience, while there have been some excesses, our Parties have found solutions one after another.

Second – Both our delegations have expressed their views and stances. On the land we have agreed on much already. We use the 100 000 French map to demonstrate our good will, but some matters we propose for negotiation. So, there are no new demands for you comrades. Some places are unclear; we will discuss them to reach clarity. If we are in solidarity and are considerate of one another and understand one another's interests, there can be a solution.

But on the sea, we do not take the Brevier Line because of its name, but it is a line with a long history, a line which both sides have always respected. You comrades say to use administrative lines controlled by both sides. If we speak of history, it is nearly 40 years. If we do not use this, there is no basis for the division of the sea border and dividing the islands. We use this line in principle, the line designated by history, because all the borders, it was the French who made them. We do not use two lines to divide the land and the sea. We use one line.

You comrades have said to divide the sea border first, and think about commerce later. We do not grasp that. So, if you comrades accept the Brevier Line, you lose nothing at all. We make no new demands.

In our opinion, we have each reached a clear stage. You comrades have said that we have violated sovereignty, but no, that is an old story. The land, that is an old story too.

So how do we reach a solution? We will report to our Organization more clearly. Previously, we have reported to comrades on duty, but not the collective, because they have been busy at the base.

Though in fact our stances are different, in our opinion if our Party examines this there will be additional light shed. And in past experience, time has made us understand one another ever better and made us be in more solidarity, and there will probably be a solution. Perhaps in the immediate future we cannot solve this, but in fact both our peoples have always been in solidarity and understand one another. You comrades have said that a Kampuchea in solidarity is the strategy of Vietnam. As for us, we consider Vietnam, consider friendship and solidarity with Vietnam as our precious object.

Standing upon this, we clearly believe that we can reach a solution. The obstacles are technical. But if we stand on politics, stand on the solidarity and friendship and compromise which our two Parties have had, we can reach a solution. We will strive to strengthen and expand further.

C. A number of specific matters: We deny all the events that they brought up. We explain that we have forbidden going within 500 meters of the border. We propose the same for their side, in order to not have any clashes.

We firmly deny. Aside from this, propose that the Liaison Committees remain in constant contact one another. Tell them that enemies are active. Sometimes enemies create problems to destroy our negotiations.

Comrade Nuon ឌុន: The possibility is they will not yet go. They “Lam Pa” ឡំប៉ា in June. They will want the month of June.

Therefore, until there is some concession, only when they first accept our conditions, will there be negotiations.

Comrade Van វ៉ាន់: They use absolute words saying they won't accept the Brevier Line. But after a long while, they may perhaps accept this Brevier Line.

Comrade Secretary: As I see it, the situation is not that they have the advantage over us. First – We take a clear political stance, and are not greedy for anything at all. Second – Our reasons are appropriate. Third – Our attitude has been modest.

So, they prolong. Perhaps when they say want to meet us in June, they are just talking. But that they need us for the summit conference, this is clear.

Comrade Nuon ឌុន: As I see it, Lê Duân ឡេឌួន himself wrote that he wanted to meet us twice. Both of his telegrams stated that. He really needs us.

Comrade Secretary: So, we act gentle. We go watch their movie. They do not yet have any reason to break off from us, because will keep smiling freshly, and have never cursed them. If they break it off, they gain nothing, they only lose.