List of Documents

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My name is Michael Scott DEEDS. I am an American citizen. I was born on 15 November 1949 in Long Beach, California.

My father's name is Cameron Scott DEEDS and my mother's, Kathleen DEES. They have four sons and I am the second. My father is a professor of physical education. He teaches tennis and leads and controls the other sports activities. My mother is a housewife. She does not do anything else to earn a living. Their home address is at 592 Appian Way, Long Beach, California. My father is 58 years old and my mother, 57 years old.

My older brother is named Robert and he is 31 years old. And my two other young brothers are Karl, 28, and Timothy.

I attended primary school from 1955 to 1961. In the first year, I learned how to read and write. Then, I studied English Grammar, Mathematics, American History, Music...

After that, I went to Will Rogers Junior High School from 1961 to 1964. There, I again studied Mathematics, English Language, Music,... Sociology, and History. It was in Junior High School that I started to recognise the bad motives of communism and that I started to hate it.

Such a doctrine contradicts the way of life in the United States of America. When they follow communism, individuals do not have any freedom and rights to decide to do what they want to.... [My mother] said communists are against religion; they will harm Catholics. My mother is a Catholic and only believes in this religion. She always explains to her sons that danger to religious belief means danger to the United States of America.

From 1964 to 1967, I attended Woodrow Wilson High School. In World Issues and Geography, I learnt more about communism. That it is a major threat to freedom and rights to express one's opinions, to choose one's religion, and so on. Communism is always considered as contradiction to the way of life in the United States of America. And it is further recalled that communism will not stop until it has conquered the world. This is what I am taught at home and at school, that is, to hate communism. I hate communism even more whenever I hear elders condemning it even though they do not indicate the reason why they do.

When I was 18, which was almost a year after I finished high school, I joined the support force of the navy; usually it takes six months in service. In January 1968 I was sent for military training in Memphis, Tennessee. I had been in training for one week when military commander Lazenby came to contact me. He asked whether I wanted to be trained with the CIA instead. I agreed, and he told me that he, in fact, was a commanding officer of the CIA and that he would assign me to a new place.

Two days thereafter, I flew to Queantico, Virginia. There, I was trained to read maps, as my initial training, as well as to do physical exercises. They taught me the primary purposes of the CIA, that is, to ensure the balance the power between countries and to protect some areas that are essential to the interests of the United States. I was trained in the use various weapons and given some other instructions and directions.

I returned home for a two-week rest and I had to consider myself as an ordinary soldier and I must not tell anyone about the CIA. Later on, I went to Camp Pendleton in California for a further eight weeks of training. I was trained in how to use handguns and

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rifles effectively and how to swim. I had to swim up to one mile without taking a break, float on the water surface for three hours without lifebuoy. I was also trained in how to swim in difficult conditions, such as when there is burning oil or gas on the water surface. And I was trained in how to overcome obstacles: running, jumping over a wall, crawling, climbing on a rope, and keeping my balance when walking on a bumpy path without falling. And I had to overcome these obstacles in a very short time or within a given time limit. I had to learn how to survive with bare hands, in the forest or in the mountains for one week. In other words, I had to eat tree leaves and roots and find drinking water by myself. I learnt some self defence tactics using my own hands, military manoeuvre to attack (enemy), and how to use empty guns as deadly weapons and to be able to understand people’s weaknesses so that I could defeat them. The instructor of the eight-week course was an officer named Harold Twilley, who was a colonel. An intelligence officer named Brent Davis came and gave a briefing about my role and duties within the CIA when I became an agent later on.

After that, I went to Intelligence and Operations School (អាជីវការនិងការប្រជែងនិងជម្រើស) in Washington. Initially, I was at the school for 16 weeks; after that I went back to the school every year for six weeks in order to be updated on current information and instructions regarding daily activities. At the school, I learned about such the CIA’s reconnaissance methods, such as sending an agent to an area and infiltrating traders in order to obtain intelligence from them. I also learnt how to disguise myself as a gardener in order to enter buildings and other places. They taught me how to make friends with leaders and those who have information that is of interest to the CIA, and to disguise myself as a house or building repairer so as to go into a building and install a recording device. I was also taught to set up a station, in a car or a room, to search for information. I was taught how to work in team taking turns in spying on someone and how to take photos of places or regions where the CIA was planning to send its agents.

After that, I attended a ten-week course on how to work with other agents, either openly or covertly using signals to communicate. And such communication techniques must be changed all the time for security reasons. At that same time, I learned how to observe suspects on the street or in airports without them knowing that I am spying on them. I had to know how to hide myself and to keep an eye on people I am spying on through mirrors on the wall. I had to know how to bribe security guards or those who deliver luggage so that they could bring me information I need because they would not be suspected. Such information includes flight departure times or guests’ hotel room numbers. And I was also expected to know how to register in hotels under a fake name and how to get a car for travelling purpose. I was also trained in how to avoid being spied on, by taking public transport as a means of travelling or by walking back and fro in one place, to check if someone else is also spying on me. In so doing, the person who is spying on me will become aware that I know they are spying on me and will stop following me. And I can also identify who is following me so that I could escape from being spied on easily.

Later on, there was also training about how to explain the theory behind different goals of the CIA while on mission abroad. First, I recalled its history and geography. I explained then its political ideas. Most of them are against communism and keeping CIA

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strong for the United States of America. The course dealt with the issue of the CIA’s intervention virtually everywhere, but what is most important is being very cautious about the Soviet Union and China so that can effectively prevent the influence of communism. There was also discussion about the stance of the United States of America in the world – its ability to make demands during negotiations. In course, there was heavy emphasis on the role of America, a country that is strongly opposed to communism and that tries to urge other countries follow its lead against communism. The situation in Cuba was also closely monitored because the United States was greatly concerned about that the Soviet Union sending its atomic weapons to Cuba.

During the 26-week theoretical course, I also did a great deal of physical exercise to keep fit. I continued to receive additional subjects so that I could keep my conscience and physical attributes strong after I finished my training. Within four weeks, after finishing my study, I also learned how to organise ministries and departments and to get to know staff working there. I received a certificate entitling me a G-1 Operations Officer with a number 558-82-7054. In short, I spent 67 weeks for all the trainings from CIA. After that, I waited for my first mission and also additional training and instructions for such a mission. If I accomplished my missions with good results, it was possible for me to be promoted with respect to the categorisation of the following CIA ranks:

- G-1 Operations Officer 1-6 months
- G-2 Operations Officer 6-18 months
- G-3 Operations Officer more than 18 months
- G-4 Commanding Officer (an officer in charge of communicating between operations agents and the secretariat)
- G-5 Administrative Officer (Personnel Section, Training Section, etc.)
- G-6 Department Head (examining or checking guns, special weapons, etc.)
- G-7 Senior Officer (Administration and Department)
- G-8 Regional Commander (Pacific Region, Atlantic Region, European Region, etc.)
- G-9 Assistant of Deputy Chief
- G-10 Deputy Chief
- G-11 Chief, Admiral Stansfield Turner

It is the President (of the United States of America) who approves appointments to positions of G-9 to G-11.

I returned to California, and the CIA instructed me to go to University of Long Beach, wait until I was called because at that time I was too young, 19 years old. I did not have sufficient experience to work go on international assignment. The CIA paid for my studies, including school fees, registration and books. And my monthly allowance was 300$. For the first six months, I received 500$ per month, and then I received 750$ for the subsequent months. I was instructed to follow and monitor the Modern Students Organisation and those who were opposed to the policies of the United States. In December 1971, I stopped studying and was ordered to go on assignment in Miami, Florida. I was promoted G-3 and received a 1000$ in salary other benefits. I was instructed by a G-4 Commanding Officer, William Simon, to observe a weapons and
drugs smuggler, who was a Colombian national. The CIA suspected this man of preparing a revolution. I trailed him and noted the names of those whom he contacted in Florida. I continued to trail him until we arrived at Bogota Airport, where a CIA agent arrested him and led him away. I returned then to California. I requested a change of residence to Hawaii. Before I got the approval, I had an accident while riding my motorbike, and broke both knees. I was treated until I got recovered; this took me 19 months.* I then moved to Hawaii. In May 1973, I returned to Washington to attend a course and receive further instructions. There, I was informed that there was a movement in Hawaii against the army. I had to try to infiltrate an organisation called The Protect Kaholawe Association, in order to find out whether or not it was supported by foreign countries, that is, whether or not it received financial support to be against the American military presence in Hawaii. I worked in the association for two years. I was then based on Kaholawe Island. The association was working to prevent the US army from using the island as a base for shooting practice. Having examined their financial statements and participated in various meetings and activities, I found out that they had no other purpose than religion and culture as a way to protect the island for Hawaiian people. I then reported what I observed to my G-4 commanding officer, Richard Sawyer, in Hawaii. He was pleased with the report, and so he kept my documents. During my last month with the Kaholawe Association, whilst I was playing football, I injured my left knee again, and suffered a broken cartilage. I thus put my work on hold and took a nine-month leave for medical treatment.

When I recovered, I noticed that the CIA had given me a poor evaluation, because they told me to stay at home and wait for them to call me when I was needed. It confirmed my understanding about the CIA organisation. That is, we will be used when we can be used. If an operation proves ineffective, the CIA assigns another agent. In November 1976, I took an annual training for 6 weeks. Its purpose was to review every aspect I learnt from previous training courses. I was welcomed as usual, but people there were not as friendly as they were before. I felt frustrated. It seemed that the CIA was not confident that I could perform tasks for them because my knees were not in good condition. I also wished to resign from the CIA, but I could not, because on Molokai Island there was no other way for me to make a living.

At that time, I met a woman and got married to her. Her name was Glenda SIBAYAN; she was a Filipina. After graduating from university in early 1977, she returned to Molokai, which where she was born, and had lived since birth. We met and got to know each at a festival. We went out very often, and in early 1978 we got married, just before I received my last assignment.

In February 1978, an Operations Officer named Sawyer asked me to meet him once again. He asked me to sail a yacht for a CIA mission in the near future. I was instructed to go and get a yacht in Hong Kong and to prepare it as if it was going to carry passengers on a voyage. For doing this assignment, I received 1000$ in salary and other benefits. And I was to receive an additional 2000$ upon completion of the assignment.

* CIA paid for all of my hospital fees and during my treatment paid me 75% of my regular salary.

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On 30 April, before I departed for Hong Kong, I met with a G-3 operations officer named Joseph Russell at Honolulu airport. He told me was expected to go on assignment to Cambodia, and he also briefed me about the CIA plan for the region. He briefed about the country (Cambodia) and the result of a mission carried out by a G-3 operations officer, named William PALMER, who had completed the assignment two weeks earlier. Two days earlier, Officer Russell met with Officer Palmer in San Francisco, where he was briefed by Palmer. Later on, Officer Russell gave told me the content of the briefing.

The CIA was to send an agent to Cambodia in the future to join a unit of agents that were being prepared there, in order to monitor the political situation and to observe the possibility to attack as a strategy to draw their attention away.

CIA agents have to observe how the political situation impacts the people. They also have to observe the way people live, in which region most people live and the type of transportation used. They also have to know about the general situation and the standard of living of the local people. They have to accomplish the task so that other CIA agents will find it easy to proceed with the work in each region. The team of agents has to draw various road and regional maps that the CIA will use to continue observing those regions. They have to find a place where they can deploy a strategy to divert people’s attention—such as a place where a fire can be lit, where a bomb can explode, or any other place that can be used to divert people’s attention. In so doing, CIA agents can travel to Cambodia without being noticed.

The reason why we gather information and draw maps of regions is for the CIA to easily send their agents in the future or for soldiers to use to attack Cambodia.

The CIA will send as many of their intelligence agents as possible everywhere. Each agent has their own target and will report everything related to it. The senior operations officer is the one who will gather the daily reports and who will determine if every agent has carried out their duty effectively. Then, that officer will send the reports to the commanding officer, who will evaluate them before he sends them further to the regional commander or the secretariat. And finally the secretariat will evaluate those reports, and if there has to be a response, the secretariat will reply immediately, either for clarification of the reports or for acknowledgement of receipt of the reports.

If an agent goes missing or is not able to continue his mission, the senior operations officer will explain [the situation of the duty] to a reserve agent so that he can continue the job. Once they arrive, all reserve agents will receive instructions about all targets so they can substitute for any agent.

CIA agents have to contact each other through small communication radio or through messengers when possible or necessary. Communication radio is a means for them to send out their daily reports.

Officer Russell said that CIA agents have to observe 24 hours a day when they were on duty at the airport. That way, the CIA will be able to acquire much more intelligence regarding military movements, especially of air forces, and will also know the various types of aircraft being used. They also have to observe the military movement to see where the troops are heading and by which route and, if necessary, to block that route.

I prepared the boat, as planned, with Chris De Lance, and on 5 June, I left Hong Kong for Singapore. I knew Chris De Lance before that, when we were together at junior
and senior high school in California. I then got to know him even more when I moved to Mavi Island in Hawaii, when I learned he was living there. He had his own yacht, and we used to sail it around Mavi Island and Molokai Island. He was my best partner on that boat trip, because he was a very skilful sailor and very good friend too. Besides, his brother taught me how to play music, and both of us liked to discuss music a lot.

We stopped in Manila (The Philippines) to refuel and arrived in Singapore on 28 June. We went to dock our boat at the Yacht Association of the Republic of Singapore, where we filled out respective application forms and documents, as instructed.

When I was at the Yacht Association, I received a letter from Commanding Officer Sawyer, asking me to wait for a man named Harris at the music hall in the Hyatt Hotel. I was not informed of anything else other than the name Harris. I went to meet him at the music hall; we then went to his room to discuss my mission, the CIA plan and information and other matters related to this issue. I had to take photographs of sea regions from the Cambodian-Yuon (Vietnamese) border to the Cambodian-Thailand border, with a camera that could shoot from a far distance. In other words, it could shoot pictures of land that could not be seen by the human eye. Harris had given me the camera.

In the night of 24 November, I sailed the yacht without using the engine to avoid being heard. I had to sail the yacht quietly towards the shore where the water was about 27.5 metres deep. Sound devices of three categories were to be installed there; in each category there were three devices. Those devices were to be used later by the CIA as a communication station between the mainland and the Gulf of Thailand. The devices were embedded into floating buoys that could be seen just above the water surface and were attached with anchors, dropped into the seabed using ropes of about 33 metres in length. That way, the buoys could move with the current. The communication devices served two functions: first, they received sound transmitted from a radio on the mainland and sent it to a radio station on a ship in the Gulf of Thailand, second, when I took photos of the area where I installed those devices, [the CIA] could determine the coordinates of the area. As a result, if someone made a call from the mainland, his specific location would be identified by measuring the radio signal strength on each device. And so the CIA could inform its agents or the military where the person was located, and they could therefore travel and enter Cambodia. Moreover, there could be a station set up in the Gulf of Thailand for the secretariat to directly command the operations on the mainland, in case the station of G-7 agents was detected.

The communication devices had to be 3.75 kilometres away from each other in order to emit different radio signal strengths. They had to be positioned as accurately as possible along Cambodia's central coast.

Because I had to throw them away into the sea, roughly 36.5 to 38.5 metres deep, they must now be 46 metres deep into the sea—and so they no longer function.

I had to give the camera back to Harris through Steven Swaytree, who rented boats to the CIA.

After that, we would discuss the CIA plan and other matters related to the plan.

Nowadays, the CIA is preparing agency network in Cambodia step by step and with a great deal of caution. The CIA will expand the internal agency system in order to gather as much intelligence as possible. The core force of this operation is a group of G-7 operations agents who will enter Cambodia through the mountainous and the forest along
the border. This group could live on their own in the forest and must carry out highly covert spying operations. Their mission is to [spy] with utmost caution so as to avoid being discovered. They have to spy on military operations and to report any military movement. Only after examining the outcome of this investigation will the CIA be able to decide what mechanism to use in Cambodia.

This is the first force that has to be secret for long time It is the CIA information centre in Cambodia. As planned, the CIA must constantly monitor various activities in Cambodia. It is CIA’s central organisation in Cambodia, and all other missions come from this organisation. The future of the CIA in Cambodia depends solely on this plan. The most challenging task for CIA agents is to make sure that they are not discovered. If missions are accomplished, the main organisation will have sufficient time to decide what to do in Cambodia. The subsequent operations will not be carried out carelessly.

This plan must be executed between the middle and the end of 1979. This is a new event for CIA in Cambodia and other location; in other words, it is created from the new democratic government in America (the Carter administration) and Admiral Stransfield Turner, the CIA Director, in that these two people – Carter and Turner - are very close to each other. It is worth noticing this new event because there has always been clash between the CIA director and the US government. Recently, the CIA has meddled in the internal political affairs of the United States, including plans to spy on staff and political leaders. There is another problem involving a former agent named Philip Agee, who was found to be against the CIA and had revealed the real names and residential addresses of CIA agents abroad. Because of such problems, the CIA immediately re-organised its units, and today, I do not know how the CIA works.

Because there is such good relation, the CIA hopes that operations will be carried with much greater ease than before, with government officials and the army. With such good relations, the CIA will receive more funds than before and will thus be able to realise major plans for long time. It will not be a problem if the CIA needs to spend more than usual. The operation in Cambodia is very pleasant.

The CIA will also have more modern equipments and will also be able to employ more agents. More resources do not mean more operations, but it means that the on-going operation are conducted more effectively.

The CIA will continue to expand its presence in Cambodia and to make sure that its cover is not blown. Once the CIA has accomplished the task of establishing a permanent station, it can move on to other activities, and will prepare enough agents in Cambodia to carry out missions or other plans in the future. But at the present time, this is its only goal. This is the only operation the CIA has to carry out in Cambodia. After a comfortable and effective [station] is established for six to one year, the CIA will devise plans for various activities in Cambodia.

Only now has Harris told me that the first G-7 group will be accompanied by other agents, who will assist with their work. The new agents are the investigating unit who duty is similar to what Officer Russell told me before. So the CIA will increase the number of agents in Cambodia. The new group will spy non-military regions and targets; as a result, the CIA will have a handle on the overall situation in Cambodia.

With adequate funds and firm support from the American government, the CIA has sufficient time to move forward step by step in carrying out the operation. The CIA
operates steadily to ensure effective work, since hasty operations or lack of proper equipment can affect the quality of the work. As emphasised by Harris, these are new important improvements of CIA. The CIA cannot do more than what it plans to do, but it has to gather good intelligence in Cambodia.

Knowing clearly that future American foreign policy in Cambodia depends solely on how this operation pans out, [the CIA] has must obtain reliable intelligence. Any failure will be highly prejudicial; so it must be very caution and must obtain reliable and specific intelligence. This way, the CIA’s operations in Cambodia will be consistent with overall US policy. At least they will be better than the ones conducted in recent times.

Once the plan to gather intelligence is executed, the CIA will be in position to execute new plans in Cambodia. Most of the intelligence is related to the situation in Cambodia and Yuon (Vietnam).

The United States thinks that it must regain some of its influences in Southeast Asia because America is quite concerned that the spread of communism throughout the Gulf of Thailand will endanger the large number of ships sailing through the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Malacca is a vital economic sea route [...] linking the Middle East to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, America is concerned about security for ship movements in the area. If Thailand espouses communism, this does pose a threat to ship movements in the Strait of Malacca. Because of this problem, the United States cannot afford to overlook Cambodia. Even though Cambodia is engaged with Yuon, it is still a threat for Thailand. Therefore, America must control Cambodia.

The CIA will investigate in detail the long-standing and large-scale struggle between Cambodia and Vietnam. If the war were more and more intense, America will be ready [to send troops]. America will then begin attacking Cambodia politically in a bid to gain support from both within and outside the country, before it go on to do anything further. If the Cambodian military becomes very weak, America will attack to win the state power of Cambodia. But before that, if Cambodia prepares its military to attack Thailand, America will immediately begin attacking Cambodia from the border with Thailand.

If the US army takes control of Cambodia, the matter will be between the government and the army, and the CIA will immediately withdraw its agents. This is the theory the CIA is relying on in carrying out its operations. In other words, the CIA must not reveal its duty in carrying out any operations, for both past and future operations or for the ones that are being carried out. CIA will send all obtained information to the American government and keep only one group of its intelligence agents in Cambodia. It is consistent with CIA policy in that the CIA does not work with any other organisation and is totally independent in conducting its operations.

If there is a change in the daily work in Cambodia, which may be caused by the fact that it is under the control of American military force, it is the US government which will resolve the problem. Then, everyone will know that the US has once again intervened in Cambodia; therefore, there will be no need to hide the events related to the operation. But [the US] must be careful not to involve Vietnam. In other words, everything has to do with security in Cambodia only. The US army must devise policies in Cambodia, and the CIA will monitor any opposition to those policies.
If the operations in Cambodia proceed as planned and if the security situation in Cambodia improves, the CIA will send its agents to monitor the situation at the Cambodia-Vietnam border. They will monitor and evaluate the situation there for a period of time before [the CIA] decides on any military operations. This time is different because, unlike Cambodia, Vietnam is not a threat to Thailand.

Finally, Harris told me that the plan may not be accomplished as planned. If the attempt to capture Cambodia fails, the CIA will still continue to operate as before and identify the cause(s) of the failure. It will have to immediately send the intelligence gathered back to the CIA headquarters for [people there] to examine it and determine which decision caused the failure and whether the CIA may have contributed to the failure. If it is found that the CIA has contributed to failure, the information will be kept separately. However, if the CIA is found not to have contributed to the failure, [the information] will be sent to the army, which will examine it and determine the cause of the failure.

When the CIA launches its operations in Cambodia in the next two or three years, it will monitor the capacity of Cambodian army, to see determine whether it is prepared and is capable of moving quickly. It will also monitor the extent of the fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam, and the outcome. This is aimed at helping the CIA prepare its attack once the fighting between these two parties reaches a peak and causes a lot of damage. It will monitor military movements along the Cambodian-Thai border if there are preparations for large-scale fighting in the area.

All this is in response to the threat to the Strait of Malacca, which requires the CIA to launch such operations. As long as the US believes there is such threat, it will continue to interfere in the internal affairs of both Cambodia and Vietnam, but the intervention in Vietnam will not be as extensive as it will be in Cambodia.

If the situation does not permit America to attack, [America] has to devise other means to prevent Cambodia from becoming strong or spreading its influence or expanding its territory. There will be a diplomatic campaign to attack Cambodia, namely by involving as many participants as possible, especially those countries which need and use the Strait of Malacca. They include Japan, The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, which receive goods directly from the Middle East via the Strait of Malacca, and various other countries in the Middle East which also use this sea route. There need to be an organisation comprising these countries and other countries which are concerned about the potential threat. Such an organisation will cut off their trade relations with Cambodia and thus prevent it from receiving various raw materials and oil. As a result, Cambodia will not be able to increase its military capacity; at most it can only protect itself. And Cambodia therefore cannot expand its territory, and there will no longer be any threat to the Strait of Malacca either. Eventually, Cambodia will have to negotiate with those countries. The CIA's activities could create problems to relations with the Soviet Union and China. In the next three years as America prepares to attack Cambodia, the good relations with China time will turn sour. This is a big problem for the United States, because over the past few years, relations between the US and China have been good. However, on the diplomatic front, there will not be a major concern because not many senior US officials are travelling to Beijing.
Relations with the Soviet Union will depend on the extent the intervention in Cambodia and US attitude towards Vietnam. If the US takes control of Cambodia and forms a puppet government, the Soviet Union will strongly oppose to it. However, if the US proceeds with the force comprising the above-mentioned countries, the Soviet Union will not react strongly.

After receiving all the instructions from Harris, I went back to the yacht and hid the camera in a container in which sails are kept, making sure that it could not be found by De Lance or anyone else. We prepared the yacht, did some repairs, cleaning and painting. We sold off unnecessary parts and made replaced some others. We arranged some food and took it to people in Australia. In short, we spent four months doing all this.

In the beginning of November, I received an order from Commanding Officer Sawyer to depart on 18 November. I told De Lance that I had been informed by the owner of the yacht to depart on 18 November. We then prepared the yacht, and checked the water and fuel levels, and if the sails, ropes, masts and the speed and distance equipment were in good condition. We departed from Singapore during the night of 18 November. Six days later, we came within a short distance of Cambodia. We sailed on the right part of the Gulf of Thailand so that we would be able to take advantage of the sea currents which move up to the north along the Indochina coast and which, in this season, we move back southwards along the coast of Thailand and Malaysia. In the morning of 24 November, it was my turn to sail the yacht. I waited until De Lance went to take a rest; normally when there are only two sailors, one takes a rest while the other is sailing. When De Lance fell asleep, I directed the yacht towards Cambodia.

I saw a piece of land which looked like an island and I noticed that there was a ship coming from that direction towards us. I then went to fetch the camera from the container so as to have it handy. After that, I changed the direction to 180 degree, and the ship also changed direction towards my yacht. When it arrived at a distance from which I could see it with a telescope, I realised it was equipped with artilleries. I then threw the camera into the sea as I had been instructed to do when in such a situation. I woke De Lance up and told him that we were being followed by a ship. We continued sailing the yacht, and the ship kept pace, and we were arrested.