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Third Year Anniversary of the Organization of Peasant Cooperatives

(20 May 1973 to 20 May 1976)

On 20 May 1973, the Party decided to organize peasant cooperatives. The decision to organize peasant cooperatives marked an important historical event. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the history of our Kampuchean revolution clearly shows that peasant cooperatives play a decisive role in achieving the great and victorious National Democratic Revolution. In the new phase of socialist revolution and socialist construction, peasant cooperative serves as a cornerstone in ensuring the great victory of the Great Socialist Revolution and the socialist construction at present and in future.

I. Role of peasant cooperatives during the phase of National Democratic Revolution

During the phase of National Democratic Revolution, the peasant cooperatives played an important role until great victory was completely achieved on 17 April 1975. We must support important role of peasant cooperatives during the phase of National Democratic Revolution in order to carry out proper evaluation and strongly promote peasant cooperatives during the new phase of socialist revolution and socialist construction.

In the past, unclear on its organization, certain cadres did not fully understand what cooperatives were during the initial phase. They did not believe in cooperatives. They did not recognize the important role of cooperatives and only identified their disadvantages and shortcomings. These cadres were far removed from the revolutionary movement including activities, stance and sentiment. They relied on the stance of the oppressive class in reviewing and evaluating cooperatives. They reviewed and evaluated cooperatives through the lens of private ownership and their family background. In spite of their review and evaluation, the important role of cooperatives cannot be discounted.

ឯការភេដអាវិ ក្រុង TRANSLATION/TRADUCTION ថ្ងៃ ខែ ឆ្នាំ (Date): 17-Jan-2011, 09:03 CMS/CFO: Ly Bunloung 00636009

 Cooperatives are the basis in extensively and firmly gathering National Democratic Forces, and accelerate the Revolutionary War to liberate the nation and the people.

Immediately after the coup, people actively joined the revolutionary war to fight enemies, but peoples' forces were neither cohesive nor strong; they were still scattered. Drawing the distinction between comrade and enemy was not clear. They were also uncertain with regard to their stance of class. The poor lived in difficulty as they relied on land owners and traders. The revolution had not yet resolved the peoples' problems. We made some symbolic gestures but had not resolved basic things for them yet. Therefore, the people had not yet matured to absolute revolutionary consciousness; they were still influenced by the capitalists and land owners.

Based on this situation, in 1972-73 the Party took measures to organize the people based on political consciousness in view of thwarting the economic power of land owners and capitalists, cut off private trading, control traders, dismantle the former means of production, establish new ones and organize cooperatives. Chief among the measures was the organization of cooperatives. It consisted of attacking the power of the classes of feudalists, land owners and capitalists. It was a measure to harness the force of the base people and forge a strong alliance between workers and peasants. We gathered the forces in large number and stirred their fervor. This was the Party's line in building, strengthening and expanding the people's forces. If the line was not followed and only educational propaganda was carried out worker-peasant alliance could not be forged. How could educational propaganda work if people were under influence of capitalists and feudal-land owners?

When rural people forces were mobilized to unite with worker-peasant alliance, we also mobilized upper-tier forces. It was not until 1972-73 that the Party began implementing the line attacking old methods of production and organizing rural people who were previously under the economic influence of land owners and capitalists into cooperatives. When the Party attacked the economic influence of land owners and capitalists and organized cooperatives, the Party mobilized rural forces and established the worker-peasant alliance, a force so strong, that it commanded nothing but respect. Even the capitalist and land-owning classes had to respect the

worker-peasant alliance and the revolutionary authority. Therefore, based on the worker-peasant alliance, we had mobilized forces widely and forward. If there had been no cooperatives and no strong worker-peasant alliance, we would not have won the attack on enemies and would not have mobilized forces to the frontlines even if great solidarity had been achieved.

2. Cooperatives accelerated the movement to storm the enemies on the frontline and inflict defeat on the military, politics and the economy.

The Party fomented a rural collectivized movement in 1973. Nineteen-seventy-three was the year of cruel air warfare with American imperialists. We had won aerial battles with American imperialists and the traitor's army, and by circling into Phnom Penh, the enemies' condition in the areas of politics, military and the economy worsened. The year 1974 marked the first raid of Phnom Penh and the surrounding areas. Nineteen-seventy-five marked the ultimate attack as evidenced by the Party's achievements. On 20 May 1973, the worker-peasant cooperatives were organized countrywide. Had there been no cooperatives to resist the air warfare of American imperialism, the attack on the enemy would not have been possible.

Cooperatives accelerated the movement to launch military attacks against the enemies. Thanks to the cooperatives, the Party was able to strengthen and extend its army quickly emboldening its consciousness, politics and manpower. The cooperatives screened and selected youths to send to the frontline battlefields; they managed the forces and supported the base unit by carrying the injured, transporting ammunition, providing food to army forces; and in addition, managed labor forces at the home base so that they were able to provide materials and supports to the livelihood and consciousness of families of the revolutionary soldiers and cadres. The cooperatives took on all the burdens of the people's war to liberate the nation and the people. Without cooperatives, increasing and multiplying the number of forces would not have occurred so quickly. Serving large battlefields such as the Mekong river battlefield, Phnom Penh and the environs of Phnom Penh could not have occurred simultaneously.

Cooperatives accelerated the movement to politically attack the enemies. Thanks to the firm positioning of the worker-peasant alliance national forces were widely mobilized to isolate enemies inside and outside the country. In 1973, the enemies had attacked us politically and militarily. Their international stratagem was full of even more trickery than during all previous years. American imperialists played tricks to curry international support through persuasion and negotiation. The international political climate was shaped by persuading and negotiating with American imperialists. This type of maneuvering was hoisted upon us. Militarily, the enemies had combined forces and attacked us in the cruelest methods, especially in aerial warfare. As such, the frontline was strongly shaken, its fighting capacity was severely compromised. In sum, in 1973, the situation exacted a significant toll both inside and outside the country, but we resisted the situation and we strongly counterattacked the enemies on all fronts: military, political and diplomatic. It was thanks to the cooperatives forces as well as the strong worker-peasant alliance that we had in our country. It was the strong worker-peasant alliance that we defeated the enemies in the military, political and diplomatic realms. In addition, we preserved our frontline. The enemies were isolated, they could do nothing to us; instead, we gained supporters worldwide. The enemy was extremely isolated and the American imperialists domestic affairs, its administration and its Congress were strongly shaken and fractured.

Cooperatives serve as an additional weapon for the Party to attack the enemies economically. Cooperatives have choked the enemies' economy and placed embargoes. Before the Party had organized the cooperatives country-wide, we had still not owned the economy in our liberated zones. The feudal-land owner and capitalist classes owned it; they collected rice and other products freely, selling these commodities to the enemies and other foreigners. But our people and our army forces in the battlefields were in need of rice as they faced difficulty.

The organization of the cooperatives had abolished an economy run by land owners and capitalists. Land owners and capitalists no longer owned rice and husked rice and they no longer ran the economy. Peasant cooperatives and the revolutionary authority controlled rice, husked rice and all strategic products. American imperialists and traitors were diminished in Phnom Penh, their military, political, economic and

material power was being suffocated. Other foreigners who had used to collect rice through traders and capitalists were now forced to respect our peoples' authority regarding the purchase of rice, white rice and food. Thus, our peasant cooperatives attacked the enemy's economy and in so doing, safeguarded the dignity and sovereignty of the nation.

Said in a word, cooperatives accelerated the movement attacking the enemy in all realms. Its role serves as a fundamental key in achieving the great victory of the National Democratic Revolution.

3. Cooperatives promoted the production movement that supports the nation, and the people's liberation war; thereby raising the standard of living for the people

During the national and people liberation war, the peasant cooperatives served the battlefields and the home bases, and did so extremely well. Peasant cooperatives promoted the production movement to build dams, to dig canals, to farm dry season rice and wet season rice, to place emphasis on growing other strategic crops, as well as support the frontline battlefield. Cooperatives were on the offensive by solving a hundred thousand difficulties. The cooperatives resolved problems such as shortage of labor forces, cattle, plowshares, plows, rakes, hoes, knives, axes, the means of production, etc. Had there been no cooperatives in this climate of such high-pitched warfare, such complex problems could not have been resolved.. The organization of cooperatives mobilized poor and lower middle-class peasant forces, empowering them to implement the production line of the Party. In the past, we had land, but we could not use that land as poor and lower-middle class peasants lacked the means of production. When the Party implemented the organization of cooperatives, it mobilized poor and lower middle-class peasant forces to boost production. Upper class forces had no choice but to follow poor and lower middle-class peasants. In the sole presence of the production line, and lacking peasant forces and cooperatives to implement this line, production and control would have fallen into the private hands and the control of traders, enemies and other foreigners.

4. Cooperatives are the base to strengthening revolutionary authority at the village and sub-district level.

Cooperatives and the worker-peasant alliance take deep root in rural areas and in all rural villages and sub-districts. The cooperative is an authoritative unit functioning in all fields on the bases. Through the cooperatives, our people, especially poor and lower middle-class peasants directly administer this authority in the areas of politics and consciousness. Under the leadership of the Party, they organize everything, including military, production, culture, social affairs and daily life. Our authority therefore is purely the worker-peasant authority. Cooperatives grow progressively stronger as our people had gained more rights to administer authority directly. The Party assigned direction to strengthen and to extend the cooperatives step by step so that they become village cooperatives, integrating 1,000 families. This constitutes a step forward in dismantling authority at the village and sub-district level so that our people gain more rights in administering authority extensively.

5. Resist Peaceful Alliance, Espionage and Banditry

Cooperatives gathered individual and scattered peasants into a collective of peasants. Through education provided by the Party, cooperatives progressed in politics and consciousness so quickly that peaceful alliance agents, spies and bandits can no longer penetrate our forces. In 1973-74 the feudal-land owner, capitalist classes and foreigners lost interest because cooperatives put up a strong resistance. They joined American Imperialists and traitors to stir movement on the part of peaceful alliance agents, spies and bandits; but they could do nothing to us. They were neither able to hide in the village and take action nor attack us in the jungle due to shortage of cooked rice and food. They were gradually destroyed by peasant cooperatives.

6. Cooperatives are a strong force in carrying out the democratic revolution to wipe out feudalism land-ownership and capitalism and serve as a central bridge.

Abolishing this feudal class requires attacking the whole regime including its political, military, economic and cultural components. This attack consists of uprooting. That is the hallmark of our absolute revolution.

In the past, during the war, it was said it is important to implement the national democratic revolution and just enough democratic revolution so that it would not risk compromising other forces. Based on the experience of our Party, the national democratic revolution should be thoroughly implemented so that we would dispose of the forces to partake in warfare. If the democratic revolution is implemented thoroughly, then the poor and lower middle-class peasant forces will be liberated as a result; we will have isolated and suppressed the feudalist, capitalist and middlemen. We will have thoroughly implemented the democratic revolution thanks to the peasant cooperatives.

7. Cooperatives can consolidate the revolutionary base of support

Based on the roles of cooperatives as mentioned in the foregoing, cooperatives benefitted the Party by consolidating the revolutionary base of support throughout the country. All rural cooperatives are bases of support and cooperatives supported frontline battlefields militarily and economically. All battles had bases of support enabling us to control the whole of the country. The enemy was reduced to banditry, even around areas surrounding Phnom Penh there were also supporting bases to serve the battlefields. The Party controlled the people, reinforced troops, boosted the economy, served the battlefields and attacked the enemies vigorously at the confluence of the Mekong and Bassac river banks. Through the leadership of the Party, cooperatives and the worker-peasant alliance became present everywhere.

This is the role of the peasant cooperative during the phase of national democratic revolution. Through this, we have ascertained the role of the cooperatives in fighting towards Great Victory on 17 April 1975. We must learn from our peasant cooperatives, as we are most proud of the organizational line of the cooperatives. We emboldened this line as to be stronger during the new phase of the socialist revolution and socialist construction.

There are cadres who had not fully grasped these roles when the Party organized cooperatives, and to this day are still unclear. Because they are separated

from the revolutionary movement and they are separated from activity, the stance, consciousness, and revolutionary sentiment. Because they have not garnered knowledge from the movement, they have not abolished the stance of private ownership and the stance of individual possessions. If the revolutionary movement takes root amongst our people, as in the past and in the present, we can continue to believe in our peasant cooperatives.

[photo]

After the rain fell our brother/sister peasant cooperatives in Kandal Steung district have attacked plowing and raking actively to open storm attack on wet season rice farming very vigorously in order to generally and absolutely achieve the assigned task of 3 tons of rice yield per hectare in this 1976.

II. The roles of peasant cooperatives during the phases of the socialist revolution and the socialist construction

Cooperatives were not just bases of support that played important roles in achieving Great Victory on 17 April 1975. Cooperatives ensure the great victory of the great socialist revolution and socialist construction at present and in future.

1. Cooperatives were the bases of support for the socialist revolution and socialist construction at present and in future.

Through the peasant cooperatives, the Party not only attacked and demolished the feudal-land owner class, the Party also attacked capitalists in cities and rich peasants in rural areas. Feudal-land owners, rich peasants and the like were attacked and smashed. Doing so was not only part and parcel of the democratic revolution but also the socialist revolution. The deep and core phase was from 1973; the authority controlled trade. A revolutionary measure was to attack capitalists, but more importantly, organize cooperatives.

After liberation we evacuated the people from Phnom Penh and from all provincial towns. We launched attacks to demolish markets, ownership, high-level capitalism, medium-scale capitalism, low-level capitalism, artisans and laborers. The National Democratic Revolution had been fully achieved and its continuation was the

socialist revolution. This was made possible through the socialist revolutionary bases in liberated zones, and especially peasant cooperatives. Had there been no peasant cooperatives in the rural areas, none of this would have been possible.

The Party led the people to fight fervently for national and popular liberation, The Party led our lower- and high-level cooperatives to implement the socialist revolution with strength and thoroughness. We have reached a pivotal point in our revolution, under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea. Our revolutionary movement has progressed by leaps and bounds. Cooperatives are the base of support, serving as a springboard to advance our revolution.

2. Cooperatives were the most significant element in changing our rural situation, agriculture, sanitation and culture in the new phase of our revolution

At present, our rural landscape is changing very quickly--not on a monthly, but daily basis. Most obvious changes are attested by new dikes and canal systems, whose construction rhymes with the defining revolutionary step forward from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture, to be achieved within 10 to 15 years, because we have cooperatives that are gradually becoming stronger.

At the same time, the profile of the people is changing. These changes include those living in rural areas and those who had left cities. The changes include feverish advancement in dike building and canal digging for the purposes of wet- and dryseason rice farming. This movement has pried open a new stance, a new world view, new technology and new forces, all part and parcel of great changes. This change affects the whole of society, encompassing change of vision, change of culture, change of societal relations and change to all aspects of daily life.

3. Cooperatives are a country's line of defense at present and in future.

In the past, cooperatives were the support bases for the national liberation revolutionary war that liberated people across the country. After the country was liberated, support bases throughout the country and in border areas remained. We have strengthened cooperatives to be stronger than a steel rampart. To build strong

cooperatives is to build a strong country defense, and allow for strong country construction. No enemy shall be able to enter.

4. Cooperatives are resource centers in the field, to provide training of cadres for the socialist revolution and socialist construction

At present, all kinds of conflicts have emerged in the cooperatives. The issue such as attacking rigid class structures has also been addressed in cooperatives. Attacks were between capitalism and socialism, between the notions of privatism and collectivism, between the Party's socialist revolutionary line and socialist construction on all fronts and the anti-socialist revolutionary line and anti-socialist construction. These conflicts occur on a daily basis and are the most blazing battles and concrete assaults. The attacks are against eating, clothing and daily life. Attacks are against the labor force, dike building, canal digging, dry-season rice farming, wet-season rice farming and on how to achieve the Party's goal of producing 3 tons of rice per hectare. These attacks serve to resolve the day-to-day problems of the people, supplies of salt, fermented fish, clothing...etc.

Therefore, cooperatives are field resource centers for edifying cadres so that they can fulfill their duties in the socialist revolution and socialist construction, on all fronts, at present and in future. At the same time cooperatives act as a social unit to educate our people on collective and socialist consciousness.

III. Duties of all cadres and combatants to strengthen and broaden cooperatives

All of our cadres and combatants must clearly understand the role of cooperatives in the National Democratic Revolution, from a historical perspective and the perspective of the socialist revolution and socialist construction at present and in future. In order to enhance and strengthen the role of cooperatives during the new phase of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, all cadres and combatants must pay attention to build up, strengthen and extend cooperatives according to the direction of the Party as follows:

1. Vigilantly ensure livelihood of cooperative members and the cooperatives' needs

- Resolve matters of rice, husked rice, vegetables, salts, fermented fish, medicine, etc.
- Resolve matters of production tools such as knives, axes, hoes, plowshares, plows, rakes, oxcarts, etc.
- Resolve the matter of managing and organizing labor forces at their own bases or bringing in forces from other bases for growing plants.

In the past, our cadres have not paid enough attention. Resolving the matter of livelihood of cooperative members affects their health and the capacity for tasks such as dike building, canal digging, paddy rice farming, and producing 3 tons of rice per hectare.

2. Always pay attention to educate and conduct political and psychological indoctrination for and organize cooperatives members

Whilst accelerating the production movement, our cadres and combatants must be vigilant over education, politics, consciousness and organization for cooperatives members, particularly as it concerns brothers and sisters of the poor and lower middle-class peasants. This can be done through daily meetings, exchanges of experience, explanations, education and instruction at production sites, within families, in homes, and through other short course trainings. By doing so, the brothers and sisters of poor and lower middle-class peasants are able to improve their stance on politics and consciousness, to better lead, manage and organize all tasks at the cooperatives. Once our poor and lower middle-class peasants are able to maintain their effective leadership role in the cooperatives and become more mastery it will ensure that real elements of the cooperatives are the absolute proletarian organization which is more superior than all other classes.

3. Be vigilant in building and strengthening the core organization and the Party branch in cooperatives

In order to lend cooperatives solid revolutionary elements to sustain the socialist revolution and socialist construction as directed by the Party, it is necessary Original KH: 00442207-00442250

for the Party to control and lead the cooperatives in all fields, with Party members and youth leagues. Thus the Party must have cadres within its ranks and core organization. They must be strong in both quantity and calibre in order to assume leadership role in production. Middle-class, upper-middle-class and upper-class peasants can take leadership role in the cooperatives, and they can change revolutionary elements to serve the interests of their own classes. They can even turn political and economical forces of the cooperatives against the socialist revolution and socialist construction of our Party.

Therefore we must pay attention to strengthen and extend both the core organization and the Party branch within cooperatives in accordance with class line of the Party and to preserve the revolutionary and peasant class elements of our cooperatives.

4. Our cadres and our combatants must work closely with the cooperatives

To promote the role of cooperatives in the socialist revolution and socialist construction, all cadres and combatants must work closely with cooperatives. They need to work closely on leading the cooperatives by tempering and re-educating themselves. They need to engage themselves in physical works in cooperatives to serve the poor and the lower middle-class peasants.

In the past, our peasant cooperatives helped Kampuchean society undergo extreme change. Even so, in some places, our peasant cooperatives still have shortcomings. In future, our peasant cooperatives will increase their real elements as an absolute proletarian tool of the Party which will eliminate other classes and push Kampuchean society to step forward in bounds, advance the socialist revolution and socialist construction. All of our cadres and our combatants must fully grasp the roles of cooperatives in order to constantly enhance these roles to be forever strong in the new phase of our revolution. If the socialist revolution and socialist construction are to be strong, cooperatives must always be strong and stand firm. If the Party does not provide firm leadership, if there are no strong cooperatives, the socialist revolution and socialist construction cannot be achieved.

Launch a categorical attack to farm wet season paddy rice and produce three tons of rice per hectare

In this year of 1976, the Party decided to build new dike systems and canals by 30% and farm paddy rice by a volume of three tons per hectare for 1.5 million hectares of rice fields. The Party is focusing its attention on achieving the goal of producing three tons of rice per hectare.

Three ton yield of rice per hectare is the strategic task and duty

The three-ton yield of rice per hectare is the core task for this year of 1976. This task is strategic because its results shall be used as capital for the future. The situation requires us to accelerate the process of advancing our socialist revolution and socialist construction. By achieving the three-ton yield of rice per hectare for 1.5 million hectares of rice fields this year, we will be making the super great leap forward. Otherwise, our enemies from every direction will step on us. At stake is the vital protection our revolution's achievements.

Instead, if we produce a three-ton yield of rice per hectare for all 1.5 million hectares of rice fields, this will be another great victory. The three-ton yield per hectare for all 1.5 million hectares of rice fields will produce 4.5 million tons. It is very great, it is very large capital for this year and in future, and will be used to raise the standard of living of our people and for building and defending the country. Just one year after the war, if we achieve such large rice yields the people in the world and our ally countries will respect and admire us. We have many friends in the world. We are strong both within and beyond our borders to the extent that no enemy can invade our sovereignty and integrity. This is the political meaning behind the task and duty to produce a three-ton rice yield per hectare as directed by the Party this year.

The people and our cadres all over the country have attained consciousness and are highly committed

When the Party organized this task most of our cadres had trust and faith, had clear consciousness and were highly committed. Other cadres viewed the task as too

13/36

difficult and hesitated.. Difficulties included lack of food for the people, lack of materials, lack of production tools and lack of everything. It was difficult as our people had never undertaken such large scale production—they were used to only small scale production for consumption. They had never considered how to take care of rice paddy by using technology. They never considered pulling weeds out of the rice fields. They never used manure fertilizer and still detest manure such as dung, stool... etc. In sum, they have never witnessed the power of the people's forces, they have never seen the capacity. Amidst such difficulties they did not know how to resolve, making them hesitate and non-absolute.

But what is the fact?

People and our cadres attacked categorically and the attack produced results beyond our assumptions.

We completely resolved the issues of salt and food.

Salt: Throughout the entire dry season, our combatants mounted an attack to resolve one thousand difficulties, ten thousand difficulties to produce salt and to protect salt as to provide salt to the people. It is not surplus, but it is enough to satisfy cooperatives needs to make any kind of fermented fish (Prohok, Pha-ork, Mam).

Clothing: The combatants responsible for growing cotton, responsible for the cloth weaving factory and for collecting spoils of the war also attacked so we had resolved the matter of clothing for our people.

Food: There was a problem of food shortage for the people, beginning now and into the cool season, but the movement of short term rice farming at the start of the year has gained momentum everywhere. We have now transplanted a lot of short term rice and we are continuing transplanting. In term of sizes of rice fields and rice seeds, the movement of short term rice farming in this early year has doubled compared to last year. We have dikes and canals, there is enough water everywhere due to enough rainfall. There are also the corn growing, bean growing, yam growing and cassava growing movements that have undergone accelerated progress. Based on the magnitude of the movement, we are completely satisfied, having resolved food shortages throughout the whole wet season. To resolve this problem is to resolve the

key element in achieving wet season rice farming and achieving the three ton rice yield per hectare. There is enough food so our people can strongly attack wet season rice farming and achieve the results with three-ton rice yield per hectare.

Aside from this, there are two more things that relate to the assigned three-ton rice yield per hectare task. They are dike and canal systems and manure.

The construction of dike and canal systems movement brought to bear the strong force of our cooperatives. Construction began since January.

[photo]

In the last dry season our cooperatives peasants were on a vigorous attack by constructing dams, dikes, and canals in order to achieve the assigned task of increasing rice production by three-ton rice yields per hectare.

In this picture, our cooperatives peasants were transporting soil to build a dam that stretches along the Bati river bank.

As of February or late February, they started constructing dikes and canals. At present, some places have achieved completion rate of 80% to 90% and other places have achieved up to 100%. From now to the end of 1976, despite the movement on short term rice farming and wet season rice farming, we may still have to continue constructing dikes and canals somewhere. We will achieve the assigned plan for constructing new dike and canal systems by 30% in 1976.

The dike and canal construction movements were assessed and great results were attested. When the Party assigned tasks for constructing a new dike system and canals covering 30% of rice-field cultivation, some of our cadres were skeptical, but our people prevailed. We must learn from the experiment of the new dike system and canal construction movements in this dry season in order to abolish such reservations, to accelerate the movements to mount an offensive consisting of short term and wet season rice farming this year, as a way of resolving the peoples' food shortage, elevating of living conditions and achieving the three-ton rice yield per hectare.

Another movement we must master is the manure making movement. This movement is underway in all sectors and zones. All materials have been collected

including: leaf fertilizer, dung fertilizer and stool fertilizer. Old toilets in the villages, in the provincial towns and even in Phnom Penh had been uncovered in order to take raw fertilizer. Bad smells were not carried over long distances. This movement uncovered old toilets, abolished old views of detesting manure and stool, and even changed old traditions of small scale production. In term of quantity, an average of 100,000 tons of fertilizer has been produced in every zone, a total of 500,000 to 600,000 tons of fertilizer has been produced for the whole country. It is a quantity ten to twenty times greater than that used in the previous regime. There is neither need to buy fertilizer from overseas nor to pay for transport costs.

Aside from this, pest control to protect paddy rice, such as pesticide for rats and worms etc. have been manufactured in moderate quantity. In particular, we have researched and exchanged experiences and we have mounted experiments of destroying rats and destroying worms more effectively than before.

The seed selection movement including screening, storing and changing of seeds from one place to another is also more robust. These seeds are for short term rice growing, floating rice growing, or good wet season rice growing which produces high yields and tasty cooked rice. Some cooperatives have produced rice but even those that lacked white rice did not dare use new rice in their efforts to economize by cooking old milled rice mixed with banana, potato and corn. They understood that new rice is pure seed that produces high yields to be kept for the future. The rice seeds were not kept for their own cooperatives but shared with other cooperatives in other places, other zones, and other sectors either in exchange for old rice or for nothing. Therefore, this year we have screened for purer and better seeds than last year. In terms of quantity, we have enough seeds in some places, and in others, double or triple the reserves.

The agricultural tool producing movement to create tools such as waterwheels, plowshares, plows, rakes and all kinds of carts is more active as well. We also have produced some water pump machines.

Our cadres, combatants and people throughout the country in all sectors, ministries, and departments have understood the three-ton rice yield per hectare task, as assigned by the Party. In order to achieve this assigned task we had prepared to

mount an absolute and unconditional attack. We have begun preparation early during this wet season by ensuring functioning and supply of dike systems, canals, water, fertilizer, pesticide, pest control, rice seed selection and production tools. This movement is the first of its kind in the agricultural history of Cambodia.

How did we achieve such significant results during this dry season?

Drawing from experience is conducive to our future performance. Statements of facts of this experience include:

- 1. The economic line of the Party is always correct. The Party line for new dike and canal systems and the five-method agricultural reform is as follows: irrigation management; agricultural tool production by increasing its quantity and converting traditional to modern means; energy production; fertilizer and pesticide production. The Party line is also to focus on research and experiments to gain and disseminate knowledge garnered from farming techniques and agriculture technology, particularly with regard to plowing, paddy transplanting, purification of reproductive rice etc. and adherence to the Party agricultural strategy to build new dike systems and canals in view of achieving the three-ton yield of rice per hectare. Such evaluations have allowed us to become clearer and more absolute in controlling this Party line and implementing it efficiently.
- 2. Our people, our revolutionary army and our cooperatives are stronger in politics, ideology and organization; these are our strengths. As such, we are able to do whatever we wish. We are accomplishing movements in building dikes, digging canals, producing fertilizer and agricultural tools and purification of reproductive seeds. Movements are underway all over the country. They constitute our large capital and basic working capital. We should exercise review to accumulate more confidence.
- 3. Our people and cadres have conducted experiments and they have learned enough from the experiments to organize forces by managing them for absolute large-scale production. In the beginning, some people were reluctant. However, they gained experience while working and now they are no longer reluctant. The forces are organized thoroughly, similar to that of the army forces in the battlefields. These forces have been organized and managed effectively for attacking on all fronts effectively, consecutively, vigorously and rightly so. During the last dry season they

attacked through the construction of dike systems and canals. In this early wet season, the attack was launched and reserved food was distributed to the people so that they could begin farming short term rice, corn, beans and potatoes. The company command committees and platoon command committees of zones and sectors in the battlefields and in target areas have attacked. If there is any obstacle, they attack by resolving the issue systematically. The frontline battlefields and supporting bases combined their forces and worked together. We must learn from the experience and harness our forces as to increase capacity and advance this experience.

4. The Party has provided strict leadership of the upper levels to lower levels. A movement always consists of people who are right and wrong, but the Party has rallied people from the top down to give direction and carry out experiments constantly. The experiments need to be promoted and disseminated. If there is mistake in experiment the Party must provide direction on time. If the dike is built too high with extremely high quality the Party's direction is to get it done first in large quantity everywhere in order complete the task of setting up irrigation. If there is reluctance and unwillingness, cadres, combatants and the people are to be led and organized by the Party, based on real needs. The Party gives direction immediately by providing shelter for people, producing vegetables and preparing water irrigation. If the frontline battlefields and the supporting bases do not work well together, the Party will reorganize them to work together again, etc. Such strict leading by the Party renders the movements more active, stronger and closer to properly following the Party line. We have carried out experiments, learned from the experience of working closely with the bases so we will continue with such action. There won't be any force that would make us work separately from the bases.

After reviewing results of this dry season we understand the reasons behind this successful experiment, allowing us to follow this Party line, learn from the experiment and push forward. We believe that we must absolutely achieve the three-ton yield of rice per hectare in this wet season.

Leadership is the key component to achieving the three-four ton yield of rice per hectare goal

This wet season of rice farming is also the phase of mounting the three-ton yield of rice per hectare offensive. We have full capacity. We are all completely clear and there is no doubt on this. In certain locations it has even been decided to raise it to four or five tons per hectare. Why? Because this year we are much better than during previous years. Where were we exactly this time last year? We had just liberated the country and we had to deal with several complicated matters, namely food supply, salt, evacuation of people, housing, transportation, etc. At the same time, we lacked everything: hoes, knives, axes, cows, buffaloes and crop seeds. Only as of May did we begin to manage rice farming.

What happened this year? We already ploughed the lower rice fields. In some locations, we even ploughed twice and we sowed rice in most of the fields. We have sowed short term and wet season rice and we have transplanted seedlings in one main location. We are continuing to transplant. To a larger extent, we have managed the water issue since we now have new dikes and canals, water channeling equipment and several water pumps. We have much more fertilizer and rice seeds than last year. We also have some pesticide. We have food reserves this year, so we are more comfortable than last year.

For the above reasons, we have enough to achieve the three-ton yield of rice per hectare. What we have now is far more than what we had in the previous regime.

What do we still need? We need the Party to lead and the command committee to organize it in the clearest manner possible. They need to lead us firmly and close to the base. They need to exercise tight control over us.

- 1. The political-psychological, propaganda and educational affairs shall be extensive, detailed and carried out continuously. Livelihood meetings at branches, core organizations and cooperatives shall be organized continuously. At the same time, short term one-to-two hour indoctrination sessions shall be organized frequently. Break time shall be used for recuperation and re-education. The above is done in order to ignite the heat of the movement to keep it constantly hot;
- 2. The workforce shall be organized, utilized and transferred carefully based on actual needs in order to spearhead targets rightly, strongly and effectively so that there shall be no un-utilized work force which would lead to sickness or waste.

Workforces at each spearhead shall be organized appropriately; namely according to plowing, transplanting, food supply, vegetable growing, fish and meat, dike and canal maintenance, water management, etc.;

3. Cooperative members shall be provided regularly with food supplies in the form of rice, bean, corn, potato, vegetable, fruit, desert, etc. For areas where there is food shortage, they shall tackle the issue by planting more corn, bean, potato and banana trees, etc.;

4. Continuous close monitoring and directing, any issue raised shall be dealt with in a timely manner with the base.

In summary, the movement needs to be directed and pushed forward. Do not be subjective in thinking that we now have enough; thereby no longer requiring us to mount offences. We need to constantly attack. We attack based on the strong stance on collectivism. Where there is sufficient water for plowing, we shall go there and assist them to finish that area first. Seedlings shall be provided to the areas that are lacking. Wherever there is water, we need to plough and sow rice. Do not distinguish one cooperative from another. No matter what, plowing, sowing and transplanting rice shall be done on time and everywhere so that there is no soil left untouched or water left unused. Whenever there is free time and unused workforce, we need to build additional dikes and canals as well as produce more fertilizer. At the same time, we need to be vigilant of natural disasters such as flooding, drought, insects or rats destroying rice crops, etc. We need to be well prepared and master our view, stance, practical measures and organization of work force to counter any eventuality.

Recently, some newly built dikes and canals were broken by cows. There shall be measures to tether the cows properly or to prevent them from stepping over dikes or canals and destroying them.

In addition, a water command committee shall be appointed to all spearheads so that they can control the water and irrigate it properly based on actual needs. Whether there is rain or no rain, no single drop of water shall be wasted. Do not allow the water to overflow and flood the seedlings or rice, or put pressure on dams or dikes and break them.

When we are not subjective and we are constantly on the offensive, careful in terms of view, stance, practical measures, as well as close to leadership and organization, we shall succeed. We shall succeed strategically. Therefore, we shall have capital for this year and for years to come so that we can transform the livelihood of the people quickly, build the country expeditiously and defend the country well. No enemy shall be able to defeat us.

The struggle to eliminate private ownership is the struggle to eliminate elements of the oppressive class

Currently the struggle to eliminate private ownership and carry out the stance of collective ownership is a daily challenge everywhere inside the Party, the army, within the revolutionary ranks, the union and cooperatives. Therefore, we need to fight more so that we can resolve the issue of private ownership.

At first blush, the phrase "to eliminate private ownership" seems ordinary and insignificant. There seems to be no element of surprise, pain or change. Will we be surprised once we clearly find out the true nature of private ownership?

Private ownership exists as a result of a society divided by class. There is an oppressive class and an oppressed class. A society of an oppressive class and an oppressed class is established based on private ownership. The stance of private ownership preserves, strengthens and expands the oppressive class and regime in order to remain sustainable. Alternatively it can be said that the stance of private ownership resuscitates the regime of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes. Therefore, the true nature of private ownership is the real nature of oppressive classes including feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes. Those who still hold the stance of private ownership are those who still possess the means of the oppressive classes of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes despite their entry in the revolution or the Party. The struggle to eliminate the stance of private ownership is the struggle against the nature of the oppressive classes of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes from within ourselves, within the Party, the army, the revolutionary ranks and our national society. That is the nature of the stance of private ownership and the nature of the struggle to eliminate it. It is class struggle at its strongest, deepest and most

intense period during the phase of socialist revolution and socialist construction in Kampuchea, at the moment. The struggle to eliminate private ownership in every shape and form and the class struggle are one and the same; like flesh and blood that cannot be separated.

Let us now examine further the issue of private ownership and class. Before we agree on the examination, what stance shall we take before we proceed?

Fundamentally, we rely on the stance of worker class of the Party for our examination. Unless we can agree on the stance of worker class and use it as our foundation, we cannot proceed. We shall bring before us the real and living documents which arise as a result of phenomenon for our examination.

First, we need to clarify that it is our Party that constantly leads us in conducting attacks to eliminate private ownership and in carrying out the stance of collective ownership of the proletarian class. Currently during this new phase of socialist revolution and socialist construction, the movement of attacks to eliminate private ownership is strong and deep, and changing based on the Party's instructions. Cadres, Party members, revolutionary army, other core organizations of the Party and even the worker union, cooperatives and peasants have progressed satisfactorily. The nature of collectivization of the Party's proletarian class is rooted deeper and deeper inside the Party, the revolutionary army and national society as a whole. We need to regard this as a major victory by our Party in socialist revolution and socialist construction. A society which is unified on the stance of collectivism of the Party's proletarian class is truly the strongest and greatest one. We shall hold on to this belief now and into the future.

[photo]

In pursuit of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in Kampuchea, our Kampuchean revolutionary army plays the most important role in defending and constructing the country.

In this photo, our revolutionary army is raising dikes and digging canals in order to resolve the water issue for rice production so that it can increase rice yields to three tons per hectare during 1976.

However, at the same time we need to acknowledge that there remains cadres and Party members who have not succeeded in their struggle to eliminate private ownership so as to achieve absolute victory in order to catch up with the great movement of attacks, the movement of the Great Leap Forward and the great movement to achieve a three-ton rice yield per hectare. The reason they have not succeeded is that they have not yet suffered from their own stance of private ownership. The reason they have not suffered is that they still possess the profile of the oppressive class of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes. Below are the documents illustrating the real phenomenon:

We provide you an excerpt of a personal description of the revolutionary life view of a comrade relating the struggle to eliminate private ownership: "I have shortcomings in private ownership: When I was a (redacted)... I was highly involved in private ownership. I did not care about the hardship or shortages at other locations or of other people. What I did was make my place more plentiful with tools and utilities. I gathered main tools and equipment for exclusive use of my office. After the battle, there were war spoils and cattle and I did not care distributing them to other cooperatives or bases; they were just piled and kept inside my ministry. When I was reassigned to (redacted)... I instructed my subordinates to gather and keep vehicles, motorbikes, machinery, clothing, medicines, French wine, packaged cakes, expensive food and materials of all kinds, out of personal greed and for exclusive use of my ministry. Whenever someone asked about them, I replied that I kept them for Angkar. There were some important materials which were left unused in my warehouse. I did not distribute them on time to the bases, so that some decayed and were wasted, including corn and bean. I reported to Angkar for those materials which I did not need. For good materials which I needed to use, I did not report to Angkar as I was afraid Angkar would take them away and distribute them to other places. The management of my living quarter and work place was done in the spirit of expanding my personal private ownership and my ministry. In my private home, I collected some important materials and kept them there, including jewelry, clothing, some other nice stuff including imported wine.

I eliminated private ownership at a lower level and did so gradually. Hence, the above materials kept increasing constantly. At the same time, my attention to

inculcate cadres and combatants with the stance of abandoning private ownership was not absolute, clear nor strong enough to become part of the great movement. For any cadre or combatant who struggled strongly to eliminate private ownership, according to the Party's guideline, I employed my technique to stall them by telling them "Be Moderate, Do not Push Too Hard". Due to my strong private ownership stance I could not build upon the Party's stance on collectivism of the proletarian class. Before the liberation, our people in particular, our poor peasants and lower-middle class peasants faced several challenges. They sacrificed their children, spouses and properties for the battlefront. I did not embrace the pain of the masses and personalize that pain. I did not fully strive to serve the livelihood of the base people. I also did not consider promoting work production through the provision of cattle, rice seeds, rice crops, salt or fermented fish, etc.

After the country was liberated, the people had to go through several other challenges as they lacked cattle, food supply and medical treatment. My ministry possessed several cattle; however, I failed to provide them to cooperatives and just left them there unattended and they became emaciated, wasted away or died. I had a huge quantity of medicines and other consumables but I did not care sending them to cooperatives quickly to meet their needs. I did not care for the misery of the people. Comparing my food consumption and utilities to those of the masses, I had far more. My living condition was comparable to that of the feudalists, land owners, capitalists and mandarins. I was absorbed and overjoyed in this abundance while the Party was concerned and strived hard to find strategies to deal with the livelihood of the people. During collectivism, I was not satisfied or clear about living in collectivity. While I was dining in collectivity, my mind was wondering about delicious food and wine which I hid at my place for my personal consumption. My reflex lured me back to thoughts of private living; free in living, free in communication and free in going out drinking. For that reason, whenever an opportunity presented itself I would use it as an excuse to go to my place immediately. My personal place was "Heaven". For me, the collectivity was "Hell".

As my personal private ownership became more pronounced, I did not feel the suffering of the people and did not commit myself to eliminating it. This stance of private ownership was the stance of the reactionary oppressive class which

superimposed my stance of collectivism over the Party's proletarian class. It gradually destroyed me until the day I completely collapsed".

We would like to provide you with another excerpt.

"I possessed strong non-revolutionary sentiments toward private ownership. In my supervision and communication with comrades, I mostly supervised them and related to them personally rather than by indoctrinating them or strengthening their psychological, political and organizational stance to meet the Party's lines. I frequently provided consumables to this comrade or that comrade whom I personally liked. Most of the combatants under my subordination wore a wrist watch, had plentiful medicine, more than sufficient food which they did not care to save and they used vehicles or motorbikes as they wished. For that reason, they were overjoyed and fell into liberalism. When I personally supervised a team, I supervised them by way of personal sentiment, I provided them food and medicine, I was friendly with them and did not want them to go elsewhere. I considered them my personal property and even when they were transferred to other ministries, I still kept contact with them. Some came back to request scarves, clothing or medicine which was not part of the Party's ration, and I still gave these to them. In particular, for women with whom I intended to play around with or have sex with, I would take care of them more than I would of others. They became spoiled with their wrist watch, food consumption, clothing, etc. They were overjoyed, liberal and violated several Angkar's disciplines. For those cadres or combatants whom I disliked, I would scold them, discipline them or transfer them at my own discretion.

In summary, I was deeply involved in ownership authority and wielded power guided by my non-revolutionary sentiment. The reason for its expansion was that I did not strive to eliminate it absolutely; instead I nurtured it, managed it, took care of it and fertilized it until it grew with each passing day and defeated my revolutionary stance. The Party paid great attention by constantly providing me with re-education. Despite the Party's attempt, I did not feel the suffering, and on the contrary, I let myself fall deeper and deeper into this private ownership".

Regarding revolutionary moral misconduct, and after highlighting the wrongdoing committed by the individual the following self-criticism was pronounced:

"The Party paid attention in providing education, to me personally and as a group, on several occasions. I also strived to be clear of personal feelings. However, my corrupted love affair was so deep that not long after my attempt to eliminate it, the same old issue re-emerged. I was prone to crying and nostalgia; therefore, I became attached. I clearly knew that one day my actions would be revealed. However, I was so "overjoyed" and this extreme "joy" placed the interests of the Party, the classes and the people at the lowest level, below my corrupted love affair. I even thought that if the secret broke out, I would be willing to die for it. In summary, I completely surrendered myself to the classes of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and this corrupted love affair. I reviewed this corrupted love affair with the most regret and pain.

I failed to rise to the highest level of interests of the Party, the revolution and the people; instead, I placed these interests at the lowest level, below my corrupted love affair.

As a revolutionary, I became completely paralyzed by this corrupted love affair. I did not fight back. I enjoyed it and became overjoyed with this corrupted love affair as if I were in the classes of feudalists, land owners and capitalists. I let this corrupt love affair defeat my revolutionary stance completely.

- My corrupt act is a grave violation of the morals that revolutionaries and people are disgusted by and seek to cleanse;
- My corrupt act is a violation of the Party's political lines, political principles and instructions;
- The masses placed their trust on the Party; they sent their children to be with the Party and I betrayed them;
- My action led to serious impact on the women's psychological states and their futures. This is comparable to what was done by the classes of feudalists, land owners, capitalists and the vagabonds who destroyed women's future.

In summary, my stance in dealing with the moral issue is the stance of the reactionaries, capitalists and feudalists which created corruption inside the Party, the

revolution and the masses. I am a person who is egocentric, stubborn and who opposes the Party's re-education time after time.

My corrupt act had a serious impact on the Party and the Party's leading organization and I became shamefully isolated from the Party, the revolution, the people and combatants'.

"In regards to family morals my wife had strong feelings for me. However, from the beginning, I used ownership authority to threaten and intimidate her even when I knew I made mistakes. I was stubborn and just wanted to win.

In the past, she knew I committed moral misconduct, and she was struggled to be with me; however I threatened and intimidated her. She did not dare speak to me face to face.

My children were also afraid of me. To conceal this moral issue, I tried to find excuses and lied to my wife so that she did not have to stay with me. That made it easier for me to continue committing my corrupted act.

I used my authority toward my family in the same way feudalists, land owners and capitalists wielded power. I was the person who destroyed the family's revolutionary happiness, betrayed my wife and children and I did not deserve to be a revolutionary".

"My stance of private ownership had dire consequences on the Party and the people:

- It destroyed the Party, affected its leadership and caused the masses to lose their trust and feel uncomfortable toward Party's leadership;
- A systematic traitorous fascist regime emerged from inside the Party causing confusion as a result of my other non-revolutionary activities. That made the masses worry, and afraid to clamp down on unjust acts and against my corrupt act in the Party.

I committed corrupt acts and was a vagabond, similar to how feudalists, land owners and capitalists in the Party caused confusion that had to be absolutely cleansed.

As a revolutionary, a Party member and a cadre, I lost all my influence as a leader. The masses lost their trust, and no longer felt comfortable. On the contrary, they felt the pain and were annoyed by my actions. I became totally isolated from the Party, the masses and combatants.

My stance of private ownership manifested through other political, psychological and organizational acts of misconduct. It was similar to the counter activities of the imperialists, feudalists, capitalists and other oppressive classes who sought to sabotage and destroy the revolution and the Party. It led to serious damage to the Party, Party members, the people and my own family. If I did not feel the pain, did not recognize my own misconduct and did not reform myself quickly and absolutely, the Party would be badly damaged. The people placed their trust in the Party, and in particular, in me. I indeed allowed myself to betray the Party, the proletarian class and all the people. The revolutionary movement and history would extend absolute punishment upon me for the acts I committed which were so similar to what would have done by feudalists, land owners, capitalists and other oppressive classes.

"The reasons for my above misconduct are as follows:

- My stance of private ownership in terms of authority, power, military, non-revolutionary sentiment, material ownership and old customary ownership of the classes of feudalists, land owners and capitalists was too strong. It was like a mountain pressing its weight upon me;
- I did not respect disciplinary organization and the Party's instructions on moral corruption, time and time again. I lived joyously and boisterously, I gave parties freely and consumed abundantly;
- I was extremely selfish, stubborn, jealous, and arrogant on the non-revolutionary matters. I did not feel the pain caused by my greatest shortcomings and I did not commit myself to refashion myself in absolute

terms. Instead, my mentality was that of a vagabond: "I do not care about dying as long as I enjoy it";

- My spirit of responsibility before the Party, the classes and the people was at its lowest, and I committed corruption time and time again;
- I did not obey the Party's organization. I made interventions to other ministries based on my personal hatred or affection or whether I had a personal interest in a particular ministry or base;
- I did not possess revolutionary gentleness. I did not allow myself to study the
 greatest sacrifice made by the Party, the revolutionary army and the masses
 during the revolutionary war, the socialist revolution and the current socialist
 construction;
- I did not learn from my mistakes. When the Party criticized me, I categorically protested, I did not acknowledge my mistakes, and when I was cornered and could no longer maneuver, I confessed to the Party. This is why my revolutionary stance was completely toppled, shamefully defeated by the imperialists, feudalists and capitalists.

Are there similarities between the description contained in the excerpts, and the elimination of private ownership and building of collectivism, the true nature of feudalists, land owners and capitalists? There is no distinction; they are exactly the same thing. The only difference lies in the appearance as a revolutionary or Party member. The stance is the same to that of the feudalists, land owners and capitalists. For that reason, do not consider lightly the phrase "**private ownership**". All forms of private ownership bear similarity to the traits of feudalism, land ownership and capitalism. It runs roughshod over collectivism, the proletarian class, the Party and it serves the current and long term interests of feudalists, land owners and capitalists. It continually lends its support to the counter-revolutionary activities of the feudalists, land owners and capitalists. Once an opportunity arises, private ownership will undoubtedly garner the support of feudalists, land owners and capitalists to attack the revolution and the Party.

The Party's stance in the past, at present and in future is to eliminate absolutely all forms of private ownership, eradicating it from the Party, revolutionary ranks and from national society. The elimination is to be done without compromise.

The measure to refashion oneself, and the most effective measure to eliminate all forms of private ownership is to partake in labour in the cooperatives; by building dikes, digging canals in order to achieve the three-ton rice yield per hectare goal. In this movement of peasant cooperatives, one shall stand and self-criticize before an audience of poor and lower-middle class peasants.

[photo]

In preparation for the offence to achieve the three-ton per hectare rice yield, during this year of 1976, our peasants on the cooperatives are preparing all kinds of equipment for rice farming.

This photo shows our peasants in the cooperative of Punhea Leu [IIII] making several plough heads in preparation for the offence to plough at the early stage of the upcoming wet season.

Experiences in the implementation of the Party's line on resolving the people's livelihood and achieving the three-ton per hectare rice yield during wet season

In the offence to resolve the people's livelihood by way of raising dikes, digging canals, achieving the three-ton per hectare rice yield during short term and wet season rice farming, our cadres and combatants throughout the country have engaged people everywhere. As a result, we have achieved a tremendous outcome. We have constructed many good dikes to meet the Party's quota. Strategically, we have managed to build canals and irrigation system in certain areas. The movement to produce fertilizer has also been strong everywhere. The movement to carry out early short term rice farming has also been strong, in conjunction with the preparation for wet season rice farming. Generally speaking, movements have all been strong adhering to activity line.

However, at the same time in certain places, our comrades have not fully understood the Party's activity line clearly in order to resolve the people's livelihood

and reach the three-ton per hectare rice yield goal. Their movement was rather strong; however the implementation of the activity line was not yet properly executed. As a result, at those locations, food supply during the transition to wet season was not sufficiently met. The ability to produce three tons of rice per hectare was uncertain.

We would like to highlight some shortcomings on the implementation of the Party's activity line to resolve the people's livelihood and reach the three-ton per hectare rice yield goal during wet season. The intention here is to show comrades the proper path of the movement.

First shortcoming: Focus only on long term rice farming without considering early short term rice farming or growing other vegetables to ensure people's livelihood during seasonal transition

The Party issued a direction that in order to produce three tons of rice per hectare, there must be sufficient food supply for the people during the wet season. In order to have sufficient food supply for the people during the wet season, early short term rice shall be planted. At the same time, other vegetables including corn, beans, potatoes and yam shall be grown to supplement the food supply.

For strategic farming and achievement to reach the three-ton per hectare rice yield goal, we need a proper approach or implementation line. In some areas, people grasped the Party's implementation line and maximized the use of soil and water to achieve its maximum yield. In a number of locations, each district cultivated either nearly one thousand hectares or more. As a supplement, they grew other vegetables including corn, bean and potatoes, etc. They also planted gourds, pumpkins and cucumbers. They did it individually. They did it collectively. They utilized the work force from the rear. They planted bunches all over around the house. A new and interesting movement emerged from this activity, and it helped ensure the people's livelihood during this transition to wet season. People were happy, joyful and brightened and they had hope. The activities of plowing and sowing in preparation for the three-ton yield of rice per hectare during wet season rice farming was progressing steadily.

However, in some other areas, implementation of the Party's activity line was neither efficient nor effective.

For example, in one location the land was very fertile. If it were properly managed we could have carried out one harvest during short term rice-farming season, and another during the wet season. If we were to farm twice a year we would at least produce five to six tons of rice per hectare. However, the land was left unused. Short term rice was not produced as they thought the yield was insignificant. They waited for long term rice farming. Thus, they only went on an attack strategically, but not tactically. They squandered the opportunity to carry out early short term rice farming to produce enough rice during the wet season transition. Therefore, they had no means of resolving food supplies for the people during seasonal transition. Furthermore, it affected the requirement to produce three tons of rice per hectare.

This resulted from the fact that our cadres did not completely assimilate our Party's activity line. The implementation of the activity line was not effective. They did not take the opportunity to do something to supplement their supplies.

In another area, there was about a thousand hectare plot of land. The land was fertile. It was situated near the river bank and there were sufficient tools. If they used the tools to make an inlet canal along the river bank to get water, coupled with rain water, they could produce early short term rice. When the water receded, they were also able to farm rice in shallow water. To duplicate this action, they could also produce five to six tons of rice per hectare. However, they did not use the land or the tools properly. Now they are making sow rice. Sow rice requires long term farming and they could only do it one time with no guarantee of yield. On average the yield is 70 to 80 bushels per hectare. The yield of both short term and early rice in this area alone is 100,000 tons. The figure for sow rice would be only around three thousand tons. The difference here is threefold. If sow rice is produced this way, there would not be any other means to ensure the people's livelihood during their transition to wet season, as sow rice can only be harvested every six months.

Based on people's experience, when rice transplantation is possible, they would do it that way. They would not make sow rice farming. Thus, if our cadres were to ask the opinions of the people living in cooperatives, they would not be wrong. Therefore in order to implement the Party's activity line properly, they shall grasp the masses' line, based on the opinions of the people from the cooperatives.

Another location was an island. In the past, people farmed good corn on this land every year. They could always harvest corn before the water rose. However, currently there is nothing planted, only a few bunches here or there. So the Party's activity line was not actively implemented. They did not take the opportunity to attack everywhere. They just wasted this piece of fertile land. They do not have any solution to supplement the food supply for the people during this wet season transition. This, therefore, has an impact on the strategy to produce three tons of rice per hectare.

Second shortcoming: The work force was spread too thin and scattered, and not assigned to fertile land

In another location, the land was also fertile. They did not finish working on this fertile land, instead they gathered the work force to clear forests and hills. They cleared an extensive section of land. They built checkered dikes. However, this month is still completely dry. The land is spread over hills. They did not target it correctly and they wasted a huge amount of labour. If they wanted to produce three tons of rice per hectare, they would have had to use thirty tons of fertilizer per hectare. The yield would not be guaranteed though. Food supply for the transition to wet season was not ensured. If our cadres were to ask the opinions of the cooperatives regarding this area, they would know that the masses would not work on this land because it would be a waste. If the workforce were utilized elsewhere, the yield would be much better. Hence, failure to grasp the masses' line, the masses' view in order to implement the Party's activity line led to ultimate ineffectiveness.

In another location, they gathered the workforce to unnecessarily dig up stumps of palm trees, Jambolan Plum [រុំពីង], Raing [រាំង] and tamarind [អំពីល] trees.

Each palm tree stump required several persons to dig up, and it took several hours. They used hundreds labourers to dig up palm tree stumps. They wasted a large amount of the workforce. It affected the three-ton yield of rice per hectare goal. It also affected the tactic to make short term rice and grow vegetables in other places in order to resolve people's livelihood during their wet season transition. This is because they did not assimilate the Party's activity line and did not grasp the masses' line nor their opinions.

Third shortcoming: Tendency toward excessive ambition, working on more land with insufficient tools, inability to work properly or attack strongly

The Party's principle is: "Do not cover more land or spread out the workforce". The workforce needs to be regrouped and targeted in a location which is rich and where we can master the land, water, fertilizer, seeds, workforce and housing, etc.

However, the tendency to work on larger land without evaluating available tools or work force is one which needs to be re-directed. Working this way means spreading the work force without particular concentration, hindering the ability to attack strongly. We shall gather the work force to work on one location properly and we shall attain better yields as opposed to when the work force is spread out.

For example: In one area, there is piece of 150,000 hectare farmland. They want to work on the entire land area but they do not have the work force to do so. They hesitate. This hesitation is not conducive to a strong attack, thus it cannot produce any results.

The Party's instruction is to focus hard on the 50,000 or 100,000 hectare farm land. The focus is on the area where we already have dikes and canals, and where we have mastered irrigation. At the same time, we screen rice seeds, use proper fertilizer, plow the field properly, pull the grass and irrigate the field carefully and regularly. In addition, working this way means we do not spread out the work force and people do not need to walk far too work or be further mobilized. Thus, we master housing, health of the people, the food supply and maintenance of the work force so that we can go on strong attack. We need to achieve a yield of four tons per hectare. If we can achieve four tons per hectare, it means we shall obtain a 400,000 ton rice yield. We can sufficiently put aside 100,000 tons for the 300,000 people. We leave another 100,000 tons aside for rice seeds, and as capital. This therefore means we can provide the Party with more than 100,000 or 200,000 tons for country construction.

Therefore, this is abundant.

Another area covers 120,000 hectares of farm land. A proportion of 42 to 43 per cent of dikes has been completed. There are some main canals providing irrigation

to 40,000 hectare farm land. The Party's instruction is to conduct a strong attack on that 40,000 hectare farm land during this wet season and the next dry season. During this wet season, we shall strive to achieve four to five tons. Another rice transplant shall be done in November in order to harvest another three tons. Therefore, at the very least, we shall achieve six tons per hectare. For the 40,000 hectare farmland, the rice yield shall be 240,000 tons. We have 420,000 people. We can set aside 100,000 tons for their consumption, which is sufficient. We can set aside around 100,000 tons for rice seeds, and as capital for the area's use and we can have 40,000 tons to deliver to the Party for country construction. Here, we do not even take into account our capability to work on the additional 50,000 hectare farm land.

We have highlighted some experiences in order to improve our activity line so that it becomes better and more effective in ensuring the people's livelihood and in producing three tons of rice per hectare.

We can summarize the above experiences as follows:

- 1. In order to achieve the three tons per hectare strategy, we need to have a proper tactic. In particular, we need to consider resolving the food supply issue for the people during the transition to the wet season. This is the core issue. This is the key. Therefore we need to combine the rear and the front battlefields so that we can go on a smaller or larger attack, to conduct a large-scale attack or even an ambush so that attacks can be launched everywhere. Eventually, we need to know how to use the land, water and work force to its maximum so that we can make early short term rice, plant corn, beans, pumpkins, gourds or cucumber... We must plant it collectively and organize the work force at the rear. We can plant it individually for a bunch or two around the house, the office, the work site, on the dike or along the canal, we can plant it everywhere according to the proverb: "Young or old, male or female, we plant, plant and plant until every parcel of land is covered";
- 2. Do not spread the workforce at the front battlefield. It must be gathered as to focus a farming campaign on fertile land;
- 3. Do not be too ambitious and seek to work on more land than the workforce can handle, otherwise the work is not detailed, and the offensive is not strong. Focus

more on areas with good resources in land, water, fertilizer and dikes. Go on a strong offensive of that area.

In summary, the Party already has proper line, a strong movement has produced results by leaps and bounds. The important thing that needs to be done is to re-direct our activity line so that it is fitting for effective implementation of the Party's line.

Therefore, each location needs to draw experience from real practice in order to re-direct the activity line and make it even more effective. To have a proper activity line, it is important to rely on the cooperatives and their opinions. When we are able to re-direct our activity line properly everywhere, achievement of the three to four ton rice yield per hectare will be in clear view during this year of 1976, since we have all the necessary resources. For this reason, we need to pay more attention to the Party's activity line.

[photo]

By committing themselves to the cooperatives movement, carrying out the offensive to reach the three-ton rice yield per hectare, the revolutionary youth medics in Prey Kabas [fithis] district in Takeo [fithis] province are producing medicine for treatment of the people in cooperatives. They adhere steadfastly to the stance of mastery and independence.