Craig ETCHESON
Pseudonym: KW-02
Cases: Case 001
Category: Expert
Background and Role
Craig Etcheson was an investigator with the Office of the Co-Prosecutors at the ECCC at the time of the trial.
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He holds senior academic and research positions at a number of universities in the United States of America, has extensive research experience relating to Southeast Asia and genocide studies, and has published his work relating to the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia.
2
He testified as an expert in Case 001 on the structure of the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s (“CPK”) and implementation of party policy.
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Party Structure and Policies of the CPK
Democratic Kampuchea was organised with absolute hierarchical authority and that the Party Centre (the Committees) exercised centralised control over communication.
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The CPK’s ideology was based upon principles of “centralism” and “collectivism.”
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The CPK Statute served as a primary source of CPK policy that not only applied to its members, but also to the entire Cambodian population.
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Another piece of legislation, the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, provided for a Kampuchean People’s Representative Assembly (“KPRA”), which was to be elected by secret ballot in direct general elections.
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According to Etcheson, although plans for elections of members were discussed, the 250 KPRA members were in fact appointed by the upper echelon.
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The KPRA did not meet regularly, pass any laws, or appear to have any duties or enforcement mechanisms.
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It simply served as a propaganda facade in an effort to burnish the reputation of Democratic Kampuchea among other nations of the world.
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The territory of Cambodia was divided into Zones, which were subdivided into Sectors, Districts, and Communes.
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Districts maintained the “Security offices” and decided which “enemies” would be “disposed of” locally and which sent to higher authorities, playing a key role in the regime.
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In addition to the six original Zones, there were a number of autonomous sectors and special municipal regions under military authority.
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Central Committee
The Central Committee was the CPK’s “most powerful organ”.
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The CPK directed the Central Committee to implement the Party’s “lines” (or policies) throughout the country, instruct the Zone, Sector, and Military Organisations and Party organs responsible for various nationwide departments, including administering and deploying cadre and party members.
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The CPK also kept a record of each cadre’s biography and constantly educated them in relation to politics, ideology, and the organisation.
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According to Etcheson, there was no traditional bureaucratic structure operating in the various Ministries, which were simply areas of responsibility assigned to a Party member.
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He also explained that contrary to the CPK Statute, the party did not meet as often as six months, especially during periods of war.
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Standing Committee
The Central Committee delegated its powers to its executive body, the Standing Committee, which was known as the “Centre,” the “Organization,” or “Angkar.”
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The Standing Committee exercised “total control of the government”.
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The Standing Committee (Office 870) was the point of contact between each section that was also tasked with monitoring and implementing of the Party’s policies nationwide.
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Under Office 870 or under its control was an organisation known as S-71, which was organised into a series of units code-named with K designations.
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Etcheson summarised functions of five of the 20 K offices as follows: (i) K-1 was the organisation’s office and residence and office of Pol Pot; (ii) K-3 housed Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, hosted Standing Committee meetings, and accommodated other Standing Committee members when they were in town; (iii) K-4 was the logistic office for organising the movement of the Standing Committee, its supply, and transport; (iv) K-5 was the political school where the upper echelons trained cadres; and (v) K-7 was the messengers’ unit for the Party Centre.
23
Smashing Enemies
The Decision of the Central Committee Regarding a Number of Matters dated 30 March 1976 listed the CPK entities entitled to “smash” or kill enemies.
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According to Etcheson, it was likely drafted by the Standing Committee even though it apparently emanated from the Central Committee.
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Pol Pot spoke at a conference in 1976 concerning the need to deal with enemies in the cooperatives through “continuous absolute measures to smash them”.
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According to Etcheson, smashing did not merely mean “physical smashing but also a “psychological smashing” involving the “dehumanization and debasement of the individual psyche”.
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S-21 Security Centre
S-21 was the penultimate node in the power pyramid of Democratic Kampuchea:
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unlike S-24 Security Center, detainees at S-21 had no possibility of release.
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Etcheson argued that S-21 was a unique security centre that could not be compared to other special security centres for several reasons.
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S-21 had the authority to arrest individuals from the entire territory.
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It was designed to smash the highest-ranking individuals and had the authority to interrogate members of the Central Committee and Standing Committee.
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S-21 also had the greatest number of staff members.
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Confessions and interrogation procedures adopted were far more elaborate, detailed, and rigorous than other security centres.
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For instance, many of the personnel being interrogated were veteran revolutionaries from high-ranking units and thus had many more topics which they could discuss in a confession.
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Lastly, its Chairman directly reported to the upper echelon on a daily and often personal basis.
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S-21 confessions were used to decide upon the arrest of those denounced as enemy agents and often led to the arrest of many others implicated as traitors.
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The confessions thus served the political interest of those in control of the CPK by justifying arrests and implicating the networks of those sent to S-21.
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Duch
Etcheson described Duch as an innovator, a creator, a developer, and an institutionaliser of the methods of making very detailed confessions that were extracted over long periods of time.
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According to Etcheson, purges were both driven by the paranoia of the CPK Standing Committee and the zeal of Duch.
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Duch was the principal trainer of torture techniques.
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Torture was widely practised at other security offices, but most places appeared to use a much smaller range of techniques compared to S-21.
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At security offices situated in lower echelons, torture techniques were generally restricted to beatings, whippings, suffocation with plastic bags, and electrocution.
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By contrast, S-21 used additional torture techniques such as burning, piercing of finger and toe nails, ripping out finger and toe nails, flaying skin and pouring salt or salty water on wounds, tormenting with poisonous insects, various kinds of water tortures, tying victims’ hands behind their backs and lifting them by their hands to dislocate shoulders, among others things.
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The Trial Chamber’s Findings
The Trial Chamber relied on Etcheson’s testimony to make several findings in the Case 001 Judgment concerning: (i) the CPK’s party structure;
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(ii) the implementation of the CPK policies concerning the killing of enemies;
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(iii) the function and operation of S-21;
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and (iv) Duch’s character.
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Videos
| Date | Written record of proceedings | Transcript number |
|---|---|---|
| 18 May 2009 | E1/20 | E1/20.1 |
| 19 May 2009 | E1/21 | E1/21.1 |
| 20 May 2009 | E1/22 | E1/22.1 |
| 21 May 2009 | E1/23 | E1/23.1 |
| 26 May 2009 | E1/25 | E1/25.1 |
| 27 May 2009 | E1/26 | E1/26.1 |
| 28 May 2009 | E1/27 | E1/27.1 |
| Document title Khmer | Document title English | Document title French | Document D number | Document E3 number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| កំណត់ហេតុនៃការវិភាគដោយលោក Craig Etcheson អ្នកស៊ើបអង្កេតនៃការិយាល័យសហព្រះរាជអាជ្ញា | Written Record of Analysis by Craig C. Etcheson, Investigator of the Office of Co-Prosecutors | Procès-verbal de l’analyse de Craig C. Etcheson, enquêteur du Bureau des coprocureurs | D2-15 | E3/32 |
| រចនាសម្ព័ន្ធនៃកម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ (ធ្វើដោយលោក Craig Etcheson) | The Organization of Democratic Kampuchea (Chart by Craig Etcheson) | L’organisation du Kampuchéa démocratique (Organigramme de Craig Etcheson) | None | E66 |
| សៀវភៅសរសេរដោយលោក Craig Etcheson ដែលមានចំណងជើងថា “ការចាប់ផ្តើម និង ការបញ្ចប់នៃកម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ” | Book by Craig ETCHESON entitled “The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea” | Ouvrage de Craig ETCHESON intitulé « The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea » | IS 4.15 | E3/33 |